Employment consequences of restrictive permanent contracts: Evidence from Spanish labor market reforms

Temporary employment contracts allowing unrestricted dismissals wereintroduced in Spain in 1984 and quickly came to account for most new jobs.As a result, temporary employment increased from around 10% in themid-eighties to more than 30% in the early nineties. In 1997, however,the Spanish government attempted to reduce the incidence of temporaryemployment by reducing payroll taxes and dismissal costs for permanentcontracts. In this paper, we use individual data from the Spanish LaborForce Survey to estimate the effects of reduced payroll taxes anddismissal costs on the distribution of employment and worker flows. Weexploit the fact that recent reforms apply only to certain demographicgroups to set up a natural experiment research design that can be usedto study the effects of contract regulations. Our results show that thereduction of payroll taxes and dismissal costs increased the employmentof young workers on permanent contracts, although the effects for youngwomen are not always significant. Results for older workers showinsignificant effects. The results suggest a moderately elastic responseof permanent employment to non-wage labor costs for young men. We alsofind positive effects on the transitions from unemployment and temporaryemployment into permanent employment for young and older workers, althoughthe effects for older workers are not always significant. On the otherhand, transitions from permanent employment to non-employment increasedonly for older men, suggesting that the reform had little effect ondismissals.

The daily market for funds in Europe: Mathematical appendix

This paper includes the derivations of the main expressions in the paper ``The Daily Market for Funds in Europe: Has Something Changed With the EMU?'' by G. Pérez Quirós and H. Rodríguez Mendizábal.

An experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game

We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firm in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well--specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players in such a situation.

Crises and growth: A re-evaluation

We address the question of whether growth and welfare can be higher in crisis prone economies. First, we show that there is a robust empirical link between per-capita GDP growth and negative skewness of credit growth across countries with active financial markets. That is, countries that have experienced occasional crises have grown on average faster than countries with smooth credit conditions. We then present a two-sector endogenous growth model in which financial crises can occur, and analyze the relationship between financial fragility and growth. The underlying credit market imperfections generateborrowing constraints, bottlenecks and low growth. We show that under certain conditions endogenous real exchange rate risk arises and firms find it optimal to take on credit risk in the form of currency mismatch. Along such a risky path average growth is higher, but self-fulfilling crises occur occasionally. Furthermore, we establish conditions under which the adoption of credit risk is welfare improving and brings the allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal level. The design of the model is motivated by several features of recent crises: credit risk in the form of foreign currency denominated debt; costly crises that generate firesales and widespread bankruptcies; and asymmetric sectorial responses, wherethe nontradables sector falls more than the tradables sector in the wake of crises.

On the impact of fundamentals, liquidity and coordination on market stability

We develop a coordination game to model interactions betweenfundamentals and liquidity during unstable periods in financial markets.We then propose a flexible econometric framework for estimationof the model and analysis of its quantitative implications. The specificempirical application is carry trades in the yen dollar market, includingthe turmoil of 1998. We find a generally very deep market, withlow information disparities amongst agents. We observe occasionallyepisodes of market fragility, or turmoil with up by the escalator, downby the elevator patterns in prices. The key role of strategic behaviorin the econometric model is also confirmed.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

Product market deregulation and labor market outcomes

We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulationand equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combininga Mortensen-Pissarides model with monopolistic competition in the goods marketand individual wage bargaining. Product market competition affects unemploymentvia two channels: the output expansion effect and a countervailing effect dueto a hiring externality. Competition is then linked to barriers to entry. Acalibrated model compares a high-regulation European regime to a low-regulationAnglo-American one. Our quantitative analysis suggests that under individualbargaining, no more than half a percentage point of European unemployment ratescan be attributed to entry regulation.

Globalization and the provision of incentives inside the firm: The effect of foreign competition

This paper studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the structureof compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We measure foreign competitionas import penetration and use tariffs and exchange rates as instrumental variables toestimate its causal effect on pay. We find that higher foreign competition leads tomore incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases the sensitivity of payto performance. Second, it increases whithin-firm pay differentials between executivelevels, with CEOs typically experiencing the largest wage increases, partly becausethey receive the steepest incentive contracts. Finally, higher foreign competition is alsoassociated with a higher demand for talent. These results indicate that increased foreigncompetition can explain some of the recent trends in compensation structures.

Generic entry into a regulated pharmaceutical market

The aim of this paper is to analyse empirically entry decisions by generic firms intomarkets with tough regulation. Generic drugs might be a key driver of competitionand cost containment in pharmaceutical markets. The dynamics of reforms ofpatents and pricing across drug markets in Spain are useful to identify the impact ofregulations on generic entry. Estimates from a count data model using a panel of 86active ingredients during the 1999 2005 period show that the drivers of genericentry in markets with price regulations are similar to less regulated markets: genericfirms entries are positively affected by the market size and time trend, and negativelyaffected by the number of incumbent laboratories and the number of substitutesactive ingredients. We also find that contrary to what policy makers expected, thesystem of reference pricing restrains considerably the generic entry. Short run brandname drug price reductions are obtained by governments at the cost of long runbenefits from fostering generic entry and post-patent competition into the markets.

A century of global equity market correlations

In this paper, we use a unique long-run dataset of regulatory constraints on capital account openness to explain stock market correlations. Since stock returns themselves are highly volatile, any examination of what drives correlations needs to focus on long runs of data. This is particularly true since some of the short-term changes in co-movements appear to reverse themselves (Delroy Hunter 2005). We argue that changes in the co-movement of indices have not been random. Rather, they are mainly driven by greater freedom to move funds from one country to another. In related work, Geert Bekaert and Campbell Harvey (2000) show that equity correlations increase after liberalization of capital markets, using a number of case studies from emerging countries. We examine this pattern systematically for the last century, and find it to be most pronounced in the recent past. We compare the importance of capital account openness with one main alternative explanation, the growing synchronization of economic fundamentals. We conclude that greater openness has been the single most important cause of growing correlations during the last quarter of a century, though increasingly correlated economic fundamentals also matter. In the conclusion, we offer some thoughts on why the effects of greater openness appear to be so much stronger today than they were during the last era of globalization before 1914.

The role of institutions in the contractual process

Human beings increase their productivity by specializingtheir resources and exchanging their products. Theorganization of exchange is costly, however, becausespecialized activities need coordination and incentiveshave to be aligned. This work first describes how theseexchanges are organized in an institutional environment.It then focuses on the dual effect of this environment-as with any other specialized resource, institutions maybe used for expropriation purposes. They enjoyspecialization advantages in safeguarding exchange butthey also make possible new forms of opportunism,causing new costs of exchange. Three perverse tendenciesare identified:In the legal field, there is a surplus ofmandatory rules and, at the same time, a deficit in default rules. Second, courts activity is biased againstthe quasi-judicial role of the parties and the market. Third, Market enforcement is based on reputationalassets that are badly exposed to opportunism.

Judges' cognition and market order

We argue that during the crystallization of common and civil law in the 19th century, the optimal degree of discretion in judicial rulemaking, albeit influenced by the comparative advantages of both legislative and judicial rulemaking, was mainly determined by the anti-market biases of the judiciary. The different degrees of judicial discretion adopted in both legal traditions were thus optimally adapted to different circumstances, mainly rooted in the unique, market-friendly, evolutionary transition enjoyed by English common law as opposed to the revolutionary environment of the civil law. On the Continent, constraining judicial discretion was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing a market economy. The ongoing debasement of pro-market fundamentals in both branches of the Western legal system is explained from this perspective as a consequence of increased perceptions of exogenous risks and changes in the political system, which favored the adoption of sharing solutions and removed the cognitive advantage of parliaments and political leaders.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Circulation of private notes during a currency shortage

This paper provides a search theoretical model that captures two phenomena that have characterized several episodes of monetary history: currency shortages and the circulation of privately issued notes. As usual in these models, the media of exchange are determined as part of the equilibrium. We characterize all the different equilibria and specify the conditions under which there is a currency shortage and/or privately issued notes are used as means of payment. There is multiplicity of equilibria for the entire parameter space, but there always exist an equilibrium in which notes circulate, either alone or together with coins. Hence, credit is a self-fulfilling phenomenon that depends on the beliefs of agents about the acceptability and future repayment of notes. The degree of circulation of coins depends on two crucial parameters, the intrinsic utility of holding coins and the extent with which it is possible to find exchange opportunities in the market.

Assesing the political viability of labour market reform: The case of employment protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation.Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot ofattention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer jobduration. The support for employment protection will then depend onthe value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. Wehighlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers'bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more preciselyits rate of creative destruction.