Tracking the invisible hand: Convergence of double auctions to competitive equilibrium

Economics is the science of want and scarcity. We show that want andscarcity, operating within a simple exchange institution (double auction),are sufficient for an economy consisting of multiple inter--related marketsto attain competitive equilibrium (CE). We generalize Gode and Sunder's(1993a, 1993b) single--market finding to multi--market economies, andexplore the role of the scarcity constraint in convergence of economies to CE.When the scarcity constraint is relaxed by allowing arbitrageurs in multiple markets to enter speculative trades, prices still converge to CE,but allocative efficiency of the economy drops. \\Optimization by individual agents, often used to derive competitive equilibria,are unnecessary for an actual economy to approximately attain such equilibria.From the failure of humans to optimize in complex tasks, one need not concludethat the equilibria derived from the competitive model are descriptivelyirrelevant. We show that even in complex economic systems, such equilibriacan be attained under a range of surprisingly weak assumptions about agentbehavior.

Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate

This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance \delta. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fails to exist in this model, except under special conditions about \delta and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve for the essentially unique symmetric mixed equilibrium, show that candidate A adopts more moderate policies than candidate D, and obtain some comparative statics results about the probability of victory and the expected distance between the two candidates' policies.

Optimization of multiclass queueing networks with changeover times via the achievable region method: Part II, the multi-station case

We address the problem of scheduling a multi-station multiclassqueueing network (MQNET) with server changeover times to minimizesteady-state mean job holding costs. We present new lower boundson the best achievable cost that emerge as the values ofmathematical programming problems (linear, semidefinite, andconvex) over relaxed formulations of the system's achievableperformance region. The constraints on achievable performancedefining these formulations are obtained by formulatingsystem's equilibrium relations. Our contributions include: (1) aflow conservation interpretation and closed formulae for theconstraints previously derived by the potential function method;(2) new work decomposition laws for MQNETs; (3) new constraints(linear, convex, and semidefinite) on the performance region offirst and second moments of queue lengths for MQNETs; (4) a fastbound for a MQNET with N customer classes computed in N steps; (5)two heuristic scheduling policies: a priority-index policy, anda policy extracted from the solution of a linear programmingrelaxation.

Comment to "Weak instruments robust tests in GMM and the New Keynesian Phillips curve" by Frank Kleibergen and Sophocles Mavroeidis

I discuss the identifiability of a structural New Keynesian Phillips curve when it is embedded in a small scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Identification problems emerge because not all the structural parameters are recoverable from the semi-structural ones and because the objective functions I consider are poorly behaved. The solution and the moment mappings are responsible for the problems.