Assessing an intuitive condition for stability under a range of traffic conditions via a generalised Lu-Kumar network

We argue the importance both of developing simple sufficientconditions for the stability of general multiclass queueing networks and also of assessing such conditions under a range of assumptions on the weight of the traffic flowing between service stations. To achieve the former, we review a peak-rate stability condition and extend its range of application and for the latter, we introduce a generalisation of the Lu-Kumar network on which the stability condition may be tested for a range of traffic configurations. The peak-rate condition is close to exact when the between-station traffic is light, but degrades as this traffic increases.

Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and constructive ambiguity

This paper addresses the issue of the optimal behaviour of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) in its microeconomic role regarding individual financial institutions in distress. It has been argued that the LOLR should not intervene at the microeconomic level and let any defaulting institution face the market discipline, as it will be confronted with the consequences of the risks it has taken. By considering a simple costbenefit analysis we show that this position may lack a sufficient foundation. We establish that, instead, uder reasonable assumptions, the optimal policy has to be conditional on the amount of uninsured debt issued by the defaulting bank. Yet in equilibrium, because the rescue policy is costly, the LOLR will not rescue all the banks that fulfill the uninsured debt requirement condition, but will follow a mixed strategy. This we interpret as the confirmation of the "creative ambiguity" principle, perfectly in line with the central bankers claim that it is efficient for them to have discretion in lending to individual institutions. Alternatively, in other cases, when the social cost of a bank's bankruptcy is too high, it is optimal for the LOLR to bail out the insititution, and this gives support to the "too big to fail" policy.

A simple access pricing rule to achieve the Ramsey outcome for interconnected networks

This paper considers a general and informationally efficient approach to determine the optimal access pricing rule for interconnected networks. It shows that there exists a simple rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price discrimination. The approach is informationally efficient in the sense that the regulator is required to know only the marginal cost structure, i.e. the marginal cost of making and terminating a call. The approach is general in that access prices can depend not only on the marginal costs but also on the retail prices, which can be observed by consumers and therefore by the regulator as well. In particular, I consider the set of linear access pricing rules which includes any fixed access price, the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Modified ECPR as special cases. I show that in this set, there is a unique rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium independently of the underlying demand conditions.

On the receiver pays principle

This paper extends the theory of network competition betweentelecommunications operators by allowing receivers to derive a surplusfrom receiving calls (call externality) and to affect the volume ofcommunications by hanging up (receiver sovereignty). We investigate theextent to which receiver charges can lead to an internalization of thecalling externality. When the receiver charge and the termination(access) charge are both regulated, there exists an e±cient equilibrium.Effciency requires a termination discount. When reception charges aremarket determined, it is optimal for each operator to set the prices foremission and reception at their off-net costs. For an appropriately chosentermination charge, the symmetric equilibrium is again effcient. Lastly,we show that network-based price discrimination creates strong incentivesfor connectivity breakdowns, even between equal networks.

Tobin meets Oates: Solidarity and the optimal fiscal federal structure

We explore the implications for the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization when people spreferences for goods and services, which classic treatments of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972)place in the purview of local governments, exhibit specific egalitarianism (Tobin, 1970), orsolidarity. We find that a system in which the central government provides a common minimumlevel of the publicly provided good, and local governments are allowed to use their ownresources to provide an even higher local level, performs better from an efficiency perspectiverelative to all other systems analyzed for a relevant range of preferences over solidarity.

Optimal taxation without state-contingent debt

To recover a version of Barro's (1979) `random walk'tax smoothing outcome, we modify Lucas and Stokey's (1983) economyto permit only risk--free debt. This imparts near unit root like behaviorto government debt, independently of the government expenditureprocess, a realistic outcome in the spirit of Barro's. We showhow the risk--free--debt--only economy confronts the Ramsey plannerwith additional constraints on equilibrium allocations thattake the form of a sequence of measurability conditions.We solve the Ramsey problem by formulating it in terms of a Lagrangian,and applying a Parameterized Expectations Algorithm tothe associated first--order conditions. The first--order conditions andnumerical impulse response functions partially affirmBarro's random walk outcome. Though the behaviors oftax rates, government surpluses, and government debts differ, allocationsare very close for computed Ramsey policies across incomplete and completemarkets economies.

Optimization of multiclass queueing networks with changeover times via the achievable region approach: Part I, the single-station case

We address the performance optimization problem in a single-stationmulticlass queueing network with changeover times by means of theachievable region approach. This approach seeks to obtainperformance bounds and scheduling policies from the solution of amathematical program over a relaxation of the system's performanceregion. Relaxed formulations (including linear, convex, nonconvexand positive semidefinite constraints) of this region are developedby formulating equilibrium relations satisfied by the system, withthe help of Palm calculus. Our contributions include: (1) newconstraints formulating equilibrium relations on server dynamics;(2) a flow conservation interpretation of the constraintspreviously derived by the potential function method; (3) newpositive semidefinite constraints; (4) new work decomposition lawsfor single-station multiclass queueing networks, which yield newconvex constraints; (5) a unified buffer occupancy method ofperformance analysis obtained from the constraints; (6) heuristicscheduling policies from the solution of the relaxations.

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

European research funding and regional technological capabilities: Network composition analysis

We use network and correspondence analysis to describe the compositionof the research networks in the European BRITE--EURAM program. Our mainfinding is that 27\% of the participants in this program fall into one oftwo sets of highly ``interconnected'' institutions --one centered aroundlarge firms (with smaller firms and research centers providing specializedservices), and the other around universities--. Moreover, these ``hubs''are composed largely of institutions coming from the technologically mostadvanced regions of Europe. This is suggestive of the difficulties of attainingEuropean ``cohesion'', as technically advanced institutions naturally linkwith partners of similar technological capabilities.

An enhanced concave program relaxation for choice network revenue management

The network choice revenue management problem models customers as choosing from an offer-set, andthe firm decides the best subset to offer at any given moment to maximize expected revenue. The resultingdynamic program for the firm is intractable and approximated by a deterministic linear programcalled the CDLP which has an exponential number of columns. However, under the choice-set paradigmwhen the segment consideration sets overlap, the CDLP is difficult to solve. Column generation has beenproposed but finding an entering column has been shown to be NP-hard. In this paper, starting with aconcave program formulation based on segment-level consideration sets called SDCP, we add a class ofconstraints called product constraints, that project onto subsets of intersections. In addition we proposea natural direct tightening of the SDCP called ?SDCP, and compare the performance of both methodson the benchmark data sets in the literature. Both the product constraints and the ?SDCP method arevery simple and easy to implement and are applicable to the case of overlapping segment considerationsets. In our computational testing on the benchmark data sets in the literature, SDCP with productconstraints achieves the CDLP value at a fraction of the CPU time taken by column generation and webelieve is a very promising approach for quickly approximating CDLP when segment consideration setsoverlap and the consideration sets themselves are relatively small.

Optimization of multiclass queueing networks with changeover times via the achievable region method: Part II, the multi-station case

We address the problem of scheduling a multi-station multiclassqueueing network (MQNET) with server changeover times to minimizesteady-state mean job holding costs. We present new lower boundson the best achievable cost that emerge as the values ofmathematical programming problems (linear, semidefinite, andconvex) over relaxed formulations of the system's achievableperformance region. The constraints on achievable performancedefining these formulations are obtained by formulatingsystem's equilibrium relations. Our contributions include: (1) aflow conservation interpretation and closed formulae for theconstraints previously derived by the potential function method;(2) new work decomposition laws for MQNETs; (3) new constraints(linear, convex, and semidefinite) on the performance region offirst and second moments of queue lengths for MQNETs; (4) a fastbound for a MQNET with N customer classes computed in N steps; (5)two heuristic scheduling policies: a priority-index policy, anda policy extracted from the solution of a linear programmingrelaxation.

A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two-way access pricing

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in linear prices, we show that there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand conditions. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under linear prices but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under this class of rules. Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network coverage or investment: for instance, we show that both static and dynamic e±ciency can be achieved at the same time.