A logistic regression approach to estimating customer profit loss due to lapses in insurance

This article focuses on business risk management in the insurance industry. A methodology for estimating the profit loss caused by each customer in the portfolio due to policy cancellation is proposed. Using data from a European insurance company, customer behaviour over time is analyzed in order to estimate the probability of policy cancelation and the resulting potential profit loss due to cancellation. Customers may have up to two different lines of business contracts: motor insurance and other diverse insurance (such as, home contents, life or accident insurance). Implications for understanding customer cancellation behaviour as the core of business risk management are outlined.

Modelling the disability severity score in motor insurance claims: an application to the Spanish case

Bodily injury claims have the greatest impact on the claim costs of motor insurance companies. The disability severity of motor claims is assessed in numerous European countries by means of score systems. In this paper a zero inflated generalized Poisson regression model is implemented to estimate the disability severity score of victims in-volved in motor accidents on Spanish roads. We show that the injury severity estimates may be automatically converted into financial terms by insurers at any point of the claim handling process. As such, the methodology described may be used by motor insurers operating in the Spanish market to monitor the size of bodily injury claims. By using insurance data, various applications are presented in which the score estimate of disability severity is of value to insurers, either for computing the claim compensation or for claim reserve purposes.

Individual prediction of automobile bodily injury claims liabilities

[spa] La mayoría de siniestros con daños corporales se liquidan mediante negociación, llegando a juicio menos del 5% de los casos. Una estrategia de negociación bien definida es, por tanto, fundamental para las compañías aseguradoras. En este artículo asumimos que la compensación monetaria concedida en juicio es la máxima cuantía que debería ser ofrecida por el asegurador en el proceso de negociación. Usando una base de datos real, implementamos un modelo log-lineal para estimar la máxima oferta de negociación. Perturbaciones no-esféricas son detectadas. Correlación ocurre cuando más de una siniestro se liquida en la misma sentencia judicial. Heterocedasticidad por grupos se debe a la influencia de la valoración del forense en la indemnización final.

Individual prediction of automobile bodily injury claims liabilities

[spa] La mayoría de siniestros con daños corporales se liquidan mediante negociación, llegando a juicio menos del 5% de los casos. Una estrategia de negociación bien definida es, por tanto, fundamental para las compañías aseguradoras. En este artículo asumimos que la compensación monetaria concedida en juicio es la máxima cuantía que debería ser ofrecida por el asegurador en el proceso de negociación. Usando una base de datos real, implementamos un modelo log-lineal para estimar la máxima oferta de negociación. Perturbaciones no-esféricas son detectadas. Correlación ocurre cuando más de una siniestro se liquida en la misma sentencia judicial. Heterocedasticidad por grupos se debe a la influencia de la valoración del forense en la indemnización final.

Influence of the claimant’s behavioural features on motor compensation outcomes

The decision to settle a motor insurance claim by either negotiation or trial is analysed. This decision may depend on how risk and confrontation adverse or pessimistic the claimant is. The extent to which these behavioural features of the claimant might influence the final compensation amount are examined. An empirical analysis, fitting a switching regression model to a Spanish database, is conducted in order to analyze whether the choice of the conflict resolution procedure is endogenous to the compensation outcomes. The results show that compensations awarded by courts are always higher, although 95% of cases are settled by negotiation. We show that this is because claimants are adverse to risk and confrontation, and are pessimistic about their chances at trial. By contrast, insurers are risk - confrontation neutral and more objective in relation to the expected trial compensation. During the negotiation insurers accept to pay the subjective compensation values of claimants, since these values are lower than their estimates of compensations at trial.

Determinants of the decision to appeal against motor bodily injury settlements awarded by Spanish trial courts

Automobile bodily injury disputes represent one of the main causes of litigation faced by Spanish Courts. In this paper a multinomial model is implemented to analyse which factors determine the decision to appeal against the verdicts of trial courts. Use of a dataset of motor insurance claims revealed differences between the determinants of a claimant’s decision to appeal and those of insurers. Among other results it is shown that discrepancies regarding the permanent disability sustained affect the insurer’s decision to appeal. In contrast, the claimant pays more attention to differences in the stated temporary disability. Conclusions are drawn regarding which factors could reduce the percentage of appealed cases.

Full insurance, asymmetric information and genetic testing

This paper extends previous resuls on optimal insurance trading in the presence of a stock market that allows continuous asset trading and substantial personal heterogeneity, and applies those results in a context of asymmetric informationwith references to the role of genetic testing in insurance markets.We find a novel and surprising result under symmetric information:agents may optimally prefer to purchase full insurance despitethe presence of unfairly priced insurance contracts, and other assets which are correlated with insurance.Asymmetric information has a Hirschleifer-type effect whichcan be solved by suspending insurance trading. Nevertheless,agents can attain their first best allocations, which suggeststhat the practice of restricting insurance not to be contingenton genetic tests can be efficient.

Implications of dynamic trading for insurance markets

We study the interaction between insurance and capital markets within singlebut general framework.We show that capital markets greatly enhance the risksharing capacity of insurance markets and the scope of risks that areinsurable because efficiency does not depend on the number of agents atrisk, nor on risks being independent, nor on the preferences and endowmentsof agents at risk being the same. We show that agents share risks by buyingfull coverage for their individual risks and provide insurance capitalthrough stock markets.We show that aggregate risk enters private insuranceas positive loading on insurance prices and despite that agents will buyfull coverage. The loading is determined by the risk premium of investorsin the stock market and hence does not depend on the agent s willingnessto pay. Agents provide insurance capital by trading an equally weightedportfolio of insurance company shares and riskless asset. We are able toconstruct agents optimal trading strategies explicitly and for verygeneral preferences.

Equilibrium unemployment insurance

In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insuranceinto a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictionsand on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populatedby identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distributionof human capital across agents, may choose very different unemploymentinsurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interactionbetween the political decision about the level of the unemployment insuranceand the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to aself-reinforcing mechanism whichmay generate multiple steady-stateequilibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with highunemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist withan American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnoverand low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model featurestwo distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and durationrates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.

Insurance with frequent trading

This paper looks at the dynamic management of risk in an economy with discrete time consumption and endowments and continuous trading. I study how agents in such an economy deal with all the risk in the economy and attain their Pareto optimal allocations by trading in a few natural securities: private insurance contracts and a common set of derivatives on the aggregate endowment. The parsimonious nature ofthe implied securities needed for Pareto optimality suggests that insuch contexts complete markets is a very reasonable assumption.

A positive theory of geographic mobility and social insurance

This paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model thatcan explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility,unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote overunemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary effects ofinsurance on the performance of the labor market into consideration.Agents with higher cost of moving, i.e., more attached to their currentlocation, prefer more generous UI. The key assumption is that an agent'sattachment to a location increases the longer she has resided there. UIreduces the incentive for labor mobility and increases, therefore, thefraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. The mainresult is that this self-reinforcing mechanism can give rise to multiplesteady-states-one 'European' steady-state featuring high unemployment,low geographical mobility and high unemployment insurance, and one'American' steady-state featuring low unemployment, high mobility andlow unemployment insurance.

Consumption, investment and life insurance strategies with heterogeneous discounting

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza l'efecte que comporta l'introducció de preferències inconsistents temporalment sobre les decisions òptimes de consum, inversió i compra d'assegurança de vida. En concret, es pretén recollir la creixent importància que un individu dóna a la herència que deixa i a la riquesa disponible per a la seva jubilació al llarg de la seva vida laboral. Amb aquesta finalitat, es parteix d'un model estocàstic en temps continu amb temps final aleatori, i s'introdueix el descompte heterogeni, considerant un agent amb una distribució de vida residual coneguda. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es resol una equació de programació dinàmica no estàndard. Per al cas de funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA es troben solucions explícites. Finalment, els resultats obtinguts s'il·lustren numèricament.

Consumption, investment and life insurance strategies with heterogeneous discounting

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza l'efecte que comporta l'introducció de preferències inconsistents temporalment sobre les decisions òptimes de consum, inversió i compra d'assegurança de vida. En concret, es pretén recollir la creixent importància que un individu dóna a la herència que deixa i a la riquesa disponible per a la seva jubilació al llarg de la seva vida laboral. Amb aquesta finalitat, es parteix d'un model estocàstic en temps continu amb temps final aleatori, i s'introdueix el descompte heterogeni, considerant un agent amb una distribució de vida residual coneguda. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es resol una equació de programació dinàmica no estàndard. Per al cas de funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA es troben solucions explícites. Finalment, els resultats obtinguts s'il·lustren numèricament.

Evaluación de fondos de inversión garantizados por medio de portfolio insurance

La elaboración de un índice de performance para la evaluación de carteras de inversión tiene como base la correcta definición de la medida de riesgo a emplear. Este trabajo tiene como objetivo proponer una medida de performance adecuada a la evaluación de carteras de fondos de inversión garantizados. Las particularidades de este tipo de fondos hacen necesario definir una medida explicativa de las características especificas de riesgo de este tipo de carteras. Partiendo de la estrategia de porfolio insurance se define una nueva medida de riesgo basada en el downside risk. Proponemos como medida de downside risk aquella parte del riesgo total de una cartera de títulos que se elimina con la estrategia de portfolio insurance. Por contraposición, proponemos como medida de upside risk aquella otra parte del riesgo total de la cartera que no desaparece con la estrategia de portfolio insurance. De este modo, la suma del upside risk y del downside risk es el riesgo total. Partiendo de la medida de riesgo upside risk y del modelo de valoración de activos C.A.P.M. se propone una medida de performance específica para evaluar los fondos de inversión garantizados.

Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.