Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design

We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly. We find that, as theory suggests, for both types of competition the introduction of a forward market significantly lowers prices. The combination of supply function competition with a forward market leads to high efficiency levels.

Memory in contracts: the experience of the EBRD (1991-2003)

The objective of this paper is to identify the role of memory in repeated contracts with moral hazard in financial intermediation. We use the database we have built containing the contracts signed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EBRD between 1991 and 2003. Our framework is a standard setting of repeated moral hazard. After having controlled for the adverse selection component, we are able to prove that client reputation is the discrimination device according to which the bank fixes the amount of credit for the established clients. Our results unambiguously isolate the effect of memory in the bank's lending decisions.

Memory in contracts: the experience of the EBRD (1991-2003)

The objective of this paper is to identify the role of memory as a screening device in repeated contracts with asymmetric information in financial intermediation. We use an original dataset from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. We propose a simple empirical method to capture the role of memory using the client's reputation. Our results unambiguously isolate the dominant effect of memory on the bank's lending decisions over market factors in the case of established clients.

Conflict, Peace and Security in Africa: an Assessment and New Questions After 50 Years of African Independence

Since the independence processes in the African continent, armed conflicts, peace and security have raised concern and attention both at the domestic level and at the international scale. In recent years, all aspects have undergone significant changes which have given rise to intense debate. The end of some historical conflicts has taken place in a context of slight decrease in the number of armed conflicts and the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction processes. Moreover, African regional organizations have staged an increasingly more active internal shift in matters related to peace and security, encouraged by the idea of promoting “African solutions to African problems”. This new scenario, has been accompanied by new uncertainties at the security level and major challenges at the operational level, especially for the African Union. This article aims to ascertain the state of affairs on all these issues and raise some key questions to consider.

Optimal coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts in labor Markets

We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to successfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. Senior workers differ in ability and their competence is revealed after they have worked as juniors in the market. We study the length of the contractual relationships between firms and workers in an environment where the matching between firms and workers is the result of market interaction. We show that, despite in a one-firm-one-worker set-up long-term contracts are the optimal choice for firms, market forces often induce firms to use short-term contracts. Unless the market only consists of firms with very profitable projects, firms operating highly profitable projects offer short-term contracts to ensure the service of high-ability workers and those with less lucrative projects also use short-term contracts to save on the junior workers' wage. Intermediate firms may (or may not) hire workers through long-term contracts.

Growth, selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced tend to choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates a trade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificing managerial selection may be optimal at early stages of economic development and when access to information is limited. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increases the return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, where managerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Better institutions, in the form of a richer contracting environment and less severe informational frictions, speed up the transition to short-term relationships.

Decentralization of contracts with interim sidecontracting

This paper gives a new explanation for the phenomena of subcontracting. A model in which a principal contracts two agents who work in a sequence on a project, have soft information and can collude is considered. Side-contracts between agents can be signed at any stage of the game. Due to limited liability and moral hazard agents obtain a rent. The principal’s problem is to find the preferable contracting structure. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized contracting structure can be superior to a centralized structure for the principal. The paper derives the conditions under which this holds. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Contract delegation, Collusion, Interim side-contracting, Moral hazard.

A genomic analysis identifies a novel component in the genetic structure of sub-Saharan African populations

Studies of large sets of SNP data have proven to be a powerful tool in the analysis of the genetic structure of human populations. In this work, we analyze genotyping data for 2,841 SNPs in 12 Sub-Saharan African populations, including a previously unsampled region of south-eastern Africa (Mozambique). We show that robust results in a world-wide perspective can be obtained when analyzing only 1,000 SNPs. Our main results both confirm the results of previous studies, and show new and interesting features in Sub-Saharan African genetic complexity. There is a strong differentiation of Nilo-Saharans, much beyond what would be expected by geography. Hunter-gatherer populations (Khoisan and Pygmies) show a clear distinctiveness with very intrinsic Pygmy (and not only Khoisan) genetic features. Populations of the West Africa present an unexpected similarity among them, possibly the result of a population expansion. Finally, we find a strong differentiation of the south-eastern Bantu population from Mozambique, which suggests an assimilation of a pre-Bantu substrate by Bantu speakers in the region.

African signatures of recent positive selection in human FOXI1

Background: The human FOXI1 gene codes for a transcription factor involved in the physiology of the inner ear, testis, and kidney. Using three interspecies comparisons, it has been suggested that this may be a gene underhuman-specific selection. We sought to confirm this finding by using an extended set of orthologous sequences.Additionally, we explored for signals of natural selection within humans by sequencing the gene in 20 Europeans,20 East Asians and 20 Yorubas and by analysing SNP variation in a 2 Mb region centered on FOXI1 in 39worldwide human populations from the HGDP-CEPH diversity panel.Results: The genome sequences recently available from other primate and non-primate species showed that FOXI1divergence patterns are compatible with neutral evolution. Sequence-based neutrality tests were not significant inEuropeans, East Asians or Yorubas. However, the Long Range Haplotype (LRH) test, as well as the iHS and XP-Rsbstatistics revealed significantly extended tracks of homozygosity around FOXI1 in Africa, suggesting a recentepisode of positive selection acting on this gene. A functionally relevant SNP, as well as several SNPs either on theputatively selected core haplotypes or with significant iHS or XP-Rsb values, displayed allele frequencies stronglycorrelated with the absolute geographical latitude of the populations sampled.Conclusions: We present evidence for recent positive selection in the FOXI1 gene region in Africa. Climate mightbe related to this recent adaptive event in humans. Of the multiple functions of FOXI1, its role in kidney-mediatedwater-electrolyte homeostasis is the most obvious candidate for explaining a climate-related adaptation.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Completing contracts ex post: How car manufacturers manage car dealers

This article illustrates how contracts are completed ex post in practice and, in so doing, indirectly suggests what the real function of contracts may be. Our evidence comes from the contracts between automobile manufacturers and their dealers in 23 dealership networks in Spain. Franchising dominates automobile distribution because of the need to decentralize pricing and control of service decisions. It motivates local managers to undertake these activities at minimum cost for the manufacturer. However, it creates incentive conflicts, both between manufacturers and dealers and among dealers themselves, concerning the level of sales and service provided. It also holds potential for expropriation of specific investments. Contracts deal with these conflicts by restricting dealers decision rights and granting manufacturers extensive completion, monitoring and enforcement powers. The main mechanism that may prevent abuse of these powers is the manufacturers reputational capital.

Employment consequences of restrictive permanent contracts: Evidence from Spanish labor market reforms

Temporary employment contracts allowing unrestricted dismissals wereintroduced in Spain in 1984 and quickly came to account for most new jobs.As a result, temporary employment increased from around 10% in themid-eighties to more than 30% in the early nineties. In 1997, however,the Spanish government attempted to reduce the incidence of temporaryemployment by reducing payroll taxes and dismissal costs for permanentcontracts. In this paper, we use individual data from the Spanish LaborForce Survey to estimate the effects of reduced payroll taxes anddismissal costs on the distribution of employment and worker flows. Weexploit the fact that recent reforms apply only to certain demographicgroups to set up a natural experiment research design that can be usedto study the effects of contract regulations. Our results show that thereduction of payroll taxes and dismissal costs increased the employmentof young workers on permanent contracts, although the effects for youngwomen are not always significant. Results for older workers showinsignificant effects. The results suggest a moderately elastic responseof permanent employment to non-wage labor costs for young men. We alsofind positive effects on the transitions from unemployment and temporaryemployment into permanent employment for young and older workers, althoughthe effects for older workers are not always significant. On the otherhand, transitions from permanent employment to non-employment increasedonly for older men, suggesting that the reform had little effect ondismissals.

Recursive contracts

We obtain a recursive formulation for a general class of contractingproblems involving incentive constraints. Under these constraints,the corresponding maximization (sup) problems fails to have arecursive solution. Our approach consists of studying the Lagrangian.We show that, under standard assumptions, the solution to theLagrangian is characterized by a recursive saddle point (infsup)functional equation, analogous to Bellman's equation. Our approachapplies to a large class of contractual problems. As examples, westudy the optimal policy in a model with intertemporal participationconstraints (which arise in models of default) and intertemporalcompetitive constraints (which arise in Ramsey equilibria).

Fixed-term contracts and the duration distribution of unemployment

In the mid-1980s, many European countries introduced fixed-term contracts.Since then their labor markets have become more dynamic. This paper studiesthe implications of such reforms for the duration distribution ofunemployment, with particular emphasis on the changes in the durationdependence. I estimate a parametric duration model using cross-sectionaldata drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey from 1980 to 1994 to analyzethe chances of leaving unemployment before and after the introduction offixed-term contracts. I find that duration dependence has increased sincesuch reform. Semi-parametric estimation of the model also shows that forlong spells, the probability of leaving unemployment has decreased sincesuch reform.

The optimal length of contracts with application to outsourcing

This paper resolves three empirical puzzles in outsourcing by formalizing the adaptationcost of long-term performance contracts. Side-trading with a new partner alongside a long-term contract (to exploit an adaptation-requiring investment) is usually less effective than switching to the new partner when the contract expires. So long-term contracts that prevent holdup of specific investments may induce holdup of adaptation investments. Contract length therefore trades of specific and adaptation investments. Length should increase with the importance and specificity of self-investments, and decrease with the importance of adaptation investments for which side-trading is ineffective. My general model also shows how optimal length falls with cross-investments and wasteful investments.