128 resultados para individual capital
Resumo:
This paper presents a stylized model of international trade and asset price bubbles. Its central insight is that bubbles tend to appear and expand in countries where productivity is low relative to the rest of the world. These bubbles absorb local savings, eliminating inefficient investments and liberating resources that are in part used to invest in high productivity countries. Through this channel, bubbles act as a substitute for international capital flows, improving the international allocation of investment and reducing rate-of-return differentials across countries. This view of asset price bubbles could eventually provide a simple account of some real world phenomenae that have been difficult to model before, such as the recurrence and depth of financial crises or their puzzling tendency to propagate across countries.
Resumo:
Individual-specific uncertainty may increase the chances of reform beingenacted and sustained. Reform may be more likely to be enacted because amajority of agents might end up losing little from reform and a minoritygaining a lot. Under certainty, reform would therefore be rejected, butit may be enacted with uncertainty because those who end up losing believethat they might be among the winners. Reform may be more likely to besustained because, in a realistic setting, reform will increase theincentives of agents to move into those economic activities that benefit.Agents who respond to these incentives will vote to sustain reform infuture elections, even if they would have rejected reform under certainty.These points are made using the trade-model of Fernandez and Rodrik (AER,1991).
Resumo:
The assessment of Latin American long term economic performance is in urgent need ofmobilizing more data to match the pressing demands of growth analysts. We present asystematic comparison of capital goods imports for 20 Latin American countries in 1925. It relies on both the foreign trade data of the importing countries and of the major exporting countries the industrialized economies of the time. The quality of foreign trade figures is tested; an homogeneous estimate of capital goods imported is derived, and its per capita ranking is discussed providing new light on Latin American development levels before import substitution.
Resumo:
This paper studies the effects of uncertain lifetime on capitalaccumulation and growth and also the sensitivity of thoseeffects to the existence of a perfect annuities market. Themodel is an overlapping generations model with uncertainlifetimes. The technology is convex and such that the marginalproduct of capital is bounded away from zero. A contribution ofthis paper is to show that the existence of accidental bequestsmay lead the economy to an equilibrium that exhibits asymptoticgrowth, which is impossible in an economy with a perfect annuitiesmarket or with certain lifetimes. This paper also shows that ifindividuals face a positive probability of surviving in everyperiod, they may be willing to save at any age. This effect ofuncertain lifetime on savings may also lead the economy to anequilibrium exhibiting asymptotic growth even if there exists aperfect annuities market.
Resumo:
In this paper I present a model in which production requires two types of labor inputs: regular productive tasks and organizational capital, which is accumulated by workers performing organizational tasks. By allocating more workers from organizational to productive tasks, firms can temporarily increase production without hiring. The availability of this intensive margin of labor adjustment, in combination with adjustment costs along the extensive margin (search frictions, firing costs, training costs), makes it optimal to delay employment adjustments. Simulations indicate that this mechanism is quantitatively important even if only a small fraction of workers perform organizational tasks, and explains why the hiring rate is persistent and why employment is slow to recover after the end of a recession.
Resumo:
The standard deviations of capital flows to emerging countries are 80 percent higher than those to developed countries. First, we show that very little of this difference can be explained by more volatile fundamentals or by higher sensitivity to fundamentals. Second, we show that most of the difference in volatility can be accounted for by three characteristics of capital flows: (i) capital flows to emerging countries are more subject to occasional large negative shocks ( crises ) than those to developed countries, (ii) shocks are subject to contagion, and (iii) the most important one shocks to capital flows to emerging countries are more persistent than those to developed countries. Finally, we study a number of country characteristics to determine which are most associated with capital flow volatility. Our results suggest that underdevelopment of domestic financial markets, weak institutions, and low income per capita, are all associated with capital flow volatility.
Resumo:
We model firm-owned capital in a stochastic dynamic New-Keynesian generalequilibrium model à la Calvo. We find that this structure impliesequilibrium dynamics which are quantitatively di¤erent from the onesassociated with a benchmark case where households accumulate capital andrent it to firms. Our findings therefore stress the importance ofmodeling an investment decision at the firm level in addition to ameaningful price setting decision. Along the way we argue that the problemof modeling firm-owned capital with Calvo price-setting has not been solvedin a correct way in the previous literature.
Resumo:
We employ a non-parametrical approach to growth accounting (Data Envelopment Analysis,DEA) to disentangle the proximate sources of labour productivity growth in 41 nationsbetween 1929 and 1950 by decomposing productivity growth into four components:technological change; efficiency catch-up (movements towards the production frontier),capital accumulation and human capital accumulation. We show that efficiency catch-upgenerally explains productivity growth, whereas technological change and factoraccumulation were limited and distorted by the effects of war. War clearly hamperedefficiency. Moreover, an unbalanced ratio of human capital to physical capital (a gap to thetechnological leader) was crucial for efficiency catching-up.