Las posiciones de los diferentes grupos políticos israelíes sobre la resolución de la situación de los refugiados

La cuestión de los refugiados palestinos es uno de los asuntos clave para alcanzar una resolución firme del conflicto palestino-israelí. Para ello debe resolverse la situación de los cientos de miles de palestinos que fueron expulsados y/o huyeron con la guerra de 1948, y sus descendientes, que hoy suman casi 5 millones. En el proceso de paz, este es uno de los asuntos que ni siquiera fue tenido en cuenta con la profundidad que lo requiere. Los palestinos se acogen a la resolución 194 de la Asamblea de Naciones Unidas y reivindican el Derecho al Retorno. Pero del lado israelí tres argumentos ponen en duda este derecho al retorno: A) El asunto de la responsabilidad en la huida/expulsión de cientos de miles de palestinos de sus hogares. B) La «necesidad» existencial de ser un estado de mayoría judía, que el retorno podría poner en cuestión. C) El hecho de que Israel ya acogió a cientos de miles de judíos originarios de los países árabes. Analizaremos cómo los partidos políticos israelíes tratan este asunto, y cómo los «nuevos historiadores israelíes» pueden ayudar a cambiar el punto de vista israelí al poner en cuestión la narrativa sionista de la guerra del 48.

A Model of ethnic conflict

We present a model of conflict, in which discriminatory government policy or social intolerance is responsive to various forms of ethnic activism, including violence. It is this perceived responsiveness -captured by the probability that the government gives in and accepts a proponed change in ethnic policy- that induces individuals to mobilize in support for their cause. Yet, mobilization is costly and demonstrators have to be compensated accordingly. Individuals have to weigh their ethnic radicalism with their material well-being to determine the size of their money contribution to the cause. Our main results are: (i) a one-sided increase in radicalism or in population size increases conflict; (ii) a one-sided increase in income has ambiguous effects depending on the elasticity of contributions to income; (iii) an increase in within-group inequality increases conflict; and (iv) an increase in the correlation between ethnic radicalism and inequality also increases conflict.

Polarization, fractionalization and conflict

A recent upsurge of empirical studies on the causes of conflict attempts to connect various features of the distribution of the relevant characteristic (typically ethnicity or religion) to conflict. The distributional indices differ (polarization, fractionalization or Lorenz-domination) and so do the various specifications of "conflict" (onset, incidence or intensity). Overall, the results are far from clear, and combined with the mixture of alternative indices and notions of "conflict" it is not surprising that the reader may come away thoroughly perplexed. The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework that permits us to distinguish between the occurrence of conflict and its severity and that clarifies the role of polarization and fractionalization in each of these cases.

An instrumental analysis of the European Union's capability to act in conflict response

Descripció i anàlisi dels instruments polítics, econòmics, civils i militars de la Unió Europea per enfrontar qualsevol conflicte.

Creating the Gorizia-Goriska euroregion: an European cross-border administrative model for integrated socio-economic development in the upper adriatic. Crossborder co-operation as a tool for trans-national integration and conflict resolution

Contribució al Seminari: "Les Euroregions: Experiències i aprenatges per a l’Euroregió Pirineus-Mediterrània", 15-16 de desembre de 2005

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Linking conflict to inequality and polarization

In this paper we study a behavioral model of conflict that provides a basis for choosing certain indices of dispersion as indicators for conflict. We show that the (equilibrium) level of conflict can be expressed as an (approximate) linear function of the Gini coefficient, the Herfindahl-Hirschman fractionalization index, and a specific measure of polarization due to Esteban and Ray

Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.

Ethnicity and conflict : an empirical study

This paper examines the impact of ethnic divisions on conflict. The analysis relies on a theoretical model of conflict (Esteban and Ray, 2010) in which equilibrium conflict is shown to be accurately described by a linear function of just three distributional indices of ethnic diversity: the Gini coefficient, the Hirschman-Herfindahl fractionalization index, and a measure of polarization. Based on a dataset constructed by James Fearon and data from Ethnologue on ethno-linguistic groups and the "linguistic distances" between them, we compute the three distribution indices. Our results show that ethnic polarization is a highly significant correlate of conflict. Fractionalization is also significant in some of the statistical exercises, but the Gini coefficient never is. In particular, inter-group distances computed from language and embodied in polarization measures turn out to be extremely important correlates of ethnic conflict.

Conflict prevention and decentralized governance: some remarks about the state of the art in theory and practice

Is there a link between decentralized governance and conflict prevention? This article tries to answer the question by presenting the state of the art of the intersection of both concepts. Provided that social conflict is inevitable and given the appearance of new threats and types of violence, as well as new demands for security based on people (human security), our societies should focus on promoting peaceful changes. Through an extensive analysis of the existing literature and the study of several cases, this paper suggests that decentralized governance can contribute to these efforts by transforming conflicts, bringing about power-sharing and inclusion incentives of minority groups. Albeit the complexity of assessing its impact on conflict prevention, it can be contended that decentralized governance might have very positive effects on the reduction of causes that bring about conflicts due to its ability to foster the creation of war/violence preventors. More specifically, this paper argues that decentralization can have a positive impact on the so-called triggers and accelerators (short- and medium-term causes).

Bringing actors and violent conflict into forced migration literature. A model of the decision to return

Populations displaced as a result of mass violent conflict have become one of the most pressing humanitarian concerns of the last decades. They have also become one salient political issue as a perceived burden (in economic and security terms) and as an important piece in the shift towards a more interventionist paradigm in the international system, based on both humanitarian and security grounds. The saliency of these aspects has detracted attention from the analysis of the interactions between relocation processes and violent conflict. Violent conflict studies have also largely ignored those interactions as a result of the consideration of these processes as mere reaction movements determined by structural conditions. This article takes the view that individual’s agency is retained during such processes, and that it is consequential, calling for the need to introduce a micro perspective. Based on this, a model for the individual’s decision of return is presented. The model has the potential to account for the dynamics of return at both the individual and the aggregate level. And it further helps to grasp fundamental interconnections with violent conflict. Some relevant conclusions are derived for the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and about the implications of the politicization of return.

The Barcelona Forum: on decentralized governance and conflict prevention 6-8 july 2009

The Barcelona Forum aimed to generate both a theoretical and practical discussion on decentralized governance and its capacity to promote peace, prevent conflict, advance human security and ensure greater governmental accountability. The Forum intended to review the theoretical strength of decentralization as a political tool and discuss how it can be properly implemented. Eight case studies were selected to be covered during the two days in order to draw conclusions and offer proposals for the future implementation of decentralization. The case of Catalonia and the decentralized experience of Spain was given special attention, as an example of successful decentralization. The other cases presented achievements and challenges and prompted discussions on both the validity and universality of decentralization as a way to promote and preserve peace. Topics such as ethnic and territorial divisions, democratic accountability, financial decentralization and distribution, resource sharing, and external implementation of decentralization through peace processes were discussed.

Conflict, Peace and Security in Africa: an Assessment and New Questions After 50 Years of African Independence

Since the independence processes in the African continent, armed conflicts, peace and security have raised concern and attention both at the domestic level and at the international scale. In recent years, all aspects have undergone significant changes which have given rise to intense debate. The end of some historical conflicts has taken place in a context of slight decrease in the number of armed conflicts and the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction processes. Moreover, African regional organizations have staged an increasingly more active internal shift in matters related to peace and security, encouraged by the idea of promoting “African solutions to African problems”. This new scenario, has been accompanied by new uncertainties at the security level and major challenges at the operational level, especially for the African Union. This article aims to ascertain the state of affairs on all these issues and raise some key questions to consider.

Ethnic and religious polarization and social conflict

In this paper we examine the link between ethnic and religious polarization and conflict using interpersonal distances for ethnic and religious attitudes obtained from the World Values Survey. We use the Duclos et al (2004) polarization index. We measure conflict by means on an index of social unrest, as well as by the standard conflict onset or incidence based on a threshold number of deaths. Our results show that taking distances into account significantly improves the quality of the fit. Our measure of polarization outperforms the measure used by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and the fractionalization index. We also obtain that both ethnic and religious polarization are significant in explaining conflict. The results improve when we use an indicator of social unrest as the dependent variable.

A Comparative analysis of oil production setors in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates

Aquest article s'aplica un enfocament comparatiu de la gestió del sector petrolier en dos països rics en petroli a l'Orient Mitjà: Aràbia Saudita i els Emirats Àrabs Units (EAU). Més explícitament, s'examinen els factors que millor expliquen la variació en les estratègies que han vingut aplicant en el sector des de l'establiment de les seves empreses petrolieres nacionals (NOC). Recorrent a la literatura sobre expropiació / privatització en el camp d'Estudis de l'Energia, en aquest treball es proposa un marc teòric per analitzar la lògica que hi ha al darrera de les diferents formes d'exploració i les estratègies de producció en el sector petrolier. Teòricament, aquesta investigació té com a objectiu avançar en un conjunt d'eines d'anàlisi per abordar millor i entendre els determinants reals del procés de presa de decisions en el upstream. Empíricament, el model es prova en els casos divergents d'Aràbia Saudita i els Emirats Àrabs Units, i una sèrie de lliçons s'han extret. En última instància, aquest treball ha d'augmentar la conscienciació entre els erudits i els polític, tant sobre el poc coneixement que tenim sobre els mecanismes interns que impulsen les estratègies ascendents en el majors estats productor de petroli.