Obliteration study of lambdatic and obelionic region sutures in ruminant, carnivores and hominids

The morphology of Orce cranial fragment VM-0 is contrasted with the frontoparietal region in artiodactyls, and the obelionic region in carnivores and primates including hominids. Sutural development at obelion is compared in those taxa throughout the growth period up to the onset of sutural obliteration, and ontogenetic differences between non-primates and primates lead us to conclude that the configuration in VM-0 more resembles that found in hominids than in artiodactyls or carnivores. Moreover, cranial capacity for VM-0 is estimated at >470cm 3 , comparable to Plio-Pleistocene hominids, but greater than in young equids.

Comparative genomics of Hedgehog loci in chordates and the origin of Shh regulatory novelties

The origin and evolution of the complex regulatory landscapes of some vertebrate developmental genes, often spanning hundreds of Kbp and including neighboring genes, remain poorly understood. The Sonic Hedgehog (Shh) genomic regulatory block (GRB) is one of the best functionally characterized examples, with several discrete enhancers reported within its introns, vast upstream gene-free region and neighboring genes (Lmbr1 and Rnf32). To investigate the origin and evolution of this GRB, we sequenced and characterized the Hedgehog (Hh) loci from three invertebrate chordate amphioxus species, which share several early expression domains with Shh. Using phylogenetic footprinting within and between chordate lineages, and reporter assays in zebrafish probing >30 Kbp of amphioxus Hh, we report large sequence and functional divergence between both groups. In addition, we show that the linkage of Shh to Lmbr1 and Rnf32, necessary for the unique gnatostomate-specific Shh limb expression, is a vertebrate novelty occurred between the two whole-genome duplications.

New features of the layer-by-layer deposition of microcrystalline silicon films revealed by spectroscopic ellipsometry and high resolution transmission electron microscopy

Spectroscopic ellipsometry and high resolution transmission electron microscopy have been used to characterize microcrystalline silicon films. We obtain an excellent agreement between the multilayer model used in the analysis of the optical data and the microscopy measurements. Moreover, thanks to the high resolution achieved in the microscopy measurements and to the improved optical models, two new features of the layer-by-layer deposition of microcrystalline silicon have been detected: i) the microcrystalline films present large crystals extending from the a-Si:H substrate to the film surface, despite the sequential process in the layer-by-layer deposition; and ii) a porous layer exists between the amorphous silicon substrate and the microcrystalline silicon film.

Public and Private Production in a Mixed Delivery System: Regulation, Competition and Costs

Academics and policy makers are increasingly shifting the debate concerning the best form of public service provision beyond the traditional dilemma between pure public and pure private delivery modes, because, among other reasons, there is a growing body of evidence that casts doubt on the existence of systematic cost savings from privatization, while any competition seems to be eroded over time. In this paper we compare the relative merits of public and private delivery within a mixed delivery system. We study the role played by ownership, transaction costs, and competition on local public service delivery within the same jurisdiction. Using a stochastic cost frontier, we analyze the public-private urban bus system in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area. Our results suggest that private firms tendering the service have higher delivery costs than those incurred by the public firm, especially when transaction costs are taken into account. Tenders, therefore, do not help to reduce delivery costs. Our results suggest that under a mixed delivery scheme, which permits the co-existence of public and private production, the metropolitan government and the regulator can use private delivery to contain costs in the public firm and, at the same time, benefit from the greater flexibility of private firms for dealing with events not provided for under contract.

El foc que afina: homenatge d'Agustí Eura (s. XVIII) a Dalmau Moner (s. XIV)

Breu repàs de la vida i, sobretot, de l’obra d’Agustí Eura, home de lletres de formació barroca amb una obra àmplia en català, castellà i llatí

Riqueza y rareza de los insectos acuáticos de la laguna temporal de Espolla (Pla de l’Estany, Cataluña)

The richness and rarity of an insect community were analysed in a Mediterranean temporary pond located in NE of the Iberian Peninsula. The aquatic community was sampled weekly over 7 periods of flooding during y years (1996-1999). Distribution of rare species (with scarce presence at regional or peninsular levels, is detailed. The richness of the Espolla pond has been compared with that of other aquatic environments. The number of rare species of insects (8 taxa: 5 Corixidae, 1 Limnephilidae and 2 Chironomidae) and the insect richness (82 taxa) contrast with the traditional attribution of a low richness and rarity to the temporary aquatic environments

Collusion in growing and shrinking markets: empirical evidence from experimental duopolies

We study collusive behaviour in experimental duopolies that compete in prices under dynamic demand conditions. In one treatment the demand grows at a constant rate. In the other treatment the demand declines at another constant rate. The rates are chosen so that the evolution of the demand in one case is just the reverse in time than the one for the other case. We use a box-design demand function so that there are no issues of finding and co-ordinating on the collusive price. Contrary to game-theoretic reasoning, our results show that collusion is significantly larger when the demand shrinks than when it grows. We conjecture that the prospect of rapidly declining profit opportunities exerts a disciplining effect on firms that facilitates collusion and discourages deviation.

Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because its members fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. In previous research, we have shown that financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Here we examine the sensitivity of this result to the ability of people to observe others' choices. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by the employees of an experimental firm is a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or start with high incentives, which typically yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all employees in their experimenta

Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance

We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.

Competition and well-being

We study the effects of competition in a context in which people's actions can not be contractually fixed. We find that in such an environment the very presence of competition does neither increase efficiency nor does it yield any payoff gains for the short side of the market. We also find that competition has a strong negative impact on social well-being, the disposition towards others, and individually experienced well-being, the emotional state, of those on the long side of the market. We conjecture that this limits the possibilities of satisfactory interaction in the future and, hence, has negative implications for efficiency in the longer-run

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation.

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms effectively behave in this way. Bagwell and Ramey (1996) propose a game with a specific sequence of moves and partially-recoverable capacity costs in which forward induction provides a theoretical rationalization for firm behavior in the field. We conduct an experiment with a game inspired by their work. In our data the incumbent tends to keep the market, in contrast to what the forward induction argument of Bagwell and Ramey would suggest. The results indicate that players perceive that the first mover has an advantage without having to pre-commit capacity. In our game, evolution and learning do not drive out this perception. We back these claims with data analysis, a theoretical framework for dynamics, and simulation results.

Auctions for government securities: a laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and spanish designs

The Bank of Spain uses a unique auction format to sell government bonds, which can be seen as a hybrid of a uniform and a discriminatory auction. For winning bids above the average winning bid, buyers are charged the average winning bid, otherwise they pay their respective bids. We report on an experiment that compares this auction format to the discriminatory format, used in most other countries, and to the uniform format. Our design is based on a common value model with multi-unit supply and two-unit demand. The results show significantly higher revenue with the Spanish and the uniform formats than with the discriminatory one, while volatility of prices over time is significantly lower in the discriminatory format than in the Spanish and uniform cases. Actual price dispersion is significantly larger in the discriminatory than in the Spanish. Our data also exhibit the use of bid-spreading strategies in all three designs.

How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.

Do market conditions affect gift exchange? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand

We study whether people's behavior in unbalanced gift exchange markets with repeated interaction are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange markets, which vary only with respect to whether first or second movers are on the long side of the market. The direction of market imbalance could influence subjects' behavior, as second movers (workers) might react differently to favorable actions by first movers (firms) in the two cases. While our data show strong deviations from the standard game-theoretic prediction, we find mainly secondary treatment effects. Wage offers are not higher when there is an excess supply of firms, and workers do not respond more favorably to a given wage when there is an excess supply of labor. The state of competition does not appear to have strong effects in our data. We also present data from single-period sessions that show substantial gift exchange even without repeated interactions.