Average ground-state energy of finite Fermi systems

Semiclassical theories such as the Thomas-Fermi and Wigner-Kirkwood methods give a good description of the smooth average part of the total energy of a Fermi gas in some external potential when the chemical potential is varied. However, in systems with a fixed number of particles N, these methods overbind the actual average of the quantum energy as N is varied. We describe a theory that accounts for this effect. Numerical illustrations are discussed for fermions trapped in a harmonic oscillator potential and in a hard-wall cavity, and for self-consistent calculations of atomic nuclei. In the latter case, the influence of deformations on the average behavior of the energy is also considered.

Frames and games

Decision-makers are sometimes influenced by the way in which choice situations are presented to them or "framed" This can be seen as an important challenge to the social sciences, since strong and pervasive framing effects would make it difficult to study human behavior in a synthetic or theoretic manner. We present results from experiments with dilemma games designed to shed light on the effects of several frame variations. We study, among others, the particular public bad frame used by Andreoni (1995) and two more naturalistic frames involving stories. Our results show that none of the frame manipulations have a significant effect on average behavior, but we do find some effects on extreme behavior. We also find that incentives do matter where frames do not matter.

Intermediate asymptotics beyond homogeneity and self-similarity: long time behavior for [formula]

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Consumers' behavior and the Bertrand paradox: an ACE approach

We analyze the classical Bertrand model when consumers exhibit some strategic behavior in deciding from which seller they will buy. We use two related but different tools. Both consider a probabilistic learning (or evolutionary) mechanism, and in the two of them consumers' behavior in uences the competition between the sellers. The results obtained show that, in general, developing some sort of loyalty is a good strategy for the buyers as it works in their best interest. First, we consider a learning procedure described by a deterministic dynamic system and, using strong simplifying assumptions, we can produce a description of the process behavior. Second, we use nite automata to represent the strategies played by the agents and an adaptive process based on genetic algorithms to simulate the stochastic process of learning. By doing so we can relax some of the strong assumptions used in the rst approach and still obtain the same basic results. It is suggested that the limitations of the rst approach (analytical) provide a good motivation for the second approach (Agent-Based). Indeed, although both approaches address the same problem, the use of Agent-Based computational techniques allows us to relax hypothesis and overcome the limitations of the analytical approach.

Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance

We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.

The behavior of money velocity in low and high inflation countries

This paper presents a general equilibrium model of money demand where the velocity of money changes in response to endogenous fluctuations in the interest rate. The parameter space can be divided into two subsets: one where velocity is constant as in standard cash-in-advance models, and another one where velocity fluctuates as in Baumol (1952). The model provides an explanation of why, for a sample of 79 countries, the correlation between the velocity of money and the inflation rate appears to be low, unlike common wisdom would suggest. The reason is the diverse transaction technologies available in different economies.

Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions

We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders' complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller's revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.

How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.

Redistributive taxation with endogenous sentiments

We present a model in which an individual's sentiments towards others are determined endogenously on the basis of how they perform relative to the societal average. This, in turn, affects the individual's own behavior and hence other agents' sentiments toward her. We focus on stationary patterns of utility interdependence. To demonstrate the effects of such endogeneity, we consider an example of a production economy with redistributive taxation. There are two types of stationary equilibria: one in which all agents conform to the societal norm, into two or three groups. The main conclusion is that the tax structure, in that it affects behavior which in turn affects sentiments, plays a crucial role in determining which type of equilibrium occurs and its characteristics as well as the extent of altruism and social cohesion in society.

A proposal for a new specification for a conditionally heteroskedastic variance model: the Quadratic Moving-Average Conditional Heteroskedasticity and an application to the D. Mark-U.S. dollar Exchange Rate

Ever since the appearance of the ARCH model [Engle(1982a)], an impressive array of variance specifications belonging to the same class of models has emerged [i.e. Bollerslev's (1986) GARCH; Nelson's (1990) EGARCH]. This recent domain has achieved very successful developments. Nevertheless, several empirical studies seem to show that the performance of such models is not always appropriate [Boulier(1992)]. In this paper we propose a new specification: the Quadratic Moving Average Conditional heteroskedasticity model. Its statistical properties, such as the kurtosis and the symmetry, as well as two estimators (Method of Moments and Maximum Likelihood) are studied. Two statistical tests are presented, the first one tests for homoskedasticity and the second one, discriminates between ARCH and QMACH specification. A Monte Carlo study is presented in order to illustrate some of the theoretical results. An empirical study is undertaken for the DM-US exchange rate.

Personal relations and their effect on behavior in an organizational setting: an experimental study

We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.

Contractive probability metrics and asymptotic behavior of dissipative kinetic equations

The present notes are intended to present a detailed review of the existing results in dissipative kinetic theory which make use of the contraction properties of two main families of probability metrics: optimal mass transport and Fourier-based metrics. The first part of the notes is devoted to a self-consistent summary and presentation of the properties of both probability metrics, including new aspects on the relationships between them and other metrics of wide use in probability theory. These results are of independent interest with potential use in other contexts in Partial Differential Equations and Probability Theory. The second part of the notes makes a different presentation of the asymptotic behavior of Inelastic Maxwell Models than the one presented in the literature and it shows a new example of application: particle's bath heating. We show how starting from the contraction properties in probability metrics, one can deduce the existence, uniqueness and asymptotic stability in classical spaces. A global strategy with this aim is set up and applied in two dissipative models.

The Spread of free-riding behavior in a social network

We study a model where agents, located in a social network, decide whether to exert effort or not in experimenting with a new technology (or acquiring a new skill, innovating, etc.). We assume that agents have strong incentives to free ride on their neighbors' effort decisions. In the static version of the model efforts are chosen simultaneously. In equilibrium, agents exerting effort are never connected with each other and all other agents are connected with at least one agent exerting effort. We propose a mean-field dynamics in which agents choose in each period the best response to the last period's decisions of their neighbors. We characterize the equilibrium of such a dynamics and show how the pattern of free riders in the network depends on properties of the connectivity distribution.

Of Coalition and Speed: Passage and Duration of Statutes in Uruguay's Parliament, 1985-2000

We report preliminary findings from analysis of a database under construction. The paper explores the legislative process in search for some of the alleged consequences of cabinet coalitions in a presidential system. Coalition effects should be less evident in the success of executive initiatives: strategic behavior hampers this intuitive measure of performance. Better measures, because less subject to strategic considerations, are the odds of passage of legislators' bills and the time proposals take to be approved. Thus measured, coalition effects are discernible. Analysis of the universe of proposals processed in the fragmented Uruguayan Parliament between 1985 and 2000 reveals that coalition, observed about half the period, swells success rates of coalition members by 60% on average (and by as much as 150% for those close to the president). Event history analysis shows that coalitions cut the wait for an executive bill by 3 months, 1/6th the average wait. The reverse effect is felt on the duration of legislators' bills.