Monitoring bank performance in the presence of risk

This paper proposes a managerial control tool that integrates risk in efficiency scores. Building on existing efficiency specifications, our proposal reflects the real banking technology and accurately models the relationship between desirable and undesirable outputs. Specifically, the undesirable output is defined as non-performing loans to capture credit risk, and is linked only to the relevant dimension of the output set. We empirically illustrate how our efficiency measure functions for managerial control purposes. The application considers a unique dataset of Costa Rican banks during 1998-2012. Efficiency scores? implications are mostly discussed at bank-level, and their interpretations are enhanced by using accounting ratios. We also show the usefulness of our tool for corporate governance by examining performance changes around executive turnover. Results confirm that appointing CEOs from outside the bank significantly improves performance, thus suggesting the potential benefits of new organisational practices.

Discrimination in Bankruptcy Situations

In a bankruptcy situation, not all claimants are affected in the same way. In particular, some depositors may enter into a situation of personal bankruptcy if they lose part of their investments. Events of this kind may lead to a social catastrophe. We propose discrimination among the claimants as a possible solution. A fact considered in the American bankruptcy law (among others) that establishes some discrimination on the claimants, or the Santander Bank that in the Madoff’s case reimbursed only the deposits to its particular customers. Moreover, the necessity of discriminating has already been mentioned in different contexts by Young (1988), Bossert (1995), Thomson (2003) and Pulido et al. (2002, 2007), for instance. In this paper, we take a bankruptcy solution as the reference point. Given this initial allocation, we make transfers from richer to poorer with the purpose of distributing not only the personal incurred losses as evenly as possible but also the transfers in a progressive way. The agents are divided into two groups depending on their personal monetary value (wealth, net-income, GDP or any other characteristic). Then, we impose a set of Axioms that bound the maximal transfer that each net-contributor can make and each net-receiver can obtain. Finally, we define a value discriminant solution, and we characterize it by means of the Lorenz criterion. Endogenous convex combinations between solutions are also considered. Keywords: Bankruptcy, Discrimination, Compensation, Rules JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

Two-sided learning in new keynesian models: dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank (two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economy have asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. We assume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct for different sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model of the economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs through a statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study the short-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularly with respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learning can generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behavior of the variables in the model in a signifficant way. Our simulations do not converge to a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source that invalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identify a novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communication can be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified

Two-sided learning in New Keynesian models: Dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank(two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economyhave asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. Weassume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct fordifferent sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model ofthe economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs througha statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study theshort-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularlywith respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learningcan generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behaviorof the variables in the model in a significant way. Our simulations do not convergeto a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source thatinvalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identifya novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communicationcan be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified.

Role of PheE15 gate in ligand entry and nitric oxide detoxification function of Mycobacterium tuberculosis truncated hemoglobin N

The truncated hemoglobin N, HbN, of Mycobacterium tuberculosis is endowed with a potent nitric oxide dioxygenase (NOD) activity that allows it to relieve nitrosative stress and enhance in vivo survival of its host. Despite its small size, the protein matrix of HbN hosts a two-branched tunnel, consisting of orthogonal short and long channels, that connects the heme active site to the protein surface. A novel dual-path mechanism has been suggested to drive migration of O(2) and NO to the distal heme cavity. While oxygen migrates mainly by the short path, a ligand-induced conformational change regulates opening of the long tunnel branch for NO, via a phenylalanine (PheE15) residue that acts as a gate. Site-directed mutagenesis and molecular simulations have been used to examine the gating role played by PheE15 in modulating the NOD function of HbN. Mutants carrying replacement of PheE15 with alanine, isoleucine, tyrosine and tryptophan have similar O(2)/CO association kinetics, but display significant reduction in their NOD function. Molecular simulations substantiated that mutation at the PheE15 gate confers significant changes in the long tunnel, and therefore may affect the migration of ligands. These results support the pivotal role of PheE15 gate in modulating the diffusion of NO via the long tunnel branch in the oxygenated protein, and hence the NOD function of HbN.

When do central banks prefer to intervene secretly?

Central banks often intervene secretly in the foreign exchange market. This secrecy seems to be at odds with the signalling channel. In this article we will analyse when a central bank intervening in the foreign exchange rate market purely through the signalling channel would prefer to act secretly or publicly. By using a microstructure model, we will show that the consistency of the intervention with fundamentals, the volume of noise trading, the weight given to the effectiveness of intervention and the degree of superior information held by the central bank will influence the decision to intervene secretly or publicly. Keywords: foreign exchange intervention, market microstructure. JEL Classifi…cation: D82, E58, F31, G14.

Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and constructive ambiguity

This paper addresses the issue of the optimal behaviour of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) in its microeconomic role regarding individual financial institutions in distress. It has been argued that the LOLR should not intervene at the microeconomic level and let any defaulting institution face the market discipline, as it will be confronted with the consequences of the risks it has taken. By considering a simple costbenefit analysis we show that this position may lack a sufficient foundation. We establish that, instead, uder reasonable assumptions, the optimal policy has to be conditional on the amount of uninsured debt issued by the defaulting bank. Yet in equilibrium, because the rescue policy is costly, the LOLR will not rescue all the banks that fulfill the uninsured debt requirement condition, but will follow a mixed strategy. This we interpret as the confirmation of the "creative ambiguity" principle, perfectly in line with the central bankers claim that it is efficient for them to have discretion in lending to individual institutions. Alternatively, in other cases, when the social cost of a bank's bankruptcy is too high, it is optimal for the LOLR to bail out the insititution, and this gives support to the "too big to fail" policy.

Spatial market expansion through mergers

In this paper we present a model that studies firm mergers in a spatial setting. A new model is formulated that addresses the issue of finding the number of branches that have to be eliminated by a firm after merging with another one, in order to maximize profits. The model is then applied to an example of bank mergers in the city of Barcelona. Finally, a variant of the formulation that introduces competition is presented together with some conclusions.

Independent Central Banks: Low inflation at no cost?: A model with fiscal policy

In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal policy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that, with this extension, the politically induced variance of output is not always eliminated nor reduced by delegating monetary policy to an independent and conservative central bank. Further, in flation and output stabilisation will be affected by the degree of conservativeness of the central bank and by the probability of the less in flation averse party gaining power. Keywords: rational partisan theory; fiscal policy; independent central bank JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.

The role of central bank operating procedures in an economy with productive government spending

The choice of either the rate of monetary growth or the nominal interest rate as the instrument controlled by monetary authorities has both positive and normative implications for economic performance. We reexamine some of the issues related to the choice of the monetary policy instrument in a dynamic general equilibrium model exhibiting endogenous growth in which a fraction of productive government spending is financed by means of issuing currency. When we evaluate the performance of the two monetary instruments attending to the fluctuations of endogenous variables, we find that the inflation rate is less volatile under nominal interest rate targeting. Concerning the fluctuations of consumption and of the growth rate, both monetary policy instruments lead to statistically equivalent volatilities. Finally, we show that none of these two targeting procedures displays unambiguously higher welfare levels.

Side-branch growth in two-dimensional dendrits. Part II: Phase-field model

The development of side-branching in solidifying dendrites in a regime of large values of the Peclet number is studied by means of a phase-field model. We have compared our numerical results with experiments of the preceding paper and we obtain good qualitative agreement. The growth rate of each side branch shows a power-law behavior from the early stages of its life. From their birth, branches which finally succeed in the competition process of side-branching development have a greater growth exponent than branches which are stopped. Coarsening of branches is entirely defined by their geometrical position relative to their dominant neighbors. The winner branches escape from the diffusive field of the main dendrite and become independent dendrites.

The spreading of the introduced seaweed Caulerpa taxifolia (Vahl) C. Agardh in the Mediterranean Sea: testing the boat transportation hypothesis

The Spreading of the Introduced Seaweed Caulerpa taxifolia (Vahl) C. Agardh in the Mediterranean Sea: Testing the Boat Transportation Hypothesis

Internet Banking in Europe: a comparative analysis

A key strategic issue for banks is the implementation of internet banking. The ‘click and mortar’ model that complements classical branch banking with online facilities is competing with pure internet banks. The objective of this paper is to compare the performance of these two models across countries, so as to examine the role of differences in the banking system and technological progress. A fuzzy cluster analysis on the performance of banks in Finland, Spain, Italy and the UK shows that internet banks are hard to distinguish from banks that follow a click and mortar strategy; country borders are more important. We therefore explain bank performance by a group of selected bank features, country-specific economic and IT indicators over the period 1995-2004. We find that the strategy of banking groups to incorporate internet banks reflects some competitive edge that these banks have in their business models. Extensive technological innovation boosts internet banking.