Can You Home Again? Desertion and Control of Hometowns in Civil Wars

What allows an armed group in a civil war to prevent desertion? This paper addresses this question with a focus on control in the rearguard. Most past studies focus on motivations for desertion. They explain desertion in terms of where soldiers stand in relation to the macro themes of the war, or in terms of an inability to provide positive incentives to overcome the collective action problem. However, since individuals decide whether and how to participate in civil wars for multiple reasons, responding to a variety of local conditions in an environment of threat and violence, a focus only on macro-level motivations is incomplete. The opportunities side of the ledger deserves more attention. I therefore turn my attention to how control by an armed group eliminates soldiers’ opportunities to desert. In particular, I consider the control that an armed group maintains over soldiers’ hometowns, treating geographic terrain as an important exogenous indicator of the ease of control. Rough terrain at home affords soldiers and their families and friends advantages in ease of hiding, the difficulty of using force, and local knowledge. Based on an original dataset of soldiers from Santander Province in the Spanish Civil War, gathered from archival sources, I find statistical evidence that the rougher the terrain in a soldier’s home municipality, the more likely he is to desert. I find complementary qualitative evidence indicating that soldiers from rough-terrain communities took active advantage of their greater opportunities for evasion. This finding has important implications for the way observers interpret different soldiers’ decisions to desert or remain fighting, for the prospect that structural factors may shape the cohesion of armed groups, and for the possibility that local knowledge may be a double-edged sword, making soldiers simultaneously good at fighting and good at deserting.

Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars

Importa si una guerra civil es combat com un conflicte irregular, convencional o simètric no convencional? En altres paraules, tenen les “tecnologies de la rebel·lió” un impacte sobre la gravetat d’una guerra, la seva durada o el seu resultat? Aquest treball mostra que els conflictes irregulars duren més que els altres tipus de conflicte, mentre els convencionals tendeixen a ser més greus en termes de letalitat al camp de batalla. D’altra banda, els conflictes irregulars tendeixen a ser guanyats pels governs, mentre els altres són més propensos a acabar en empat. Substancialment, aquests resultats ens ajuden a donar sentit a l’evolució de les guerres civils, les quals tendeixen a ser més curtes, més intenses i més difícils per als governs. Teòricament, aquests resultats donen suport a la importància de la tecnologia de rebel·lió a l’estudiar la gravetat, la durada i els resultats de les guerres civils; a més, contribueixen a una millor comprensió de la contribució històrica de la guerra irregular a la construcció de l’Estat i al canvi social.

Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars

This paper analyzes the relationship between ethnic fractionalization, polarization, and conflict. In recent years many authors have found empirical evidence that ethnic fractionalization has a negative effect on growth. One mechanism that can explain this nexus is the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on rent-seeking activities and the increase in potential conflict, which is negative for investment. However the empirical evidence supporting the effect of ethnic fractionalization on the incidence of civil conflicts is very weak. Although ethnic fractionalization may be important for growth, we argue that the channel is not through an increase in potential ethnic conflict. We discuss the appropriateness of indices of polarization to capture conflictive dimensions. We develop a new measure of ethnic heterogeneity that satisfies the basic properties associated with the concept of polarization. The empirical section shows that this index of ethnic polarization is a significant variable in the explanation of the incidence of civil wars. This result is robust to the presence of other indicators of ethnic heterogeneity, other sources of data for the construction of the index, and other data structures.

Fighting against Malaria: Prevent wars while waiting for the "miraculous" vaccine

The World Health Organization estimates that 300 million clinical cases of malaria occur annually and observed that during the 80's and part of the 90's its incidence increased. In this paper we explore the influence of refugees from civil wars on the incidence of malaria in the refugee-receiving countries. Using civil wars as an instrumental variable we show that for each 1,000 refugees there are between 2,000 and 2,700 cases of malaria in the refugee receiving country. On average 13% of the cases of malaria reported by the WHO are caused by forced migration as a consequence of civil wars.

Ethnic polarization, potential conflict and civil wars

This paper analyzes the relationship between ethnic fractionalization, polarization, and conflict. In recent years many authors have found empirical evidence that ethnic fractionalization has a negative effect on growth. One mechanism that can explain this nexus is the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on rent-seeking activities and the increase in potential conflict, which is negative for investment. However the empirical evidence supporting the effect of ethnic fractionalization on the incidence of civil conflicts is very weak. Although ethnic fractionalization may be important for growth, we argue that the channel is not through an increase in potential ethnic conflict. We discuss the appropriateness of indices of polarization to capture conflictive dimensions. We develop a new measure of ethnic heterogeneity that satisfies the basic properties associated with the concept of polarization. The empirical section shows that this index of ethnic polarization is a significant variable in the explanation of the incidence of civil wars. This result is robust to the presence of other indicators of ethnic heterogeneity, other sources of data for the construction of the index, and other data structures.

World Of Wars Android Game

World Of Wars es un videojuego de acción para plataformas Android basándose en los estilos shoot em¿up arcades antiguos pero adaptándolos a los nuevos tiempos y nuevas formas de juego que existen en la actualidad. Se ha utilizado la librería Cocos2D-x, así como el lenguaje de programación C++ para el desarrollo de el.

World of wars : Desarrollo de aplicaciones Android

World of wars es un videojuego de acción para plataformas Android basándose en los estilos shoot 'em up arcade antiguos pero adaptándolos a los nuevos tiempos y nuevas formas de juego. Se ha utilizado la librería Cocos2d-x, así como el lenguaje de programación C++ para su desarrollo.

El Giravolt de la Família Robafaves

Treball de recerca realitzat per un alumne d'ensenyament secundari i guardonat amb un Premi CIRIT per fomentar l'esperit cientí­fic del Jovent l'any 2009. 'El Giravolt de la Família Robafaves' és un treball de recerca que engloba tota la història del fet geganter a Mataró des dels seus orígens fins a l'actualitat. Es tracta d'una activitat amb una dimensió cultural, folklòrica i històrica que ha servit per donar respostes a molts dels interrogants promulgats abans de dur a terme aquest projecte. Aquesta família de Gegants ha estat víctima de molts dels entrebancs vigents al llarg de la història així com guerres, revoltes, dictadures, etc. De manera que s'ha pogut comprovar com la política interior i exterior ha afectat a la Família Robafaves d'una manera directa. S'ha fet una investigació a través de les revistes publicades durant la transició democràtica. També cal dir que, s'ha tingut el recolzament d'entrevistes fetes a persones puntals en la història dels Gegants com ara geganters, Caps de Colla, la primera gegantera de la Família Robafaves, etc. Per poder corroborar la base teòrica i documental d'aquest treball s'ha fet un estudi estadístic de la significació social de la Festa Major de Mataró per poder valorar en quina situació es troba actualment. Així doncs, s'ha pogut valorar la influència i importància que tenen els Gegants per Mataró.

Civil war and foreign influence

We study a symmetric information bargaining model of civil war where a third (foreign) party can affect the probabilities of winning the conflict and the size of the post conflict spoils. We show that the possible alliance with a third party makes peaceful agreements difficult to reach and might lead to new commitment problems that trigger war. Also, we argue that the foreign party is likely to induce persistent informational asymmetries which might explain long lasting civil wars. We explore both political and economic incentives for a third party to intervene. The explicit consideration of political incentives leads to two predictions that allow for identifying the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence. Both predictions are confirmed for the case of the U.S. as a potential intervening nation: (i) civil wars around the world are more likely under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with U.S. presidential approval rates.

The participation of women in peace processes: the other tables

This paper argues that women’s absence in peace processes cannot be explained by their alleged lack of experience in dialogue and negotiation, but by a serious lack of will to include them in such important initiatives of change. Women have wide ranging experience in dialogue processes including many war and post-war contexts, but there has been a deliberate lack of effort to integrate them in formal peace processes. After introducing the research framework, the paper addresses women’s involvement in peace, and analyzes the role played by women in peace processes, through the cases of Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland. The paper concludes that peace processes are as gendered as wars, and for that reason gender has to be a guiding line for including women in peace processes.

The Sustainable Debts of Philip II: A Reconstruction of Spain's Fiscal Position, 1560-1598

The defaults of Philip II have attained mythical status as the origin of sovereign debt crises. Four times during his reign the king failed to honor his debts and had to renegotiate borrowing contracts. In this paper, we reassess the fiscal position of Habsburg Spain. New archival evidence allows us to derive comprehensive estimates of debt and revenue. These show that primary surpluses were sufficient to make the king's debt sustainable in most scenarios. Spain's debt burden was manageable up to the 1580s, and its fiscal position only deteriorated for good after the defeat of the "Invincible Armada." We also estimate fiscal policy reaction functions, and show that Spain under the Habsburgs was at least as "responsible" as the US in the 20th century or as Britain in the 18th century. Our results suggest that the outcome of uncertain events such as wars may influence on a history of default more than strict adherence to fiscal rules.

Poor, Hungry and Stupid: Numeracy and the Impact of High Food Prices in Industrializing Britain, 1780-1850

This paper argues that low levels of nutrition impaired cognitive development in industrializing England, and that welfare transfers mitigated the adverse effects of high food prices. Age heaping is used as an indicator of numeracy, as derived from census data. For the cohorts from 1780-1850, we analyse the effect of high grain prices during the Napoleonic Wars. We show that numeracy declined markedly for those born during the war years, especially when wheat was dear. Crucially, where the Old Poor Law provided for generous relief payments, the adverse impact of high prices for foodstuffs was mitigated. Finally, we show some tentative evidence that Englishmen born in areas with low income support selected into occupations with lower cognitive requirements.

The Speed of the Financial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare’s Bank

Finance is important for development, yet the onset of modern economic growth in Britain lagged the British financial revolution by over a century. We present evidence from a new West-End London private bank to explain this delay. Hoare’s Bank loaned primarily to a highly select and well-born clientele, although it did not discriminate against “unknown” borrowers in the early 18th century. It could not extend credit more generally because of government restrictions (usury limits) and policies (frequent wars). Britain’s financial development could have aided growth substantially, had it not been for the rigidities and turmoil introduced by government interference.

The Three Horsemen of Growth: Plague, War and Urbanization in Early Modern Europe

How did Europe overtake China? We construct a simple Malthusian model with two sectors, and use it to explain how European per capita incomes and urbanization rates could surge ahead of Chinese ones. That living standards could exceed subsistence levels at all in a Malthusian setting should be surprising. Rising fertility and falling mortality ought to have reversed any gains. We show that productivity growth in Europe can only explain a small fraction of rising living standards. Population dynamics - changes of the birth and death schedules - were far more important drivers of the longrun Malthusian equilibrium. The Black Death raised wages substantially, creating important knock-on effects. Because of Engel's Law, demand for urban products increased, raising urban wages and attracting migrants from rural areas. European cities were unhealthy, especially compared to Far Eastern ones. Urbanization pushed up aggregate death rates. This effect was reinforced by more frequent wars (fed by city wealth) and disease spread by trade. Thus, higher wages themselves reduced population pressure. Without technological change, our model can account for the sharp rise in European urbanization as well as permanently higher per capita incomes. We complement our calibration exercise with a detailed analysis of intra-European growth in the early modern period. Using a panel of European states in the period 1300-1700, we show that war frequency can explain a good share of the divergent fortunes within Europe.

The implicit theory of historical change in the work of Alan S. Milward

Alan S. Milward was an economic historian who developed an implicit theory ofhistorical change. His interpretation which was neither liberal nor Marxist positedthat social, political, and economic change, for it to be sustainable, had to be agradual process rather than one resulting from a sudden, cataclysmicrevolutionary event occurring in one sector of the economy or society. Benignchange depended much less on natural resource endowment or technologicaldevelopments than on the ability of state institutions to respond to changingpolitical demands from within each society. State bureaucracies were fundamentalto formulating those political demands and advising politicians of ways to meetthem. Since each society was different there was no single model of developmentto be adopted or which could be imposed successfully by one nation-state onothers, either through force or through foreign aid programs. Nor coulddevelopment be promoted simply by copying the model of a more successfuleconomy. Each nation-state had to find its own response to the political demandsarising from within its society. Integration occurred when a number of nation states shared similar political objectives which they could not meet individuallybut could meet collectively. It was not simply the result of their increasinginterdependence. It was how and whether nation-states responded to thesedomestic demands which determined the nature of historical change.