46 resultados para 360° partnership strategy
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
The Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference (1995) was intended to be a launching pad" for creating a new, innovative relationship between the EU-Fifteen and a selected set of non-member Middle Eastern and North African countries. The Barcelona Process was to become the European Union´s first attempt, of several, to create postmodern inclusive policy spheres as a way to deal with the post-enlargement problems of ´ins´ and outs´ in its immediate periphery. Nevertheless, in spite of geographical proximity, common problems and stated interest in creating amorphous EU borders in different sectors, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is today all but abandoned. This paper will examine some of the factors behind the current degeneration of the EU´s post-bipolar foreign policy strategy in the Mediterranean, by exploring the dialectic between the Union´s desire to expand its geopolitical, economic and cultural boundaries and the need to secure its territorial area (from migration, proliferation, social instability etc.). In the final part of the paper some suggestions for how to revive the relationship across the Mare Nostrum will be forwarded.
Resumo:
For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.
Resumo:
A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is hard or impossible to find nontrivial social choice functions satisfying even the weakest condition of individual strategy-proofness. However, there are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. This is the case, for example, when preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped. In other cases, this equivalence does not hold. We provide sufficient conditions defining domains of preferences guaranteeing that individual and group strategy-proofness are equivalent for all rules defined on the
Resumo:
Nobody would deny that we today live in a globalized world. Our digitalized living daily revises our worldwide mindmaps. Thanks to free trade and travel our material and social worlds have become global as well. This radical sociocultural change has since the last decade been preached all over the world with public institutions and business-interest organizations as megaphones. Since those carrying the globalization message mainly represent nations or super-nations such as the EU, the viewpoints of lower-level actors such as regions, localities, firms and individual citizens have seldom been considered. Paternalistically (super-)national bodies have instructured its subjects, not the least the many small firms that populate the (private) economy, what action to take. The basic message is: submit to the global forces – local is not beautiful any longer.
Resumo:
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.
Resumo:
This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 2, Edited by K. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumura
Resumo:
Este trabajo tiene como propósito presentar y valorar, desde la perspectiva del alumnado participante, un proyecto de investigación-formación puesto en marcha durante el curso 2003-2004 en la elaboración del trabajo de tesina, fin de carrera, en la Escuela de Enfermería de Vitoria, dentro del programa de Licenciatura Europea de Enfermería. Constituye el punto de partida de un proyecto a largo plazo, iniciado con la intención de desarrollar principios teóricos y procedimientos prácticos que nos permitan sistematizar procesos formativos que, centrados en la investigación, articulen la teoría y la práctica e integren una perspectiva comunicativa y cooperativa.
Resumo:
This working paper shows the evolution of the Aceh conflict until its peaceful resolution in 2005. The key factors in the success of this peace process have been the confluence of several factors related to the internal and external dynamics of the country, including the new political leadership, the decreasing role of the military power, the international support and the meeting of the objectives of both groups, and so on. The end of the conflict in Aceh shows that the administrative decentralization and the promotion of the political participation of the main actors involved have made possible the development of a solid alternative to the arms strategy of conflict resolution used for years in Indonesia.
Resumo:
We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections between the defined concepts under different assumptions on their domains of definition. We characterize the social choice functions that satisfy each one of them and whose ranges consist of two alternatives, in terms of two types of basic properties.
Resumo:
This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a firm's optimal R&D strategy choice. In this paper a firm's R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal firms. characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. In the theoretical model this yields three types of equilibria in which either all firms innovate, some firms innovate and others imitate, or no firm innovates. Firms'equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We find that the efficiency of intellectual property rights protection positively affects firms'incentives to engage in R&D, while competitive pressure has a negative effect. In addition, smaller firms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. These results are supported by empirical evidence for German .rms from manufacturing and services sectors. Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous effect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account specific market and firm characteristics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C35, D43, L13, L22, O31. Keywords: Innovation; imitation; spillovers; product differentiation; market competition; intellectual property rights protection.
Resumo:
El proyecto consiste en la realización de un juego online para la consola de Microsoft Xbox 360 titulado IceFire. El videojuego pertenece al género de los MOBA y permitirá a los usuarios jugar de forma offline en el modo práctica pero tambien en un modo online donde crear o unirse a salas de juego donde empezar partidas en las que podrán elegir entre dos personajes distintos con sus habilidades propias y enfrentarse con su rival.
Resumo:
El presente proyecto consiste en la creación de un videojuego sencillo para la consola Xbox 360. Se trata de un “Shoot'em up” o juego de naves, en el que deberemos ir esquivando y matando a nuestros enemigos. Todo esto ha sido posible gracias a las librerías XNA que permiten crear código en C# que la consola Xbox 360 puede leer. Así pues, disponemos de una pantalla de presentación, un menú principal, una pantalla con tres oleadas distintas de enemigos y un jefe final y un selector de idiomas y otro de dificultades. Todo esto creado en un entorno que mezcla el espacio y la música para darle una estética única y una identidad propia.
Resumo:
A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of definition. For the same reason, different conditions may be equivalent for functions defined on some domains, while different in other cases. Understanding the role of domains is therefore a crucial issue in mechanism design. We illustrate this point by analyzing the role of different conditions that are always related, but not always equivalent to strategy-proofness. We define two very natural conditions that are necessary for strategy-proofness: monotonicity and reshuffling invariance. We remark that they are not always sufficient. Then, we identify a domain condition, called intertwinedness, that ensures the equivalence between our two conditions and that of strategy-proofness. We prove that some important domains are intertwined: those of single-peaked preferences, both with public and private goods, and also those arising in simple models of house allocation. We prove that other necessary conditions for strategy-proofness also become equivalent to ours when applied to functions defined on intertwined domains, even if they are not equivalent in general. We also study the relationship between our domain restrictions and others that appear in the literature, proving that we are indeed introducing a novel proposal.
Resumo:
Coded structured light is an optical technique based on active stereovision that obtains the shape of objects. One shot techniques are based on projecting a unique light pattern with an LCD projector so that grabbing an image with a camera, a large number of correspondences can be obtained. Then, a 3D reconstruction of the illuminated object can be recovered by means of triangulation. The most used strategy to encode one-shot patterns is based on De Bruijn sequences. In This work a new way to design patterns using this type of sequences is presented. The new coding strategy minimises the number of required colours and maximises both the resolution and the accuracy