Towards a theory of the credit-risk balance sheet (II). The evolution of its structure

This article has an immediate predecessor, upon which it is based and with which readers must necessarily be familiar: Towards a Theory of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (Vallverdú, Somoza and Moya, 2006). The Balance Sheet is conceptualised on the basis of the duality of a credit-based transaction; it deals with its theoretical foundations, providing evidence of a causal credit-risk duality, that is, a true causal relationship; its characteristics, properties and its static and dynamic characteristics are analyzed. This article, which provides a logical continuation to the previous one, studies the evolution of the structure of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet as a consequence of a business¿s dynamics in the credit area. Given the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet of a company at any given time, it attempts to estimate, by means of sequential analysis, its structural evolution, showing its usefulness in the management and control of credit and risk. To do this, it bases itself, with the necessary adaptations, on the by-now classic works of Palomba and Cutolo. The establishment of the corresponding transformation matrices allows one to move from an initial balance sheet structure to a final, future one, to understand its credit-risk situation trends, as well as to make possible its monitoring and control, basic elements in providing support for risk management.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Monge assignment games

Un juego de asignación se define por una matriz A; donde cada fila representa un comprador y cada columna un vendedor. Si el comprador i se empareja a un vendedor j; el mercado produce aij unidades de utilidad. Estudiamos los juegos de asignación de Monge, es decir, aquellos juegos bilaterales de asignación en los cuales la matriz satisface la propiedad de Monge. Estas matrices pueden caracterizarse por el hecho de que en cualquier submatriz 2x2 un emparejamiento óptimo está situado en la diagonal principal. Para mercados cuadrados, describimos sus núcleos utilizando sólo la parte central tridiagonal de elementos de la matriz. Obtenemos una fórmula cerrada para el reparto óptimo de los compradores dentro del núcleo y para el reparto óptimo de los vendedores dentro del núcleo. Analizamos también los mercados no cuadrados reduciéndolos a matrices cuadradas apropiadas.

On the coincidence between the Shimomura's bargaining sets and the core

[cat] En l'article es dona una condició necessària per a que els conjunts de negociació definits per Shimomura (1997) i el nucli d'un joc cooperatiu amb utilitat transferible coincideixin. A tal efecte, s'introdueix el concepte de vectors de màxim pagament. La condició necessària consiteix a verificar que aquests vectors pertanyen al nucli del joc.

Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.

The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach

This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominatedimputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms alsocharacterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balancedgames, and superadditive games

Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition

A sequential weakly efficient two-auction game with entry costs, interdependence between objects, two potential bidders and IPV assumption is presented here in order to give some theoretical predictions on the effects of geographical scale economies on local service privatization performance. It is shown that the first object seller takes profit of this interdependence. The interdependence externality rises effective competition for the first object, expressed as the probability of having more than one final bidder. Besides, if there is more than one final bidder in the first auction, seller extracts the entire bidder¿s expected future surplus differential between having won the first auction and having lost. Consequences for second object seller are less clear, reflecting the contradictory nature of the two main effects of object interdependence. On the one hand, first auction winner becomes ¿stronger¿, so that expected payments rise in a competitive environment. On the other hand, first auction loser becomes relatively ¿weaker¿, hence (probably) reducing effective competition for the second object. Additionally, some contributions to static auction theory with entry cost and asymmetric bidders are presented in the appendix

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

Vertically coupled quantum dots in the local spin-density functional theory

We have investigated the structure of double quantum dots vertically coupled at zero magnetic field within local-spin-density functional theory. The dots are identical and have a finite width, and the whole system is axially symmetric. We first discuss the effect of thickness on the addition spectrum of one single dot. Next we describe the structure of coupled dots as a function of the interdot distance for different electron numbers. Addition spectra, Hund's rule, and molecular-type configurations are discussed. It is shown that self-interaction corrections to the density-functional results do not play a very important role in the calculated addition spectra

Freezing of 4He and its liquid-solid interface from density functional theory

We show that, at high densities, fully variational solutions of solidlike types can be obtained from a density functional formalism originally designed for liquid 4He . Motivated by this finding, we propose an extension of the method that accurately describes the solid phase and the freezing transition of liquid 4He at zero temperature. The density profile of the interface between liquid and the (0001) surface of the 4He crystal is also investigated, and its surface energy evaluated. The interfacial tension is found to be in semiquantitative agreement with experiments and with other microscopic calculations. This opens the possibility to use unbiased density functional (DF) methods to study highly nonhomogeneous systems, like 4He interacting with strongly attractive impurities and/or substrates, or the nucleation of the solid phase in the metastable liquid.

Optical response of two-dimensional few-electron concentric double quantum rings: A local-spin-density-functional theory study

We have investigated the dipole charge- and spin-density response of few-electron two-dimensional concentric nanorings as a function of the intensity of a erpendicularly applied magnetic field. We show that the dipole response displays signatures associated with the localization of electron states in the inner and outer ring favored by the perpendicularly applied magnetic field. Electron localization produces a more fragmented spectrum due to the appearance of additional edge excitations in the inner and outer ring.

Helium in polygonal nanopores at zero temperature: Density functional theory calculations

We investigate adsorption of helium in nanoscopic polygonal pores at zero temperature using a finite-range density functional theory. The adsorption potential is computed by means of a technique denoted as the elementary source method. We analyze a rhombic pore with Cs walls, where we show the existence of multiple interfacial configurations at some linear densities, which correspond to metastable states. Shape transitions and hysterectic loops appear in patterns which are richer and more complex than in a cylindrical tube with the same transverse area.

Variational Wigner-Kirkwood approach to relativistic mean field theory

The recently developed variational Wigner-Kirkwood approach is extended to the relativistic mean field theory for finite nuclei. A numerical application to the calculation of the surface energy coefficient in semi-infinite nuclear matter is presented. The new method is contrasted with the standard density functional theory and the fully quantal approach.