Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

On the coincidence between the Shimomura's bargaining sets and the core

[cat] En l'article es dona una condició necessària per a que els conjunts de negociació definits per Shimomura (1997) i el nucli d'un joc cooperatiu amb utilitat transferible coincideixin. A tal efecte, s'introdueix el concepte de vectors de màxim pagament. La condició necessària consiteix a verificar que aquests vectors pertanyen al nucli del joc.

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.

On the monotonic core

The monotonic core of a cooperative game with transferable utility (T.U.-game) is the set formed by all its Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes. In this paper we show that this set always coincides with the core of a certain game associated to the initial game.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.

On the coincidence between the Shimomura's bargaining sets and the core

[cat] En l'article es dona una condició necessària per a que els conjunts de negociació definits per Shimomura (1997) i el nucli d'un joc cooperatiu amb utilitat transferible coincideixin. A tal efecte, s'introdueix el concepte de vectors de màxim pagament. La condició necessària consiteix a verificar que aquests vectors pertanyen al nucli del joc.

'Biased' Risk Perceptions of Longevity and Disability in Old Age

Rational learning theories postulate that information channels and cognitive biases such as individual optimism may influence an individual¿s assessment of the risk of undesired events, especially with regard to those that have a cumulative nature. This is the case with disability in old age, which may take place upon survival to an advanced age, and such factors have been regarded as responsible for certain individual behaviours (for example, the limited incidence of insurance purchase). This paper examines the determinants of individual perceptions with regard to disability in old age and longevity. The cumulative nature of such perceptions of risk is tested, and potential biases are identified, including `optimism¿ and a set of information determinants. Empirical evidence from a representative survey of Catalonia is presented to illustrate these effects. The findings from this research suggest a significant overestimation of disability in old age, yet this is not the case with longevity. Furthermore, individual perceptions with regard to disability in old age, unlike those with regard to longevity, exhibit on aggregate an `optimistic bias¿ and, are perceived as `cumulative risks¿. Gender influences the perceived risk of disability in old age at a population level but not at the individual level, and the opposite holds true for age. Finally, self-reported health status is the main variable behind risk perceptions at both the individual and population level.

Els set sabers traslladats al cinema formatiu. "La Ruta Natural"

Podeu consultar el document complet de la "XVI Setmana de Cinema Formatiu" a: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/22523

Els set sabers traslladats al cinema formatiu. "Explorando la máquina de los sueños". El cine y la infancia en contextos de educación no formal

Podeu consultar el document complet de la "XVI Setmana de Cinema Formatiu" a: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/22523

Edgar Morin: Autor dels set sabers i savi educador dels nostres dies

Podeu consultar el document senser de la "XVI Setmana de Cinema Formatiu" a: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/22523

Set obres sobre retòrica i persuasió

El comentari crític de set obres sobre retòrica i persuasió, publicades recentment, ofereix una visió de diverses perspectives teòriques i també de les aplicacions a situacions comunicatives específiques. Les obres són El arte de hablar , de José Antonio Hernández Guerrero i María del Carmen García Tejera; Retórica , de Giambattista Vico, editada per primera vegada en castellà; 40 jocs per parlar català , de Jacqueline Jacquet, Sílvia Casulleras, Núria Mirabet; Acròbates de l'emoció , d'Amadeu Viana; Tres finestres obertes al món de la comunicació , de Ricard Morant i Miquel Peñarroya; El lenguaje de la negociación , de Joan Mulholland; i Tècniques de negociació i resolució de conflictes , de Carles Mendieta i Suñé.

Uncertainty, electoral incentives and political myopia

We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build aframework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectlyobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies withfuture returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability.Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, undersome conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewardscan be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limitto governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised factsand with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better fiscal discipline in a panel of 20 OECDcountries.

Global periodicity conditions for maps and recurrences via Normal Forms

We face the problem of characterizing the periodic cases in parametric families of (real or complex) rational diffeomorphisms having a fixed point. Our approach relies on the Normal Form Theory, to obtain necessary conditions for the existence of a formal linearization of the map, and on the introduction of a suitable rational parametrization of the parameters of the family. Using these tools we can find a finite set of values p for which the map can be p-periodic, reducing the problem of finding the parameters for which the periodic cases appear to simple computations. We apply our results to several two and three dimensional classes of polynomial or rational maps. In particular we find the global periodic cases for several Lyness type recurrences