165 resultados para Wage
Resumo:
We construct a utility-based model of fluctuations, with nominal rigidities andunemployment, and draw its implications for the unemployment-inflation trade-off and for the conduct of monetary policy.We proceed in two steps. We first leave nominal rigidities aside. We show that,under a standard utility specification, productivity shocks have no effect onunemployment in the constrained efficient allocation. We then focus on theimplications of alternative real wage setting mechanisms for fluctuations in un-employment. We show the role of labor market frictions and real wage rigiditiesin determining the effects of productivity shocks on unemployment.We then introduce nominal rigidities in the form of staggered price setting byfirms. We derive the relation between inflation and unemployment and discusshow it is influenced by the presence of labor market frictions and real wagerigidities. We show the nature of the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment stabilization, and its dependence on labor market characteristics. We draw the implications for optimal monetary policy.
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This paper studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the structureof compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We measure foreign competitionas import penetration and use tariffs and exchange rates as instrumental variables toestimate its causal effect on pay. We find that higher foreign competition leads tomore incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases the sensitivity of payto performance. Second, it increases whithin-firm pay differentials between executivelevels, with CEOs typically experiencing the largest wage increases, partly becausethey receive the steepest incentive contracts. Finally, higher foreign competition is alsoassociated with a higher demand for talent. These results indicate that increased foreigncompetition can explain some of the recent trends in compensation structures.
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What explains the spatial distribution of wages across US counties? I find that two of the most important factors are spatial technology diffusion and externalities due to the aggregate scale of production. One empirical finding supporting the importance of spatial technology diffusion is that average wages in a county decrease with the average level of schooling in neighboring counties when employment in the county and average wages in neighboring counties are held constant. All empirical results are obtained using anovel instrument for (endogenous) employment at the county-leveland take into account other factors (e.g. productivity-differencesacross states, climate) that may determine wages.
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This paper provides an analytical characterization of Markov perfectequilibria in a politico-economic model with repeated voting, whereagents vote over distortionary income redistribution. The key featureof the theory is that the future constituency of redistributive policiesdepends positively on the current level of redistribution, since thisaffects both private investments and the future distribution of voters.Agents vote rationally and fullly anticipate the effects of their politicalchoice on both private incentives and future voting outcomes. The modelfeatures multiple equilibria. In "pro-welfare" equilibria, both welfarestate policies and their effects on distribution persist forever. In"anti-welfare equilibria", even a majority of beneficiaries ofredistributive policies vote strategically so as to induce the formationof a future majority that will vote for zero redistribution.
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We develop an equilibrium search-matching model with risk-neutral agentsand two-sided ex-ante heterogeneity. Unemployment insurance has thestandard effect of reducing employment, but also helps workers to get a suitable job. The predictions of our simple modelare consistent with the contrasting performance of the labor market in Europeand US in terms of unemployment, productivity growth and wage inequality.To show this, we construct two fictitious economies with calibratedparameters which only differ by the degree of unemployment insurance andassume that they are hit by a common technological shock which enhancesthe importance of mismatch. This shock reduces the proportion of jobs whichworkers regards as acceptable in the economy with unemployment insurance(Europe). As a result, unemployment doubles in this economy.In the laissez-faire economy (US), unemployment remains constant,but wage inequality increases more and productivity grows less due to largermismatch. The model can be used to address a number of normative issues.
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This article aims to analyse the reasons for the intensive use of childlabour in the 19th century and its subsequent decline in the first thirdof the 20th century in the context of an economy with a highly flexiblelabour supply like that of Catalonia. During the second half of the 19thcentury,factors relating to family economies, such as numerous familiesand low wages for adults, along with the technologies of the time thatrequired manual labour resources, would appear to explain the intensiveuse of child labour to the detriment of schooling. The technologicalchanges that occurred during the first third of the 20th century, thedemographic transition and adult wage increase (for both men and women)explain the schooling of children up to the age of 15 and theconsequent practical abolition of child labour in that new era ofeconomic modernisation.
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The paper shows that a matching model where technological change is partially embodied in the job match is successful in explaining the variability of unemployment and vacancies. If we incorporate long-term wage contracts into the model, it also explains a number of stylized facts on the dynamics of real wages, which have been found in the empirical labor literature.
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Estimates of the e¤ect of education on GDP (the social return to education)have been hard to reconcile with micro evidence on the private return. We present a simple explanation that combines two ideas: imperfect substitution between worker types and endogenous skill biased technological progress. When types of workers are imperfect substitutes, the supply of human capital is negatively related to its return, and a higher education level compresses wage di¤erentials. We use cross-country panel data on income inequality to estimate the private return and GDP data to estimate the social return. The results show that the private return falls by 2 percentage points when the average education level increases by a year, which is consistent with Katz and Murphy's [1992] estimate of the elasticity of substitution between worker types. We find no evidence for dynamics in the private return, and certainly not for a reversal of the negative e¤ect as described in Acemoglu [2002]. The short run social return equals the private return.
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We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulation and equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combining a job matchingmodel with monopolistic competition in the goods market and individual wage bargaining.Product market competition affects unemployment by two channels: the output expansion effect and a countervailing effect due to a hiring externality. Competition is then linked to barriers to entry. We calibrate the model to US data and perform a policy experiment to assess whether the decrease in trend unemployment during the 1980 s and 1990 s could be attributed to product market deregulation. Our quantitative analysis suggests that under individual bargaining, a decrease of less than two tenths of a percentage point of unemployment rates can be attributed to product market deregulation, a surprisingly small amount.
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Existing models of equilibrium unemployment with endogenous labor market participation are complex, generate procyclical unemployment rates and cannot match unemployment variability relative to GDP. We embed endogenous participation in a simple, tractable job market matching model, show analytically how variations in the participation rate are driven by the cross-sectional density of home productivity near the participation threshold, andhow this density translates into an extensive-margin labor supply elasticity. A calibration of the model to macro data not only matches employment and participation variabilities but also generates strongly countercyclical unemployment rates. With some wage rigidity the model also matches unemployment variations well. Furthermore, the labor supply elasticity implied by our calibration is consistent with microeconometric evidence for the US.
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Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-socialbehavior are diminished when an external authority is responsiblefor an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states that ashift of responsibility to an external authority dampens internalimpulses toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity. In a gift-exchangeexperiment, we find that subjects respond with more generosity(higher effort) when a wage is determined by a random process thanwhen it is assigned by a third party, indicating that even a slightshift in perceived responsibility for the final payoffs can changebehavior. Responsibility-alleviation is a factor in economicenvironments featuring substantial personal interaction.
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In this paper we study the evolution of the labor share in the OECD since 1970. We show it is essentially related to the capital-output ratio; that this relationship is shifted by factors like the price of imported materials or the skill mix; and that discrepancies between the marginal product of labor and the real wage (due to, e.g., product market power, union bargaining, and labor adjustment costs) cause departures from it. We provide estimates of the model with panel data on 14 industries and 14 countries for 1973-93 and use them to compute the evolution of the wage gap in Germany and the US.
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Since World War II, the United States government has made improved accessto higher education a priority. This e¤ort has substantially increasedthe number of people who complete college. We show that by reducing theeffective interest rate on borrowing for education, such policies canactually increase the gap in wages between those with a college educationand those without. The mechanism that drives our results is the signaling role of education first explored by Spence (1973). We argue that financialconstraints on education reduce the value of education as a signal. Wesolve for the reduced form relationship between the interest rate and thewage premium in the steady state of a dynamic asymmetric information model.In addition, we discuss evidence of decreases in borrowing costs for educationfinancing in the U.S.
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We use a panel of manufacturing plants from Colombia to analyze how the risein payroll tax rates over the 1980 s and 1990 s affected the labor market.Our estimates indicate that formal wages fall by between 1.4% and 2.3% as aresult of a 10% rise in payroll taxes. This 'less-than-full-shifting' islikely to be the result of weak linkages between benefits and taxes and thepresence of downward wage rigidities induced by a binding minimum wage inColombia. Because the costs of taxation are only partly shifted fromemployers to employees, employment should also fall. Our results indicatethat a 10% increase in payroll taxes lowered formal employment by between4% and 5%. In addition, we find less shifting and larger disemploymenteffects for production than non-production workers. These results suggestthat policies aimed at boosting the relative demand of low-skill workers byreducing social security taxes on those with low earnings may be effectivein a country like Colombia, especially if tax cuts are targeted to indirectbenefits.
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This study presents estimates of returns to post-secondary educationand wage differentials among graduates fromdifferent secondary schoolsin Germany. I use an empirical model that captures the basic features ofthe German education system. It controls for selection into post-secondaryeducation and treats latter as endogenous in the wage equation. Myresults show that OLS estimates are severely biased. The direction ofthe bias depends on the secondary school type. Annual returns topost-secondary education differ significantly: they are eight timeshigher for graduates from the highest secondary school than for graduatesfrom the lowest secondary school.