Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?

This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility forbanking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated bythe Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macroand microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems areclassified according to the regulatory regime in place. We find that theinflation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries wherethe Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides,although banks seem to be more profitable when Central banks supervise them,they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to moresophisticated liabilities as a funding source.The data are not definitively in favor of functional separation. However, we argue that the evolution of financial intermediaries, moral hazard problems and especially cost accountability seem to suggest that separation would be a better solution for industrialized countries.We also critically discuss the current arrangement of financial regulationand supervision in the EMU: our proposal is to establish an independentEuropean System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) structured similarly to theESCB.

An overall perspective on banking regulation

We survey the theory of banking regulation from the general perspectiveof regulatory theory. Starting by considering the different justificationsof financial intermediation, we proceed to identify the market failuresthat make banking regulation necessary. We then succinctly compare how theanalysis of regulation compares in the domains of banking and industrialorganization. Finally we analyse why a safety net for banks could be partof banking regulation and how it can be structured in an efficient way.

Corporate governance in banking: the role of board of directors

We test hypotheses on the dual role of boards of directors for a sample of large international commercial banks. We find an inverted U shaped relation between bank performance and board size that justifies a large board and imposes an efficient limit to the board’s size; a positive relation between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance; and a proactive role in board meetings. Our results show that bank boards’ composition and functioning are related to directors’ incentives to monitor and advise management. All these relations hold after we control for bank business, institutional differences, size, market power in the banking industry, bank ownership and investors’ legal protection.

The choice of banking firm: Are the interest rate a significant criteria?

The objective of the research is to know the factors that in Spain determine the choice of banking organization. The obtained results indicate that the dimension of the network of branches is the reason more valued. In spite of the increasing symmetry of the Spanish banking market, the preferences of the clients of the savings banks and those of the banks are not absolutely coincident, being the proximity - the main reason for election- much more valued by the former than by the latter. The existence of divergences in the preferences has also been detected according to the region and the typology of city of residence.

Does it pay to be socially responsible? Evidence from spanish retail banking sector

This paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of strategic competition in retail banking when some of the financial firms are non-profit organisations that invest in social activities. Banking literature about competition is fairly large, but the strategic interaction between profit maximizing and non profit maximizers has not been extensively analysed except for Purroy and Salas (1999). In this paper, a completely different approach is taken. An adaptation of Hotelling’s two stage model of spatial competition is developed to take into account consumer perceptions respect to the two different types of financial institutions. The empirical analysis confirms that consumers take into account other features different from the price, such as social contribution or closer service to make a deposit or mortgage decision. These conclusions are of interest in the debate about a firm’s social or ethical activities. It is shown that if consumers value social activities, firms can improv

Abstracting qualitative information for process supervision

Supervisory systems evolution makes the obtaining of significant information from processes more important in the way that the supervision systems' particular tasks are simplified. So, having signal treatment tools capable of obtaining elaborate information from the process data is important. In this paper, a tool that obtains qualitative data about the trends and oscillation of signals is presented. An application of this tool is presented as well. In this case, the tool, implemented in a computer-aided control systems design (CACSD) environment, is used in order to give to an expert system for fault detection in a laboratory plant

I-SS: integrated supervision systems approach based on interactive components

Process supervision is the activity focused on monitoring the process operation in order to deduce conditions to maintain the normality including when faults are present Depending on the number/distribution/heterogeneity of variables, behaviour situations, sub-processes, etc. from processes, human operators and engineers do not easily manipulate the information. This leads to the necessity of automation of supervision activities. Nevertheless, the difficulty to deal with the information complicates the design and development of software applications. We present an approach called "integrated supervision systems". It proposes multiple supervisors coordination to supervise multiple sub-processes whose interactions permit one to supervise the global process

Interacting software-agents to support a kind of expert supervision systems

Expert supervision systems are software applications specially designed to automate process monitoring. The goal is to reduce the dependency on human operators to assure the correct operation of a process including faulty situations. Construction of this kind of application involves an important task of design and development in order to represent and to manipulate process data and behaviour at different degrees of abstraction for interfacing with data acquisition systems connected to the process. This is an open problem that becomes more complex with the number of variables, parameters and relations to account for the complexity of the process. Multiple specialised modules tuned to solve simpler tasks that operate under a co-ordination provide a solution. A modular architecture based on concepts of software agents, taking advantage of the integration of diverse knowledge-based techniques, is proposed for this purpose. The components (software agents, communication mechanisms and perception/action mechanisms) are based on ICa (Intelligent Control architecture), software middleware supporting the build-up of applications with software agent features

Expert supervision based on cases

The paper focuses on taking advantage of large amounts of data that are systematically stored in plants (by means of SCADA systems), but not exploited enough in order to achieve supervisory goals (fault detection, diagnosis and reconfiguration). The methodology of case base reasoning (CBR) is proposed to perform supervisory tasks in industrial processes by re-using the stored data. The goal is to take advantage of experiences, registered in a suitable structure as cam, avoiding the tedious task of knowledge acquisition and representation needed by other reasoning techniques as expert systems. An outlook of CBR terminology and basic concepts are presented. The adaptation of CBR in performing expert supervisory tasks, taking into account the particularities and difficulties derived from dynamic systems, is discussed. A special interest is focused in proposing a general case definition suitable for supervisory tasks. Finally, this structure and the whole methodology is tested in a application example for monitoring a real drier chamber

Embedding objects into Matlab/Simulink for process supervision

This paper introduces how artificial intelligence technologies can be integrated into a known computer aided control system design (CACSD) framework, Matlab/Simulink, using an object oriented approach. The aim is to build a framework to aid supervisory systems analysis, design and implementation. The idea is to take advantage of an existing CACSD framework, Matlab/Simulink, so that engineers can proceed: first to design a control system, and then to design a straightforward supervisory system of the control system in the same framework. Thus, expert systems and qualitative reasoning tools are incorporated into this popular CACSD framework to develop a computer aided supervisory system design (CASSD) framework. Object-variables an introduced into Matlab/Simulink for sharing information between tools

Book vs. Fair Value Accounting in Banking, and Intertemporal Smoothing

The aim of this paper is to examine the pros and cons of book and fair value accounting from the perspective of the theory of banking. We consider the implications of the two accounting methods in an overlapping generations environment. As observed by Allen and Gale(1997), in an overlapping generation model, banks have a role as intergenerational connectors as they allow for intertemporal smoothing. Our main result is that when dividends depend on profits, book value ex ante dominates fair value, as it provides better intertemporal smoothing. This is in contrast with the standard view that states that, fair value yields a better allocation as it reflects the real opportunity cost of assets. Banking regulation play an important role by providing the right incentives for banks to smooth intertemporal consumption whereas market discipline improves intratemporal efficiency.

A model of shadow banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble these loans into diversified portfolios, and then finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: i) outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, ii) intermediary assets and leverage move together as in Adrian and Shin (2010), and iii) intermediaries increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce their idiosyncratic risk through diversification, as in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010). Under rational expectations, the shadow banking system is stable and improves welfare. When investors and intermediaries neglect tail risks, however, the expansion of risky lending and the concentration of risks in the intermediaries create financial fragility and fluctuations in liquidity over time.

Book vs. fair value accounting in banking and intertemporal smoothing

The aim of this paper is to examine the pros and cons of book and fair value accounting from the perspective of the theory of banking. We consider the implications of the two accounting methods in an overlapping generations environment. As observed by Allen and Gale(1997), in an overlapping generation model, banks have a role as intergenerational connectors as they allow for intertemporal smoothing. Our main result is that when dividends depend on profits, book value ex ante dominates fair value, as it provides better intertemporal smoothing. This is in contrast with the standard view that states that, fair value yields a better allocation as it reflects the real opportunity cost of assets. Banking regulation play an important role by providing the right incentives for banks to smooth intertemporal consumption whereas market discipline improves intratemporal efficiency.

Optimal regulation of a fully insured deposit banking system

We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurancein the presence of private information when the market value of depositinsurance can be determined using Merton's (1997) formula. We show that,under the assumption that transferring funds from taxpayers to financialinstitutions has a social cost, the optimal regulation combines differentlevels of capital requirements combined with decreasing premia on depositinsurance. On the other hand, it is never efficient to require the banksto hold riskless assets, so that narrow banking is not efficient. Finally,chartering banks is necessary in order to decrease the cost of asymmetricinformation.

Designing institutions for financial stability: Regulation and supervision by objective for the Euro area

In this paper, we discuss pros and cons ofdifferent models for financial market regulationand supervision and we present a proposal forthe re-organisation of regulatory and supervisoryagencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments areconsistent with both new theories and effectivebehaviour of financial intermediaries inindustrialized countries. Our proposed architecturefor financial market regulation is based on theassignment of different objectives or "finalities"to different authorities, both at the domesticand the European level. According to thisperspective, the three objectives of supervision- microeconomic stability, investor protectionand proper behaviour, efficiency and competition- should be assigned to three distinct Europeanauthorities, each one at the centre of a Europeansystem of financial regulators and supervisorsspecialized in overseeing the entire financialmarket with respect to a single regulatoryobjective and regardless of the subjective natureof the intermediaries. Each system should bestructured and organized similarly to the EuropeanSystem of Central Banks and work in connectionwith the central bank which would remain theinstitution responsible for price and macroeconomicstability. We suggest a plausible path to buildour 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.