Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

Endogenous constitutions

We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in an unequal society. A majoritarian democracy redistributes resources from the collectivity toward relatively few people, and has a relatively small government and low level of taxation. A consensual democracy redistributes resources toward a broader spectrum of social groups but also has a larger government and a higher level of taxation. We show that a consensual system turns out to be preferred by society when ex ante income inequality is relatively low, while a majoritarian system is chosen when income inequality is relatively high. We also obtain that consensual democracies should be expected to be ruled more often by center-left coalitions while the right should have an advantage in majoritarian constitutions. The implications for the relationship between inequality and redistribution are discussed. Historical evidence and a cross-sectional analysis support our results.

Stability and manipulation in representative democracies

This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure collects the names of the jurisdictional winners in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, they are able to manipulate the result of the election except in very few cases. When imposing a paretian condition on every jurisdictions voting rule, it is shown that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps voting rule that is not manipulable by movement of the electors necessarily gives to every voter the power of overruling the unanimity on its own. A characterization of the set of these rules is next provided in the case of two candidates.

Theorizing institutional changes: understanding decentralization and federalization in Brazil, Spain and South Africa

In light of the existing theories about institutional change, this paper seeks to advance a common framework to understand the unfolding of decentralization and federalization in three countries: Brazil, Spain, and South Africa. Although in different continents, these three countries witnessed processes after their respective transitions to democracy that transferred administrative and fiscal authority to their regions (decentralization) and vertically distributed political and institutional capacity (federalization). This paper attempts to explain how institutional changes prompted a shift of power and authority towards regional governments by looking at internal sources of change within the intergovernmental arena in the three countries. This analysis is organized around two propositions: that once countries transit to democracy under all-encompassing constitutions there are high incentives for institutional change, and that under a bargained intergovernmental interaction among political actors subnational political elites are able to advance their interests incrementally. In short, through a common framework this paper will explain the evolving dynamics of intergovernmental dynamics in three countries.

La profesionalización de la enfermería en Lleida a partir de las Hijas de la Caridad

El objetivo del estudio es describir el proceso de profesionalización de la enfermería en Lleida a partir de la llegada de las Hijas de la Caridad de San Vicente de Paúl en el Hospital de Santa María. MATERIAL Y MÉTODO: Estudio histórico mediante técnica de observación documental y análisis de documentos legislativos. Los documentos utilizados son: copia de la escritura del establecimiento de las Hijas de la Caridad en el Hospital de Santa María (1792) y las Constituciones para el gobierno del Santo Hospital General de la Ciudad de Lérida (1797). RESULTADOS: En la copia de la escritura se establece que las hermanas se encargarán del régimen y cuidados de los enfermos según las reglas de su instituto; y que tanto el gobierno y dirección interior y exterior de ellas dependerá de la Congregación. En las Constituciones del 1797 se acredita que han resultado beneficiosas tanto para la organización del hospital como para la atención sanitaria. Ponen énfasis en posibles divulgaciones negativas con respecto a ellas. CONCLUSIONES Y DISCUSIÓN: El establecimiento de las Hijas de la Caridad mejoró la atención sanitaria de los enfermos y la salubridad del centro. La contraprestación económica nos ayuda para que podamos hablar de profesionalización de enfermería.

Pere Compte, mestre major de l'obra de la Seu de Tortosa.

[cat] En aquest article es documenta Pere Compte com a mestre major de la Seu de Tortosa(1490), fet que es relaciona amb la promoció del protonotari apostòlic Joan Girona i es compara amb la direcció de les obres de Pere Moragues, que tingué lloc un segle abans. D'altra banda, es proposa la hipòtesi que sigui Pere Compte el responsable del disseny de la capella del Roser de l'esmentat edifici. També s'apunta la possibilitat que fos Antoni Queralt el mestre encarregat de dirigir el dia a dia de l'obra mentre Compte n'era absent i es posa de manifest la importancia que va poder tenir aquest mestre, especialment a Tortosa i a Lleida, a l'entorn del 1500. Finalment, es dóna notícia de la presencia d'altres mestres importants a la Tortosa del canvi de segles paral·lelament a la de Compte i Queralt al front de les obres de la Seu.