Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games

Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the geometryof correspondences of standard equilibiurm concepts like correlated, Nash,and robust equilibrium or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resultingequivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across differentequilibrium concepts for 2 x 2 games. It is argued that the procedure canlead to broad and game-theoretically meaningful distinctions of games aswell as to alternative ways of viewing and testing equilibrium concepts.Larger games are also briefly considered.

Multiple prisoner's dilemma games with (out) an outside option: An experimental study

Experiments in which subjects play simultaneously several finite prisoner's dilemma supergames with and without an outside optionreveal that: (i) subjects use probabilistic start and endeffect behaviour, (ii) the freedom to choose whether to play the prisoner's dilemma game enhances cooperation, (iii) if the payoff for simultaneous defection is negative, subjects' tendency to avoid losses leads them to cooperate; while this tendency makes them stick to mutual defection if its payoff is positive.

An axiomatization of the prekernel of nontransferable utility games

We characterize the prekernel of NTU games by means of consistency,converse consistency, and five axioms of the Nash type on bilateral problems.The intersection of the prekernel and the core is also characterized with thesame axioms over the class of games where the core is nonempty.

Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games

Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-person and many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which are strategically different from one another. We analyze four different treatments and observe that convergence toward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about the other player s choice and adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?

We use subjects actions in modified dictator games to perform a within-subject classification ofindividuals into four different types of interdependent preferences: Selfish, Social Welfaremaximizers, Inequity Averse and Competitive. We elicit beliefs about other subjects actions inthe same modified dictator games to test how much of the existent heterogeneity in others actions is known by subjects. We find that subjects with different interdependent preferences infact have different beliefs about others actions. In particular, Selfish individuals cannotconceive others being non-Selfish while Social Welfare maximizers are closest to the actualdistribution of others actions. We finally provide subjects with information on other subjects actions and re-classify individuals according to their (new) actions in the same modified dictatorgames. We find that social information does not affect Selfish individuals, but that individualswith interdependent preferences are more likely to change their behavior and tend to behavemore selfishly.

Ambiguity in election games

We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them toincrease the number of voters to whom they appeal when voters have intense preferences for one of the alternatives available. An ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We find conditions under which ambiguous strategies are chosen in equilibrium. These conditions include the case in which there is an outcome that is a majority winner against all other outcomes but is not the most preferred outcome for a majority of voters. It is shown that if the number of candidates or parties increases, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium.

Generic finiteness of equilibrium payoffs for bimatrix games

It is shown that in any affine space of payoff matrices the equilibriumpayoffs of bimatrix games are generically finite.

On p-beauty contest integer games

In this paper we provide a full characterization of the pure-strategyNash Equilibria for the p-Beauty Contest Game when we restrict player schoices to integer numbers. Opposed to the case of real number choices,equilibrium uniqueness may be lost depending on the value of p and thenumber of players: in particular, as p approaches 1 any symmetric profileconstitutes a Nash Equilibrium. We also show that any experimental p-BeautyContest Game can be associated to a game with the integer restriction andthus multiplicity of equilibria becomes an issue. Finally, we show thatin these games the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies maynot lead to a single outcome while the iterated best-reply process alwaysdoes (though the outcome obtained depends on the initial conditions).

Causal assessment in finite extensive-form games

Two finite extensive-form games are empirically equivalent when theempirical distribution on action profiles generated by every behaviorstrategy in one can also be generated by an appropriately chosen behaviorstrategy in the other. This paper provides a characterization ofempirical equivalence. The central idea is to relate a game's informationstructure to the conditional independencies in the empirical distributionsit generates. We present a new analytical device, the influence opportunitydiagram of a game, describe how such a diagram is constructed for a givenextensive-form game, and demonstrate that it provides a complete summaryof the information needed to test empirical equivalence between two games.

Stochastic evolution of rules for playing normal form games

The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments ofstochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal formgames that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained witha fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experimentson rules and games.

Performance evaluation of MPEG-4 Video encoder on Adres

Actualment un típic embedded system (ex. telèfon mòbil) requereix alta qualitat per portar a terme tasques com codificar/descodificar a temps real; han de consumir poc energia per funcionar hores o dies utilitzant bateries lleugeres; han de ser el suficientment flexibles per integrar múltiples aplicacions i estàndards en un sol aparell; han de ser dissenyats i verificats en un període de temps curt tot i l’augment de la complexitat. Els dissenyadors lluiten contra aquestes adversitats, que demanen noves innovacions en arquitectures i metodologies de disseny. Coarse-grained reconfigurable architectures (CGRAs) estan emergent com a candidats potencials per superar totes aquestes dificultats. Diferents tipus d’arquitectures han estat presentades en els últims anys. L’alta granularitat redueix molt el retard, l’àrea, el consum i el temps de configuració comparant amb les FPGAs. D’altra banda, en comparació amb els tradicionals processadors coarse-grained programables, els alts recursos computacionals els permet d’assolir un alt nivell de paral•lelisme i eficiència. No obstant, els CGRAs existents no estant sent aplicats principalment per les grans dificultats en la programació per arquitectures complexes. ADRES és una nova CGRA dissenyada per I’Interuniversity Micro-Electronics Center (IMEC). Combina un processador very-long instruction word (VLIW) i un coarse-grained array per tenir dues opcions diferents en un mateix dispositiu físic. Entre els seus avantatges destaquen l’alta qualitat, poca redundància en les comunicacions i la facilitat de programació. Finalment ADRES és un patró enlloc d’una arquitectura concreta. Amb l’ajuda del compilador DRESC (Dynamically Reconfigurable Embedded System Compile), és possible trobar millors arquitectures o arquitectures específiques segons l’aplicació. Aquest treball presenta la implementació d’un codificador MPEG-4 per l’ADRES. Mostra l’evolució del codi per obtenir una bona implementació per una arquitectura donada. També es presenten les característiques principals d’ADRES i el seu compilador (DRESC). Els objectius són de reduir al màxim el nombre de cicles (temps) per implementar el codificador de MPEG-4 i veure les diferents dificultats de treballar en l’entorn ADRES. Els resultats mostren que els cícles es redueixen en un 67% comparant el codi inicial i final en el mode VLIW i un 84% comparant el codi inicial en VLIW i el final en mode CGA.

Elaboración de un video sobre calidad, seguridad y medio ambiente en la Unidad de Laboratorios Docentes (ULD) de la Facultad de Farmacia de la Universidad de Barcelona

La Unidad de Laboratorios Docentes (ULD) de la Facultad de Farmacia (UB) ha implantado un sistema de gestión de la calidad (SGC) que permite transmitir al estudiante una formación adicional con el objetivo de mejorar sus competencias transversales (siguiendo las directrices del Espacio Europeo de Educación Superior, EEES). Además, en el curso académico 06-07, se instauraron las Buenas Prácticas Ambientales (BPAL) para disponer de un sistema de gestión que incorporase los criterios de calidad, medioambiente y seguridad (sistema de gestión integrada, SGI). Durante el presente curso académico se ha procedido a la grabación y edición de un video sobre calidad, seguridad y medioambiente en la ULD con el objetivo de mejorar la formación transversal de los estudiantes facilitando la integración de los conocimientos y habilidades profesionales. De esta forma, al salir del entorno universitario, los licenciados y graduados de la Facultad de Farmacia dispondrán de un valor añadido en su formación, mejorando así sus competencias para el desarrollo de su futura profesión. En el video se muestra la manera de trabajar correctamente según las normas de calidad, seguridad y medioambiente recogidas además en un tríptico que se entrega a los estudiantes al acceder por primera vez a un laboratorio de prácticas. El video se difundirá a través de la página web de la ULD, de la videoteca de la UB, del canal You Tube Canal UB, así como de las asignaturas que lo soliciten (sirviendo de soporte para el personal docente).

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition