Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas¿ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.

The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games

En aquest treball demostrem que en la classe de jocs d'assignació amb diagonal dominant (Solymosi i Raghavan, 2001), el repartiment de Thompson (que coincideix amb el valor tau) és l'únic punt del core que és maximal respecte de la relació de dominància de Lorenz, i a més coincideix amb la solucié de Dutta i Ray (1989), també coneguda com solució igualitària. En segon lloc, mitjançant una condició més forta que la de diagonal dominant, introduïm una nova classe de jocs d'assignació on cada agent obté amb la seva parella òptima almenys el doble que amb qualsevol altra parella. Per aquests jocs d'assignació amb diagonal 2-dominant, el repartiment de Thompson és l'únic punt del kernel, i per tant el nucleolo.

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.

On the nucleolus of 2 x 2 assignment games

[spa] En este artículo hallamos fórmulas para el nucleolo de juegos de asignación arbitrarios con dos compradores y dos vendedores. Se analizan cinco casos distintos, dependiendo de las entradas en la matriz de asignación. Los resultados se extienden a los casos de juegos de asignación de tipo 2 x m o m x 2.

On the coincidence between the Shimomura's bargaining sets and the core

[cat] En l'article es dona una condició necessària per a que els conjunts de negociació definits per Shimomura (1997) i el nucli d'un joc cooperatiu amb utilitat transferible coincideixin. A tal efecte, s'introdueix el concepte de vectors de màxim pagament. La condició necessària consiteix a verificar que aquests vectors pertanyen al nucli del joc.

Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

SIMSAFADIM-CLASTIC: A new approach to mathematical 3D forward simulation modelling for terrigenous and carbonate marine sedimentation

Most sedimentary modelling programs developed in recent years focus on either terrigenous or carbonate marine sedimentation. Nevertheless, only a few programs have attempted to consider mixed terrigenous-carbonate sedimentation, and most of these are two-dimensional, which is a major restriction since geological processes take place in 3D. This paper presents the basic concepts of a new 3D mathematical forward simulation model for clastic sediments, which was developed from SIMSAFADIM, a previous 3D carbonate sedimentation model. The new extended model, SIMSAFADIM-CLASTIC, simulates processes of autochthonous marine carbonate production and accumulation, together with clastic transport and sedimentation in three dimensions of both carbonate and terrigenous sediments. Other models and modelling strategies may also provide realistic and efficient tools for prediction of stratigraphic architecture and facies distribution of sedimentary deposits. However, SIMSAFADIM-CLASTIC becomes an innovative model that attempts to simulate different sediment types using a process-based approach, therefore being a useful tool for 3D prediction of stratigraphic architecture and facies distribution in sedimentary basins. This model is applied to the neogene Vallès-Penedès half-graben (western Mediterranean, NE Spain) to show the capacity of the program when applied to a realistic geologic situation involving interactions between terrigenous clastics and carbonate sediments.

On the coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the core

In this paper we prove that the Mas-Colell bargaining set coincides with the core for three-player balanced and superadditive cooperative games. This is no longer true without the superadditivity condition or for games with more than three-players. Furthermore, under the same assumptions, the coincidence between the Mas-Collel and the individual rational bargaining set (Vohra (1991)) is revealed. Keywords: Cooperative game, Mas-Colell bargaining set, balancedness, individual rational bargaining set. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

The changing relationship between commodity prices and equity prices in commodity exporting

We explore the linkage between equity and commodity markets, focusing in particular on its evolution over time. We document that a country's equity market valuehas significant out-of-sample predictive ability for the future global commodity priceindex for several primary commodity-exporting countries. The out-of-sample predictive ability of the equity market appears around 2000s. The results are robust to usingseveral control variables as well as firm-level equity data. Finally, our results indicatethat exchange rates are a better predictor of commodity prices than equity markets,especially at very short horizons.

Modelos dinámicos en finanzas

El problema de la modelización dinámica enfinanzas tiene mucho que ver con el tipo deproblema que se pretende estudiar. Es preciso teneren cuenta el subyacente así como las magnitudesque se pretende estimar para elegir el modeloadecuado.-

From caging to rouse dynamics in polymer melts with intramolecular barriers: a critical test of the mode coupling theory

By means of computer simulations and solution of the equations of the mode coupling theory (MCT),we investigate the role of the intramolecular barriers on several dynamic aspects of nonentangled polymers. The investigated dynamic range extends from the caging regime characteristic of glass-formers to the relaxation of the chain Rouse modes. We review our recent work on this question,provide new results, and critically discuss the limitations of the theory. Solutions of the MCT for the structural relaxation reproduce qualitative trends of simulations for weak and moderate barriers. However, a progressive discrepancy is revealed as the limit of stiff chains is approached. This dis-agreement does not seem related with dynamic heterogeneities, which indeed are not enhanced by increasing barrier strength. It is not connected either with the breakdown of the convolution approximation for three-point static correlations, which retains its validity for stiff chains. These findings suggest the need of an improvement of the MCT equations for polymer melts. Concerning the relaxation of the chain degrees of freedom, MCT provides a microscopic basis for time scales from chain reorientation down to the caging regime. It rationalizes, from first principles, the observed deviations from the Rouse model on increasing the barrier strength. These include anomalous scaling of relaxation times, long-time plateaux, and nonmonotonous wavelength dependence of the mode correlators.

Practical algorithms for a family of waterfilling solutions

Many engineering problems that can be formulatedas constrained optimization problems result in solutionsgiven by a waterfilling structure; the classical example is thecapacity-achieving solution for a frequency-selective channel.For simple waterfilling solutions with a single waterlevel and asingle constraint (typically, a power constraint), some algorithmshave been proposed in the literature to compute the solutionsnumerically. However, some other optimization problems result insignificantly more complicated waterfilling solutions that includemultiple waterlevels and multiple constraints. For such cases, itmay still be possible to obtain practical algorithms to evaluate thesolutions numerically but only after a painstaking inspection ofthe specific waterfilling structure. In addition, a unified view ofthe different types of waterfilling solutions and the correspondingpractical algorithms is missing.The purpose of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, itoverviews the waterfilling results existing in the literature from aunified viewpoint. On the other hand, it bridges the gap betweena wide family of waterfilling solutions and their efficient implementationin practice; to be more precise, it provides a practicalalgorithm to evaluate numerically a general waterfilling solution,which includes the currently existing waterfilling solutions andothers that may possibly appear in future problems.

Extreme-value distributions and renormalization group

In the classical theorems of extreme value theory the limits of suitably rescaled maxima of sequences of independent, identically distributed random variables are studied. The vast majority of the literature on the subject deals with affine normalization. We argue that more general normalizations are natural from a mathematical and physical point of view and work them out. The problem is approached using the language of renormalization-group transformations in the space of probability densities. The limit distributions are fixed points of the transformation and the study of its differential around them allows a local analysis of the domains of attraction and the computation of finite-size corrections.

Assignment markets with the same core

[spa] En el contexto de los juegos de asignación bilaterales, estudiamos el conjunto de matrices asociadas a mercados de asignación con el mismo nucleo. Se proporcionan condiciones sobre las entradas de la matriz que aseguran que los juegos de asignación asociados tienen el mismo núcleo. Se prueba que este conjunto de matrices que dan lugar al mismo núcleo forman un semirretículo con un número finito de elementos minimales y un único máximo. Se da una caracterización de estos elementos minimales. También se proporciona una condición suficiente para obtener un retículo.