Does Reasoning Enhance Learning?

Utilizing the well-known Ultimatum Game, this note presents the following phenomenon. If we start with simple stimulus-response agents, learning through naive reinforcement, and then grant them some introspective capabilities, we get outcomes that are not closer but farther away from the fully introspective game-theoretic approach. The cause of this is the following: there is an asymmetry in the information that agents can deduce from their experience, and this leads to a bias in their learning process.

Strong minimax lower bounds for learning

Minimax lower bounds for concept learning state, for example, thatfor each sample size $n$ and learning rule $g_n$, there exists a distributionof the observation $X$ and a concept $C$ to be learnt such that the expectederror of $g_n$ is at least a constant times $V/n$, where $V$ is the VC dimensionof the concept class. However, these bounds do not tell anything about therate of decrease of the error for a {\sl fixed} distribution--concept pair.\\In this paper we investigate minimax lower bounds in such a--stronger--sense.We show that for several natural $k$--parameter concept classes, includingthe class of linear halfspaces, the class of balls, the class of polyhedrawith a certain number of faces, and a class of neural networks, for any{\sl sequence} of learning rules $\{g_n\}$, there exists a fixed distributionof $X$ and a fixed concept $C$ such that the expected error is larger thana constant times $k/n$ for {\sl infinitely many n}. We also obtain suchstrong minimax lower bounds for the tail distribution of the probabilityof error, which extend the corresponding minimax lower bounds.

Two-sided learning in New Keynesian models: Dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank(two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economyhave asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. Weassume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct fordifferent sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model ofthe economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs througha statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study theshort-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularlywith respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learningcan generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behaviorof the variables in the model in a significant way. Our simulations do not convergeto a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source thatinvalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identifya novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communicationcan be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified.