Incumbency (dis)advantage when citizens can propose

This paper analyses the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to citizen proposals such as the outcome of referenda or popular initiatives. We argue that these proposals constitute a potential source of electoral disadvantage when citizens factor in their evaluation of the incumbent his reaction to these proposals. This is because an incumbent politician may jeopardize his re-election by implementing policies close to his preferred ones but unpopular among the electorate. We characterize conditions under which this potential disadvantage becomes in fact an electoral advantage for the incumbent. We find that the choices of the incumbent during the legislature will be closest to citizens policy proposals when the intensity of electoral competition is neither too soft nor too tough. Finally, we use our results to discuss some implications of the use of mechanisms such as referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition and on the incumbency advantage phenomenon.

“Of Spitzenkandidaten and European Leaders”: Is the new 2014 "politicized” Presidency of the Commission going to be a real step forward in the EU legitimization process?

Thanks to ART.17.7 of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council now has to “take into account” the results of EP Elections when selecting a candidate for the role of Commission President. The European Parliament has grabbed the opportunity to launch the first electoral race for spitzenkandidaten to the Presidency. Is this the start of a new democratizing (and thus, politicizing) process for the European Union? This dissertation will try to give a possible answer to the dilemma by constructing a comprehensive framework around EP Elections 2014 that will involve both the Commission and the Parliament and an analysis of the debate beyond legal provisions and the possibility of a politicized presidency of the Commission.

La política de las coaliciones en Cataluña

En este trabajo se analizan las diferentes características de los gobiernos autonómicos de Cataluña, todos ellos de coalición. La atención se centra, especialmente, en analizar los efectos que tienen los gobiernos de coalición sobre tres grandes ámbitos: el rendimiento electoral, la distribución intracoalicional del poder y el rendimiento intergubernamental.

El funcionament de la coalició entre Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds i Esquerra Unida i Alternativa (2002-2012)

Aquest estudi té per objectiu descriure el funcionament de la coalició entre Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds i Esquerra Unida i Alternativa, centrant l’atenció en el disseny de l’aliança a partir dels acords electorals firmats i el repartiment de càrrecs electes. Té la voluntat de constatar si els resultats obtinguts per cada formació són equilibrats en funció dels resultats obtinguts per cada una d’elles en el cicle electoral 1999-2000. L’objecte d’estudi és la coalició ICV-EUiA que ha funcionat en l’arena electoral, parlamentària i de govern. Es prenen Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds i Esquerra Unida i Alternativa com actors principals, i es té en compte el pes important que té Izquierda Unida com a referent i suport d’EUiA, com a company de grup parlamentari al Congrés dels Diputats i com a soci de coalició a les eleccions europees. Trobem altres actors, com són el Partit dels Comunistes de Catalunya, el PSUC Viu o el Partido Comunista de España, que acaben influint dins d’EUiA i d’IU. Pel seu costat, hi ha d’altres actors que influeixen a ICV, com són el Partit Verd Europeu i els seu aliats a nivell d’Espanya com Equo o els membres d’Espacio Plural.

Convergència i Unió, del nacionalismo moderado al secesionismo: cambio de posición de los partidos nacionalistas y sistema de gobierno multinivel

El 11 de septiembre de 2012 una multitudinaria manifestación en Barcelona con motivo de la fiesta nacional catalana bajo el lema “Catalunya Nou Estat d’Europa”, convocada por la Asamblea Nacional Catalana, una asociación partidaria de la independencia de Catalunya, acabó precipitando un avance electoral. CiU se presentó a las nuevas elecciones con el compromiso de realizar una consulta sobre la autodeterminación de Catalunya y con un programa que incluía medidas para la creación de un estado independiente. La invocación de CiU al derecho a autodeterminación no era una novedad ya que desde los años 90, en CDC dicha propuesta aparece es aprobada en los congresos del partido y ya en el programa electoral de 2010 está claramente explicitada. Sin embargo en las elecciones de 2012 dicha cuestión monopoliza la campaña electoral y marca la agenda política catalana. Este trabajo se propone demostrar que CiU ha experimentado un cambio de posición en la dimensión centro-periferia y que ha pasado de ser un partido nacionalista moderado a ser un partido secesionista y se sostiene que este cambio de posición se debe, en parte, a la naturaleza multinivel del sistema político español. El interés del estudio de caso radica en que puede permitir avanzar en el conocimiento del cambio de posición de los partidos nacionalistas y también verificar la influencia de variables institucionales en el cambio de posición de los partidos ambos aspectos bastante ignorados por la literatura sobre el cambio de posición en los partidos hasta ahora.

An Explanatory Approach to the Political Uses of ICT Initiatives for Participation : Institutions, Context, and Characteristics of the Actors

Political actors use ICTs in a different manner and in different degrees when it comes to achieving a closer relationship between the public and politicians. Usually, political parties develop ICT strategies only for electoral campaigning and therefore restrain ICT usages to providing information and establishing a few channels of communication. By contrast, local governments make much more use of ICT tools for participatory and deliberative purposes. These differences in usages have not been well explained in the literature because of a lack of a comprehensive explanatory model. This chapter seeks to build the basis for this model, that is, to establish which factors affect and condition different political uses of ICTs and which principles underlie that behaviour. We consider that political actors are intentional and their behaviour is mediated by the political institutions and the socioeconomic context of the country. Also, though, the actor¿s own characteristics, such as the type and size of the organization or the model of e-democracy that the actor upholds, can have an influence in launching ICT initiatives for approaching the public.

Online and Offline Participation at the Local Level : A Quantitative Analysis of the Catalan Municipalities

This paper presents a first analysis on local electronic participatory experiences in Catalonia. The analysis is based on a database constructed and collected by the authors. The paper carries out an explanatory analysis of local initiatives in eparticipationand off line participation taking into account political variables (usually not considered in this kind of analysis) but also classical socio-economic variables that characterise municipalities. Hence, we add a quantitative analysis to the numerous case studies on local e-participation experiences. We have chosen Catalonia because is one of the European regions with more initiatives and one that has enjoyed considerable local governmental support to citizen participation initiatives since the 80s. The paper offers a characterisation of these experiences and a first explanatory analysis, considering: i) the institutional context in which these experiences are embedded, ii) the characteristics of the citizen participation processes and mechanisms on-line, and iii) a set of explanatory variables composed by the population size, thepolitical adscription of the mayor, the electoral abstention rate, age, income and level ofeducation in the municipality. The model that we present is explanatory for the municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants but it is not for the fewer than 20,000inhabitants. Actually, the number of participatory activities developed by these last municipalities is very low. Among all the variables, population size becomes the mostinfluential variable. Political variables such as political party of the mayor and the localabstention rate have a certain influence but that have to be controlled by population size.

Online and Offline Participation at the Local level: A Quantitative Analysis of the Catalan Municipalities

This article presents an analysis on local participatory experiences in Catalonia,both online and in-person. The analysis is based on a database set up by theauthors. The article carries out an explanatory analysis of local participatoryinitiatives (on- and offline) taking into account political variables (not usually con-sidered in this kind of analysis) and also classical socio-economic variables thatcharacterize municipalities. Hence, we add a quantitative analysis to the numerouscase studies on local e-participation experiences. We have chosen Catalonia becauseit is one of the European regions with more initiatives and a considerable localgovernment support for citizen participation initiatives since the 1980s. Thearticle offers a characterization of these experiences and an explanatory analysis,considering: (i) the institutional context in which these experiences are embedded,(ii) the citizen participation processes and mechanisms online and (iii) a set ofexplanatory variables composed of the population size and the province to whichthe municipality belongs, the political tendency of the mayor, the electoral absten-tion rate, age, income, level of education, broadband connection and users of theInternet in the municipality. The model that we present is explanatory for munici-palities with more than 20,000 inhabitants but it is not for fewer than 20,000inhabitants. Actually, the majority of these latter municipalities have not developedany participatory activities. Among all the variables, population size is the mostinfluential variable and affects the influence of other variables, such as the politicalparty of the mayor, the local abstention rate and the province.

Institutional Determinants of Military Spending

Drawing on a database for 1988-2006 containing information on 157 countries, we investigate the effects on military spending of government form, electoral rules, concentration of parliamentary parties, and ideology. From an OLS regression on pooled data, our results show that presidential democracies spend more than parliamentary systems on defense, whereas the presence of a plurality voting system will reduce the defense burden. Our findings suggest that, in contrast to theoretical predictions in the literature, institutions do not have the same impact on the provision of all public goods. We present as well evidence regarding the effect of ideology on defense spending.

Pork Barrel politics in semi-democracies: the Spanish 'Parlamentary roads', 1874-1915

This paper analyzes the effects of parliamentary representation on road infrastructure expenditure during the Spanish Restoration. Using a panel dataset of Spanish provinces in 1880-1914 we find that the allocation of administrative resources among provinces depended both on the delegation characteristics (such as the share of MPs with party leadership positions, and their degree of electoral independence), and the regime"s global search for stability. These results point to the importance of electoral dynamics within semi-democratic political systems, and offer an example of the influence of government tactics on infrastructure allocation.

Pork Barrel politics in semi-democracies: the Spanish 'Parlamentary roads', 1874-1915

This paper analyzes the effects of parliamentary representation on road infrastructure expenditure during the Spanish Restoration. Using a panel dataset of Spanish provinces in 1880-1914 we find that the allocation of administrative resources among provinces depended both on the delegation characteristics (such as the share of MPs with party leadership positions, and their degree of electoral independence), and the regime"s global search for stability. These results point to the importance of electoral dynamics within semi-democratic political systems, and offer an example of the influence of government tactics on infrastructure allocation.

La garantia jurídica de la democràcia com a dret fonamental. Una anàlisi de la jurisprudència del Tribunal Constitucional sobre la participació política

L'art. 23 de la CE consagra el dret fonamental dels ciutadans a participar en els assumptes públics, preveient-ne dues grans modalitats, la participació directa i la representativa. La doctrina jurisprudencial elaborada pel Tribunal Constitucional durant quasi trenta anys ha atorgat a aquest dret una configuració especial: el seu abast es veu reduït a l'estricta participació política (aspecte que tindrà conseqüències en el vessant de la participació directa reduïda a la iniciativa legislativa popular i el referèndum, deixant fora del seu abast altres possibles institucions participatives); però, per altra banda, amplia el nucli de protecció del dret, garantint no només l'accés dels ciutadans als càrrecs públics (un ius ad officium) en condicions d'igualtat; sinó també el dret dels representants a romandre en el seu càrrec lliures de qualsevol pertorbació i el tercer contingut, el dret dels representants a exercir les facultats inherents a la funció que desenvolupen tot atorgant-los un status constitucionalment garantit. Aquesta construcció jurisprudencial del dret esdevé així la garantia jurídica de la democràcia. Certament, aquest enteniment del dret fonamental de participació té conseqüències prou rellevants en l'àmbit dels partits polítics com a instruments fonamentals per a la participació política. L'abundància de resolucions per part del Tribunal Constitucional, majoritàriament a través de recursos d'empara, ha fet possible l'entrada del dret de participació en dos àmbits singularment rellevants del procés polític, com són el sistema electoral i el dret parlamentari, i ha permès al Tribunal construir tota una teoria de la representació política en seu de drets fonamentals.

Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism

We analyze a unidimensional model of two-candidate electoral competition where voters have im- perfect information about the candidates' policy proposals, that is, voters cannot observe the exact policy proposals of the candidates but only which candidate offers the most leftist/rightist platform. We assume that candidates are purely office motivated and that one candidate enjoys a valence advan- tage over the other. We characterize the unique Sequential Equilibrium in very-weakly undominated strategies of the game. In this equilibrium the behavior of the two candidates tends to maximum extremism, due to the voters' lack of information. But it may converge or diverge depending on the size of the advantage. For small values of the advantage candidates converge to the extreme policy most preferred by the median and for large values of the advantage candidates strategies diverge: each candidate specializes in a different extreme policy. These results are robust to the introduction of a proportion of well informed voters. In this case the degree of extremism decreases when the voters become more informed.