Riding the South Sea bubble

This paper presents a case study of a well-informed investor in the South Sea bubble. We argue that Hoare's Bank, a fledgling West End London banker, knew that a bubble was in progress and nonetheless invested in the stock; it was profitable to "ride the bubble." Using a unique dataset on daily trades, we show that this sophisticated investor was not constrained by institutional factors such as restrictions on short sales or agency problems. Instead, this study demonstrates that predictable investor sentiment can prevent attacks on a bubble; rational investors may only attack when some coordinating event promotes joint action.

Why ethnic fractionalization? Polarization, ethnic conflict and growth

This paper ia an attempt to clarify the relationship between fractionalization,polarization and conflict. The literature on the measurement of ethnic diversityhas taken as given that the proper measure for heterogeneity can be calculatedby using the fractionalization index. This index is widely used in industrialeconomics and, for empirical purposes, the ethnolinguistic fragmentation isready available for regression exercises. Nevertheless the adequacy of asynthetic index of hetergeneity depends on the intrinsic characteristicsof the heterogeneous dimension to be measured. In the case of ethnicdiversity there is a very strong conflictive dimension. For this reasonwe argue that the measure of heterogeneity should be one of the class ofpolarization measures. In fact the intuition of the relationship betweenconflict and fractionalization do not hold for more than two groups. Incontrast with the usual problem of polarization indices, which are ofdifficult empirical implementation without making some arbitrary choiceof parameters, we show that the RQ index, proposed by Reynal-Querol (2002),is the only discrete polarization measure that satisfies the basic propertiesof polarization. Additionally we present a derivation of the RQ index froma simple rent seeking model. In the empirical section we show that whileethnic polarization has a positive effect on civil wars and, indirectly ongrowth, this effect is not present when we use ethnic fractionalization.

With a bang, not a whimper: Pricking Germany's "stock market bubble" in 1927 and the slide into depression

In May 1927, the German central bank intervenedindirectly to reduce lending to equity investors.The crash that followed ended the only stockmarket boom during Germany s relative stabilization 1924-28. This paper examines thefactors that lead to the intervention as well asits consequences. We argue that genuine concernabout the exuberant level of the stock market,in addition to worries about an inflow offoreign funds, tipped the scales in favour ofintervention. The evidence strongly suggeststhat the German central bank under HjalmarSchacht was wrong to be concerned aboutstockprices-there was no bubble. Also, theReichsbank was mistaken in its belief thata fall in the market would reduce theimportance of short-term foreign borrowing,and help to ease conditions in the money market.The misguided intervention had important realeffects. Investment suffered, helping to tipGermany into depression.

Horizontal innovation in the theory of growth and development

We analyze recent contributions to growth theory based on the model of expanding variety of Romer (1990). In the first part, we present different versions of the benchmark linear model with imperfect competition. These include the labequipment model, labor-for-intermediates and directed technical change . We review applications of the expanding variety framework to the analysis of international technology diffusion, trade, cross-country productivity differences, financial development and fluctuations. In many such applications, a key role is played by complementarities in the process of innovation.

Financial liberalization, bank crises and growth: Assessing the links

This paper studies the effects of financial liberalization and banking crises on growth. It shows that financial liberalization spurs on average economic growth. Banking crises are harmful for growth, but to a lesser extent in countries with open financial systems and good institutions. The positive effect of financial liberalization is robust to different definitions. While the removal of capital account restrictions is effective by increasing financial depth, equity market liberalization affects growth directly. The empirical analysis is performed through GMM dynamic panel data estimations on a panel of 90 countries observed in the period 1975-1999.

Financial development, financial fragility and growth

This paper studies the apparent contradiction between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (e.g., Kaminski and Reinhart 1999). The paper accounts for these contrasting effects based on the distinction between the short- and long-run impacts of financial intermediation. Working with a panel of cross-country and time-series observations, the paper estimates an encompassing model of short- and long-run effects using the Pooled Mean Group estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999). The conclusion from this analysis is that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth co-exists with a, mostly, negative short-run relationship. The paper further develops an explanation for these contrasting effects by relating them to recent theoretical models, by linking the estimated short-run effects to measures of financial fragility(namely, banking crises and financial volatility), and by jointly analyzing the effects of financial depth and fragility in classic panel growth regressions.

Regional industrialisation without national growth: The Catalan industrialization and the growth of Spanish economy (1830-1861)

This paper has two main objectives. First, it provides a stylised descriptionof the Catalan industrial path of the period 1830-1861. Second, it reviewsthe evolution of the Catalan industry in the Spanish context and, thus, canserve to describe the relative importance of the Catalan industrialexperience. Consequently, it is mainly devoted to computing and analysing thegrowth rates of Catalan industries during the early phase of industrialisation.The results show that Catalonia experienced a true process ofindustrialisation during the period 1830 to 1861, but that its contributionin rapid increase in Spanish GDP was relatively small.

15 years of new growth economics: What have we learnt?

This paper evaluates the empirical and theoretical contributions of theEconomic Growth Literature since the publication of Paul Romer s seminalpaper in 1986.

Banks, liquidity crises and economic growth

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages ofeconomic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents, who experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth enhancing role in reducing inefficient liquidation of long term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show that middle income economies may find optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system. Therefore, middle income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their development and, as they get richer, they eventually converge to a financially safe long run steady state. Finally, the model replicates the empirical fact of higher costs of banking crises for middle income economies.

Partisan competition, growth and the franchise

We present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along economic interests use the suffrage to influence implemented policies. Through the influence of these policies on the character of industrialization, we analyze the effects of franchise changes on economic growth. We identify in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth: When (1) there exist an economic conflict among the elite, (2) landed classes are not politically strong, and (3) there exists a critical mass of industrial workers, we observe both growth and democratization. The lack of conditions (1) or (2) resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition (3) drives growth-deterring democratic expansions. We provide historical support for our argument by analyzing the experience of 11 countries.

Why England? Demand, growth and inequality during the Industrial Revolution

Why was England first? And why Europe? We present a probabilistic model that builds on big-push models by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), combined with hierarchical preferences. The interaction of exogenous demographic factors (in particular the English low-pressure variant of the European marriage pattern)and redistributive institutions such as the old Poor Law combined to make an Industrial Revolution more likely. Essentially, industrialization is the result of having a critical mass of consumers that is rich enough to afford (potentially) mass-produced goods. Our model is then calibrated to match the main characteristics of the English economy in 1750 and the observed transition until 1850.This allows us to address explicitly one of the key features of the British IndustrialRevolution unearthed by economic historians over the last three decades the slowness of productivity and output change. In our calibration, we find that the probability of Britain industrializing is 5 times larger than France s. Contrary to the recent argument by Pomeranz, China in the 18th century had essentially no chance to industrialize at all. This difference is decomposed into a demographic and a policy component, with the former being far more important than the latter.

World population growth and fertility patterns, 1960-2000. A simple model explaining the evolution of world's fertility during the second half of the 20th Century

In this paper we attempt to describe the general reasons behind the world populationexplosion in the 20th century. The size of the population at the end of the century inquestion, deemed excessive by some, was a consequence of a dramatic improvementin life expectancies, attributable, in turn, to scientific innovation, the circulation ofinformation and economic growth. Nevertheless, fertility is a variable that plays acrucial role in differences in demographic growth. We identify infant mortality, femaleeducation levels and racial identity as important exogenous variables affecting fertility.It is estimated that in poor countries one additional year of primary schooling forwomen leads to 0.614 child less per couple on average (worldwide). While it may bepossible to identify a global tendency towards convergence in demographic trends,particular attention should be paid to the case of Africa, not only due to its differentdemographic patterns, but also because much of the continent's population has yet toexperience improvement in quality of life generally enjoyed across the rest of theplanet.

Gazelle companies: Growth drivers and an evolution analysis

Gazelle companies are relevant because they generate much more employment than other companies and deliver high returns to their shareholders. This paper analyzes their behavior in the years of high growth and their evolution in the following years. The main factors that explain their success are competitive advantages based on human resources, innovation, internationalization, the excellence in processes and a conservative financial policy. Nevertheless, as time goes by they can be divided in two groups: a group which continues having growth, but most of them with lower growth rates; and the rest which face great problems or even disappear. The present study identifies several key factors that explain this different evolution.

The economic tragedy of the XXth Century: Growth in Africa

The dismal growth performance of Africa is the worst economic tragedy ofthe XXth century. We document the evolution of per capita GDP for thecontinent as a whole and for subset of countries south of the Saharadesert. We document the worsening of various income inequality indexesand we estimate poverty rates and headcounts. We then analyze some ofthe central robust determinants of economic growth reported bySala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2003) and project the annual growthrates Africa would have enjoyed if these key determinants had taken OECDrather than African values. Expensive investment goods, low levels ofeducation, poor health, adverse geography, closed economies, too muchpublic expenditure and too many military conflicts are seen as keyexplanations of the economic tragedy.

Wealth, financial intermediation and growth

This paper presents empirical support for the existence of wealth effects in the contribution of financial intermediation to economic growth, and offers a theoretical explanation for these effects. Using GMM dynamic panel data techniques applied to study the growth-promoting effects of financial intermediation, we show that the exogenous contribution of financial development on economic growth has different effects for different levels of income per capita. We find that this contribution is generally increasing with thelevel of income per capita of the economy, up to a relatively high level of income. This contribution is consistently lower for poor countries; and for some low levels of income per capita it can be negative. We provide a model to account for these wealth effects. The model is a overlapping generations growth model where financial intermediaries implement liquidity risk sharing among depositors. We show that at early stages of economic development, a bank can increase welfare of its depositors only at the cost of lowering investment and growth. However, once the economy has crossed certain wealth threshold, the liquidity role of banks becomes unambiguously growth enhancing. As wealth increases, banks offer improving liquidity insurance, and higher growth; however, for high levels of wealth, growth generated byfinancial intermediation declines as the economy attains the optimal level of consumption risk sharing.