Governance mechanisms in Spanish financial intermediaries

This paper examines the governance of Spanish Banks around two main issues. First, does a poor economic performance activate those governance interventions that favor the removal of executive directors and the merger of non-performing banks? And second, does the relationship between governance intervention and economic performance vary with the ownership form of the bank? Our results show that a bad performance does activate governance mechanisms in banks, although for the case of Savings Banks intervention is confined to a merger or acquisition. Nevertheless, the distinct ownership structure of Savings Banks does not fully protect non-performing banks from disappearing. Product-market competition compensates for those weak internal governance mechanisms that result from an ownership form which gives voice to several stakeholder groups.

The Cost of ownership in the governance of interfirm collaborations

This paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs arguments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimension of going from “contracts” to “hierarchies” has been ignored in the past and with it the so called “costs of ownership”. The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which participate Spanish firms, indicate that the cost of ownership may offset the benefits of hierarchical controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i.e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two.

Corporate governance in banking: the role of board of directors

We test hypotheses on the dual role of boards of directors for a sample of large international commercial banks. We find an inverted U shaped relation between bank performance and board size that justifies a large board and imposes an efficient limit to the board’s size; a positive relation between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance; and a proactive role in board meetings. Our results show that bank boards’ composition and functioning are related to directors’ incentives to monitor and advise management. All these relations hold after we control for bank business, institutional differences, size, market power in the banking industry, bank ownership and investors’ legal protection.

Private Governance of Financial Markets: the US Regulatory Regime on Hedge Funds

The article investigates the private governance of financial markets by looking at the evolution of the regulatory debate on hedge funds in the US market. It starts from the premise that the privatization of regulation is always the result of a political decision and analyzes how this decision came about and was implemented in the case of hedge funds. The starting point is the failure of two initiatives on hedge funds that US regulators launched between 1999 an 2004, which the analysis explains by elaborating the concept of self-capture. Facing a trade off between the need to tackle publicly demonized issues and the difficulty of monitoring increasingly sophisticated and powerful private markets, regulators purposefully designed initiatives that were not meant to succeed, that is, they “self-captured” their own activity. By formulating initiatives that were inherently flawed, regulators saved their public role and at the same time paved the way for the privatization of hedge fund regulation. This explanation identifies a link between the failure of public initiatives and the success of private ones. It illustrates a specific case of formation of private authority in financial markets that points to a more general practice emerging in the regulation of finance.

Conflict prevention and decentralized governance: some remarks about the state of the art in theory and practice

Is there a link between decentralized governance and conflict prevention? This article tries to answer the question by presenting the state of the art of the intersection of both concepts. Provided that social conflict is inevitable and given the appearance of new threats and types of violence, as well as new demands for security based on people (human security), our societies should focus on promoting peaceful changes. Through an extensive analysis of the existing literature and the study of several cases, this paper suggests that decentralized governance can contribute to these efforts by transforming conflicts, bringing about power-sharing and inclusion incentives of minority groups. Albeit the complexity of assessing its impact on conflict prevention, it can be contended that decentralized governance might have very positive effects on the reduction of causes that bring about conflicts due to its ability to foster the creation of war/violence preventors. More specifically, this paper argues that decentralization can have a positive impact on the so-called triggers and accelerators (short- and medium-term causes).

The Barcelona Forum: on decentralized governance and conflict prevention 6-8 july 2009

The Barcelona Forum aimed to generate both a theoretical and practical discussion on decentralized governance and its capacity to promote peace, prevent conflict, advance human security and ensure greater governmental accountability. The Forum intended to review the theoretical strength of decentralization as a political tool and discuss how it can be properly implemented. Eight case studies were selected to be covered during the two days in order to draw conclusions and offer proposals for the future implementation of decentralization. The case of Catalonia and the decentralized experience of Spain was given special attention, as an example of successful decentralization. The other cases presented achievements and challenges and prompted discussions on both the validity and universality of decentralization as a way to promote and preserve peace. Topics such as ethnic and territorial divisions, democratic accountability, financial decentralization and distribution, resource sharing, and external implementation of decentralization through peace processes were discussed.

E-Governance and Citizen Information : The Generalitat of Catalonia in the International Context. Research report (synthesis document)

Aquest estudi té com a objectiu principal analitzar les transformacions que s'esdevenen al voltant de la incorporació d'innovacions tecnològiques de l'entorn de les TIC en els processos d'atenció al ciutadà per part de les administracions públiques. Les transformacions que hem analitzat tenen a veure amb tres dimensions que hem considerat bàsiques. D'una banda, ens hem centrat en els canvis que es produeixen en la forma en què els ciutadans (com a principals, tot i que no únics, usuaris) i l'administració es relacionen entre sí. De l'altra hem analitzat les transformacions que s'esdevenen en el funcionament intern i en la pròpia organització de l'administració arran de les transformacions dels canals de comunicació amb els usuaris. Per últim, hem considerat els canvis en la forma de gestionar (dissenyar, planificar, organitzar i dur a terme) el canvi i la innovació, tenint en compte especialment els rols dels diferents actors (no només públics) que hi participen. La recerca es recolza en un ampli estudi empíric sobre la Generalitat de Catalunya i en un estudi compartiu internacional sobre el Quebec, Emillia-Romagna i Escòcia.

International regimes as knowledge syndicates? Energy and trends of global governance

El poder de l'Estat i la sobirania tradicional s'està deteriorant de manera constant, sobretot en termes de la provisió de certs béns públics fonamentals. Els Estats, en particular, són incapaços de manejar el coneixement i la informació que és essencial per mantenir la competitivitat i la sostenibilitat en una economia interdependent. Estructures fiables de la governança mundial i la cooperació internacional estan lluny de ser establertes. Energia com a problema a les agendes p dels governs, les empreses privades i la societat civil és un exemple manifest d'aquesta dinàmica.. L'actual sistema de governança mundial d'energia implica accions polítiques disperses per actors divers. L'Agència Internacional de l'Energia té un paper destacat, però està debilitat per la seva composició limitada i basada en el coneixement- epistèmic en lloc del material o executiu. Aquest treball sosté que ni la mida ni nombre de membres disponibles estan dificultant la governabilitat mundial d'energia. Més aviat, l'energia és una sèrie de béns públics que es troben als llimbs, on els estats no poden pagar la seva disposició, així com els diversos interessos impedir l'establiment d'una autoritat internacional. Després de la introducció de la teoria del règim internacional i el concepte de coneixement basats en les comunitats epistèmiques, l'article revisa l'estat actual de la governabilitat de l'energia mundia. A continuació es presenta una comparació d'aquesta estructura amb els règims de govern nacional i regional, d'una banda, i amb règims globals ambientals i de salut, de l'altra

The Emergence and Governance of Euroregions: The Case of the Euregio on the Dutch-German Border

Amb una història que data de la dècada de 1950, la EUREGIO és un de les més antigues euroregions a Europa. Es pot considerar com un cas exitós d'una regió transfronterera (CBR) en el sentit que s'ha establert fermament com una agència de fronteres dins del seu tram de la frontera holandesa-alemanya. L'EUREGIO també ha estat una de les protagonistes principals darrere de l'Associació de Regions Frontereres Europees (ARFE), que en les últimes dècades va actuar per difondre el model d'euroregió a tot el territori europeu. Aquest capítol té diversos objectius. En primer lloc, es presenta el cas de la EUREGIO i presenta evidència sobre la seva història, estructura orgànica i polítiques. En segon lloc, s'analitzen les condicions del context en què la EUREGIO ha sorgit i les estructures de govern que es van crear com a resultat. Es fa especial èmfasi en la posició i el paper de l'Euroregió en el context més ampli del marc de governança europea multinivell generat per la política de cohesió de la UE. El capítol conclou amb un intent d'avaluar l'èxit i l'impacte de la EUREGIO i una discussió dels reptes relacionats amb la doble funció de l'EUREGIO com a representant dels interessos de les autoritats locals i les agències de cohesió de la UE posada en pràctica de les polítiques.

The short arm of the law: judicial institutions and local governance in Brazil

This paper estimates the effect of judicial institutions on governance at the local level in Brazil. Our estimation strategy exploits a unique institutional feature of state judiciary branches which assigns prosecutors and judges to the most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. As a result of this assignment mechanism there are counties with nearly identical populations, some with and some without local judicial presence, which we exploit to impute counterfactual outcomes. Conditional on observable county characteristics, offenses per civil servant are about 35% lower in counties that have a local seat of the state judiciary. The lower incidence of infractions stems mostly from fewer violations of financial management regulations by local administrators, fewer instances of problems in project execution and project managment, fewer cases of non-existent or ineffective civil society oversight and fewer cases of improper handling of remittances to local residents.

Corporate governance and corporate social performance

By integrating the agency and stakeholder perspectives, this study aims to provide a systematic understanding of the firm- and institutional-level corporate governance factors that affect corporate social performance (CSP). We analyze a large global panel dataset and reveal that CSP is positively associated with board independence, but negatively with ownership concentration. These results underscore the idea that the benefits of CSP do not flow to shareholders to the same extent as the costs and that the allocation of resources to CSP is lower when shareholders are powerful. Furthermore, these findings indicate that independent directors should be understood as agents in their own right, not only focused on defending shareholder interests. We also find that CSP is negatively related to investor protection and shareholder-oriented environments, while it is positively related to egalitarian environments. Finally, we jointly analyze firm-level drivers and institutional contexts.

Beyond 2015 - Governance

Postprint (published version)

World Democratic Governance

The unsustainable politically speaking institutional bipolarisation and recent events in the world arena (11 September 2001, unilateralism and the illegal war brought against Iraq by the USA, failures and blockage of WTO negotiating rounds at Seattle and Cancun, merely rhetorical results from the latest UN summits in Monterrey and Johannesburg) only serves to show just how completely outdated the system of international institutions, born after the Second World War, has become.It is vital, then, for us to establish a new system of global democratic governance, and this entails, amongst other things, In-depth reform of the system of international institutions.