Adjustment to Target Capital, Finance, and Growth

Does financial development result in capital being reallocated more rapidly to industries where it is most productive? We argue that if this was the case, financially developed countries should see faster growth in industries with investment opportunities due to global demand and productivity shifts. Testing this cross-industry cross-country growth implication requires proxies for (latent) global industry investment opportunities. We show that tests relying only on data from specific (benchmark) countries may yield spurious evidence for or against the hypothesis. We therefore develop an alternative approach that combines benchmark-country proxies with a proxy that does not reflect opportunities specific to a country or level of financial development. Our empirical results yield clear support for the capital reallocation hypothesis.

The Three Horsemen of Growth: Plague, War and Urbanization in Early Modern Europe

How did Europe overtake China? We construct a simple Malthusian model with two sectors, and use it to explain how European per capita incomes and urbanization rates could surge ahead of Chinese ones. That living standards could exceed subsistence levels at all in a Malthusian setting should be surprising. Rising fertility and falling mortality ought to have reversed any gains. We show that productivity growth in Europe can only explain a small fraction of rising living standards. Population dynamics - changes of the birth and death schedules - were far more important drivers of the longrun Malthusian equilibrium. The Black Death raised wages substantially, creating important knock-on effects. Because of Engel's Law, demand for urban products increased, raising urban wages and attracting migrants from rural areas. European cities were unhealthy, especially compared to Far Eastern ones. Urbanization pushed up aggregate death rates. This effect was reinforced by more frequent wars (fed by city wealth) and disease spread by trade. Thus, higher wages themselves reduced population pressure. Without technological change, our model can account for the sharp rise in European urbanization as well as permanently higher per capita incomes. We complement our calibration exercise with a detailed analysis of intra-European growth in the early modern period. Using a panel of European states in the period 1300-1700, we show that war frequency can explain a good share of the divergent fortunes within Europe.

Wage rigidity and job creation

Recent research in macroeconomics emphasizes the role of wage rigidity in accounting for the volatility of unemployment fluctuations. We use worker-level datafrom the CPS to measure the sensitivity of wages of newly hired workers to changesin aggregate labor market conditions. The wage of new hires, unlike the aggregatewage, is volatile and responds almost one-to-one to changes in labor productivity.We conclude that there is little evidence for wage stickiness in the data. We alsoshow, however, that a little wage rigidity goes a long way in amplifying the responseof job creation to productivity shocks.

The skill bias of world trade

Under plausible assumptions about preferences and technology, the model in this papersuggests that the entire volume of world trade matters for wage inequality. Therefore,trade integration, even among identical countries, is likely to increase the skill premium.Further, we argue that empirical evidence of a falling relative price of skill-intensive goods can be reconciled with the fast growth of world trade and that the intersectoral mobility of capital exacerbates the effect of trade on inequality. We provide new empirical evidence in support of our results and a quantitative assessment of the skill bias of world trade.

Growing at the production frontier. European aggregate growth, 1870-1914

The view of a 1870-1913 expanding European economy providing increasing welfare to everybody has been challenged by many, then and now. We focus on the amazing growth that was experienced, its diffusion and its sources, in the context of the permanent competition among European nation states. During 1870-193 the globalized European economy reached a silver age . GDP growth was quite rapid (2.15% per annum) and diffused all over Europe. Even discounting the high rates of population growth (1.06%), per capita growth was left at a respectable 1.08%. Income per capita was rising in every country, and the rates of improvement were quite similar. This was a major achievement after two generations of highly localized growth, both geographically and socially. Growth was based on the increased use of labour and capital, but a good part of growth (73 per cent for the weighted average of the best documented European countries) came out of total factor productivity efficiency gains resulting from not well specified ultimate sources of growth. This proportion suggests that the European economy was growing at full capacity at its production frontier. It would have been very difficult to improve its performance. Within Europe, convergence was limited, and it only was in motion after 1900. What happened was more the end of the era of big divergence rather than an era of convergence.

Economic growth with bubbles

We develop a stylized model of economic growth with bubbles. In this model, changes in investorsentiment lead to the appearance and collapse of macroeconomic bubbles or pyramid schemes.We show how these bubbles mitigate the effects of financial frictions. During bubbly episodes,unproductive investors demand bubbles while productive investors supply them. These transfersof resources improve the efficiency at which the economy operates, expanding consumption, thecapital stock and output. When bubbly episodes end, these transfers stop and consumption, thecapital stock and output contract. We characterize the stochastic equilibria of the model and arguethat they provide a natural way of introducing bubble shocks into business cycle models.

Wage inequality and unemployment with overeducation

A skill-biased change in technology can account at once for the changes observed in a number of important variables of the US labour market between 1970 and 1990. These include the increasing inequality in wages, both between and within education groups, and the increase in unemployment at all levels of education. In contrast, in previous literature this type of technology shock cannot account for all of these changes. The paper uses a matching model with a segmented labour market, an imperfect correlation between individual ability and education, and a fixed cost of setting up a job. The endogenous increase in overeducation is key to understand the response of unemployment to the technology shock.

A global view of economic growth

This paper integrates in a unified and tractable framework some of the key insights of the field of international trade and economic growth. It examines a sequence of theoretical models that share a common description of technology and preferences but differ on their assumptions about trade frictions. By comparing the predictions of these models against each other, it is possible to identify a variety of channels through which trade affects the evolution of world income and its geographical distribution. By comparing the predictions of these models against the data, it is also possible to construct coherent explanations of income differences and long-run trends in economic growth.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.

High-growth cooperatives: Financial profile and key factors for competitiveness

Given the current economic environment, high-growth companies are particularly relevant for their contribution to employment generation and wealth.This paper discusses the results of a survey that was conducted in order to gain a deeper understanding of high-growth cooperatives through analyzing their financial profiles and then identifying key contributing factors to their growth. To do this, we compared this particular sample with other cooperatives and other high-growth mercantile companies.The results show the main drivers related to high-growth companies success. They are the competitive advantages based on the surveyed group, modern management techniques, quality and productivity, innovation and internationalization. Additionally, we have observed some financial strengths and weaknesses. In this sense, they are under capitalized companies with an unbalanced growth.

The return of the wage Phillips curve

The standard New Keynesian model with staggered wage settingis shown to imply a simple dynamic relation between wage inflationand unemployment. Under some assumptions, that relation takes aform similar to that found in empirical wage equations-starting fromPhillips' (1958) original work-and may thus be viewed as providingsome theoretical foundations to the latter. The structural wage equation derived here is shown to account reasonably well for the comovement of wage inflation and the unemployment rate in the U.S. economy, even under the strong assumption of a constant natural rate ofunemployment.