Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention

Recent studies of American politics evidence that political polarization of both the electorate and the political elite have moved 'almost in tandem for the past half century' (McCarty et al., 2003, p.2), and that party polarization has steadily increased since the 1970s. On the other hand, the empirical literature on party platforms and implemented policies has consistently found an imperfect but nonnegligible correlation between electoral platforms and governmental policies: while platforms tend to be polarized, policies are moderate or centrist. However, existing theoretical models of political competition are not manifestly compatible with these observations. In this paper, we distinguish between electoral platforms and implemented policies by incorporating a non-trivial policy-setting process. It follows that voters may care not only about the implemented policy but also about the platform they support with their vote. We find that while parties tend to polarize their positions, the risk of alienating their constituency prevents them from radicalizing. The analysis evidences that the distribution of the electorate, and not only the (expected) location of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policies. Our results are consistent with the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the alienation and indifference components of abstention.

Electoral platforms, implemented policies and abstention

Recent studies of American politics evidence that political polarization of both the electorate and the political elite have moved 'almost in tandem for the past half century' (McCarty et al., 2003, p.2), and that party polarization has steadily increased since the 1970s. On the other hand, the empirical literature on party platforms and implemented policies has consistently found an imperfect but nonnegligible correlation between electoral platforms and governmental policies: while platforms tend to be polarized, policies are moderate or centrist. However, existing theoretical models of political competition are not manifestly compatible with these observations.In this paper, we distinguish between electoral platforms and implemented policies by incorporating a non-trivial policy-setting process. It follows that voters may care not only about the implemented policy but also about the platform they support with their vote. We find that while parties tend to polarize their positions, the risk of alienating their constituency prevents them from radicalizing. The analysis evidences that the distribution of the electorate, and not only the (expected) location of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policies. Our results are consistent with the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the alienation and indifference components of abstention.

Associationism and electoral participation: A multilevel study of 2000 Spanish general election

This work presents an application of the multilevel analysis techniques tothe study of the abstention in the 2000 Spanish general election. Theinterest of the study is both, substantive and methodological. From thesubstantive point of view the article intends to explain the causes ofabstention and analyze the impact of associationism on it. From themethodological point of view it is intended to analyze the interaction betweenindividual and context with a modelisation that takes into account thehierarchical structure of data. The multilevel study of this paper validatesthe one level results obtained in previous analysis of the abstention andshows that only a fraction of the differences in abstention are explained bythe individual characteristics of the electors. Another important fraction ofthese differences is due to the political and social characteristics of thecontext. Relating to associationism, the data suggest that individualparticipation in associations decrease the probability of abstention. However,better indicators are needed in order to catch more properly the effect ofassociationism in electoral behaviour.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.

Voting with preferences over margins of victory

This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative.The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the benefit of voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.

Voto dual y abstención diferencial. Un estudio sobre el comportamiento electoral en Cataluña

En este trabajo se presentan los resultados de un estudio empírico sobre los motivos del cambio sistemático de resultados electorales que se da en Cataluña según el ámbito de la convocatoria electoral de que se trate. La hipótesis, contrastada positivamente con datos del período 1982-1993, es que la victoria del partido nacionalista de centro derecha en las elecciones autonómicas en un territorio donde vencen siempre los socialistas en las elecciones legislativas se debe a la combinación de los fenómenos del voto dual y del abstencionismo diferencial. La aproximación metodológica de la elección racional permite construir grupos de electores que tienen distintas percepciones del espacio en el que se dirime la competición política, hecho que les induce a un comportamiento electoral diferenciado. Combinando estos resultados con los obtenidos del análisis con datos socioestructurales agregados, se establece un cierto perfil de los votantes duales y de los abstencionistas diferenciales. Finalmente, se realiza una interpretación de los resultados de las elecciones catalanas de 1995 y 1999 a la luz de los resultados de este estudio.This article presents the results of an empirical study about the reasons of the systematic change in the electoral results in Catalonia according to the type of elections. The hypothesis, positively tested with data from the period 1982-1993, is that the victory of the nationalist centre-right party in the autonomous elections in a region where always wins the socialist party in general elections, is due to the combination of the dual vote and differential abstention phenomena. The rational choice methodological approach allow to construct groups of electors with different perceptions about the space in which the political race takes place, fact that induces them different electoral behaviour. In combining these results with those obtained from the analysis with aggregated social and structural data, it is defined a certain the profile of the dual voters and the differential non-voters. Finally, it is given an interpretation of the Catalan election results in 1995 and 1999 using as a clue the results of this study.

Abstenció diferencial, vot dual i vot diferencial a L'Hospitalet de Llobregat : Estudi sobre el comportament electoral a L'Hospitalet de Llobregat entre 1979 i 2014

Aquest treball presenta un anàlisi sobre el comportament electoral a L'Hospitalet de Llobregat entre 1979 i 2014, en relació als diferents nivells de participació electoral i les diferències en el vot a partits que es produeixen segons l'àmbit de la convocatòria electoral.

Online and Offline Participation at the Local Level : A Quantitative Analysis of the Catalan Municipalities

This paper presents a first analysis on local electronic participatory experiences in Catalonia. The analysis is based on a database constructed and collected by the authors. The paper carries out an explanatory analysis of local initiatives in eparticipationand off line participation taking into account political variables (usually not considered in this kind of analysis) but also classical socio-economic variables that characterise municipalities. Hence, we add a quantitative analysis to the numerous case studies on local e-participation experiences. We have chosen Catalonia because is one of the European regions with more initiatives and one that has enjoyed considerable local governmental support to citizen participation initiatives since the 80s. The paper offers a characterisation of these experiences and a first explanatory analysis, considering: i) the institutional context in which these experiences are embedded, ii) the characteristics of the citizen participation processes and mechanisms on-line, and iii) a set of explanatory variables composed by the population size, thepolitical adscription of the mayor, the electoral abstention rate, age, income and level ofeducation in the municipality. The model that we present is explanatory for the municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants but it is not for the fewer than 20,000inhabitants. Actually, the number of participatory activities developed by these last municipalities is very low. Among all the variables, population size becomes the mostinfluential variable. Political variables such as political party of the mayor and the localabstention rate have a certain influence but that have to be controlled by population size.

Online and Offline Participation at the Local level: A Quantitative Analysis of the Catalan Municipalities

This article presents an analysis on local participatory experiences in Catalonia,both online and in-person. The analysis is based on a database set up by theauthors. The article carries out an explanatory analysis of local participatoryinitiatives (on- and offline) taking into account political variables (not usually con-sidered in this kind of analysis) and also classical socio-economic variables thatcharacterize municipalities. Hence, we add a quantitative analysis to the numerouscase studies on local e-participation experiences. We have chosen Catalonia becauseit is one of the European regions with more initiatives and a considerable localgovernment support for citizen participation initiatives since the 1980s. Thearticle offers a characterization of these experiences and an explanatory analysis,considering: (i) the institutional context in which these experiences are embedded,(ii) the citizen participation processes and mechanisms online and (iii) a set ofexplanatory variables composed of the population size and the province to whichthe municipality belongs, the political tendency of the mayor, the electoral absten-tion rate, age, income, level of education, broadband connection and users of theInternet in the municipality. The model that we present is explanatory for munici-palities with more than 20,000 inhabitants but it is not for fewer than 20,000inhabitants. Actually, the majority of these latter municipalities have not developedany participatory activities. Among all the variables, population size is the mostinfluential variable and affects the influence of other variables, such as the politicalparty of the mayor, the local abstention rate and the province.