The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix.

The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games

En aquest treball demostrem que en la classe de jocs d'assignació amb diagonal dominant (Solymosi i Raghavan, 2001), el repartiment de Thompson (que coincideix amb el valor tau) és l'únic punt del core que és maximal respecte de la relació de dominància de Lorenz, i a més coincideix amb la solucié de Dutta i Ray (1989), també coneguda com solució igualitària. En segon lloc, mitjançant una condició més forta que la de diagonal dominant, introduïm una nova classe de jocs d'assignació on cada agent obté amb la seva parella òptima almenys el doble que amb qualsevol altra parella. Per aquests jocs d'assignació amb diagonal 2-dominant, el repartiment de Thompson és l'únic punt del kernel, i per tant el nucleolo.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Monge assignment games

Un juego de asignación se define por una matriz A; donde cada fila representa un comprador y cada columna un vendedor. Si el comprador i se empareja a un vendedor j; el mercado produce aij unidades de utilidad. Estudiamos los juegos de asignación de Monge, es decir, aquellos juegos bilaterales de asignación en los cuales la matriz satisface la propiedad de Monge. Estas matrices pueden caracterizarse por el hecho de que en cualquier submatriz 2x2 un emparejamiento óptimo está situado en la diagonal principal. Para mercados cuadrados, describimos sus núcleos utilizando sólo la parte central tridiagonal de elementos de la matriz. Obtenemos una fórmula cerrada para el reparto óptimo de los compradores dentro del núcleo y para el reparto óptimo de los vendedores dentro del núcleo. Analizamos también los mercados no cuadrados reduciéndolos a matrices cuadradas apropiadas.

On the nucleolus of 2 x 2 assignment games

[spa] En este artículo hallamos fórmulas para el nucleolo de juegos de asignación arbitrarios con dos compradores y dos vendedores. Se analizan cinco casos distintos, dependiendo de las entradas en la matriz de asignación. Los resultados se extienden a los casos de juegos de asignación de tipo 2 x m o m x 2.

An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

[cat] En el domini dels jocs bilaterals d’assignació, es presenta una axiomàtica del nucleolus com l´unica solució que compleix les propietats de consistència respecte del joc derivat definit per Owen (1992) i monotonia de les queixes dels sectors respecte de la seva cardinalitat. Com a conseqüència obtenim una caracterització geomètrica del nucleolus mitjançant una propietat de bisecció més forta que la que satisfan els punts del kernel (Maschler et al, 1979).

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

Using spatially distributed parameters and multi-response objective functions to solve parameterization of complex applications of semi-distributed hydrological models

Application of semi-distributed hydrological models to large, heterogeneous watersheds deals with several problems. On one hand, the spatial and temporal variability in catchment features should be adequately represented in the model parameterization, while maintaining the model complexity in an acceptable level to take advantage of state-of-the-art calibration techniques. On the other hand, model complexity enhances uncertainty in adjusted model parameter values, therefore increasing uncertainty in the water routing across the watershed. This is critical for water quality applications, where not only streamflow, but also a reliable estimation of the surface versus subsurface contributions to the runoff is needed. In this study, we show how a regularized inversion procedure combined with a multiobjective function calibration strategy successfully solves the parameterization of a complex application of a water quality-oriented hydrological model. The final value of several optimized parameters showed significant and consistentdifferences across geological and landscape features. Although the number of optimized parameters was significantly increased by the spatial and temporal discretization of adjustable parameters, the uncertainty in water routing results remained at reasonable values. In addition, a stepwise numerical analysis showed that the effects on calibration performance due to inclusion of different data types in the objective function could be inextricably linked. Thus caution should be taken when adding or removing data from an aggregated objective function.

Comparative study of the LC-MS/MS and UPLC-MS/MS for the multi-residue analysis of quinolones, penicillins and cephalosporins in cow milk, and validation according to the regulation 2002/657/EC

The aim of this study was to develop and validate an analytical method to simultaneously determine European Union-regulated beta-lactams (penicillins and cephalosporins) and quinolones in cow milk. The procedure involves a new solid phase extraction (SPE) to clean-up and pre-concentrate the three series of antibiotics before analysis by liquid chromatography¿tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS) and ultra-high-performance liquid chromatography¿tandem mass spectrometry (UPLC-MS/MS). LC-MS/MS and UPLC-MS/MS techniques were also compared. The method was validated according to the Directive 2002/657/EC and subsequently applied to 56 samples of raw cow milk supplied by the Laboratori Interprofessional Lleter de Catalunya (ALLIC) (Laboratori Interprofessional Lleter de Catalunya, Control Laboratory Interprofessional of Milk of Catalunya).

Random assignment of intervention points in two phase single-case designs: data-division-specific distributions

The present study explores the statistical properties of a randomization test based on the random assignment of the intervention point in a two-phase (AB) single-case design. The focus is on randomization distributions constructed with the values of the test statistic for all possible random assignments and used to obtain p-values. The shape of those distributions is investigated for each specific data division defined by the moment in which the intervention is introduced. Another aim of the study consisted in testing the detection of inexistent effects (i.e., production of false alarms) in autocorrelated data series, in which the assumption of exchangeability between observations may be untenable. In this way, it was possible to compare nominal and empirical Type I error rates in order to obtain evidence on the statistical validity of the randomization test for each individual data division. The results suggest that when either of the two phases has considerably less measurement times, Type I errors may be too probable and, hence, the decision making process to be carried out by applied researchers may be jeopardized.

A new aggregation method for strategic decision making and its application in assignment theory

A new aggregation method for decision making is presented by using induced aggregation operators and the index of maximum and minimum level. Its main advantage is that it can assess complex reordering processes in the aggregation that represent complex attitudinal characters of the decision maker such as psychological or personal factors. A wide range of properties and particular cases of this new approach are studied. A further generalization by using hybrid averages and immediate weights is also presented. The key issue in this approach against the previous model is that we can use the weighted average and the ordered weighted average in the same formulation. Thus, we are able to consider the subjective attitude and the degree of optimism of the decision maker in the decision process. The paper ends with an application in a decision making problem based on the use of the assignment theory.

Group motivational intervention in overweight/obese patients in primary prevention of cardiovascular disease in the primary healthcare area

Background The global mortality caused by cardiovascular disease increases with weight. The Framingham study showed that obesity is a cardiovascular risk factor independent of other risks such as type 2 diabetes mellitus, dyslipidemia and smoking. Moreover, the main problem in the management of weight-loss is its maintenance, if it is achieved. We have designed a study to determine whether a group motivational intervention, together with current clinical practice, is more efficient than the latter alone in the treatment of overweight and obesity, for initial weight loss and essentially to achieve maintenance of the weight achieved; and, secondly, to know if this intervention is more effective for reducing cardiovascular risk factors associated with overweight and obesity. Methods This 26-month follow up multi-centre trial, will include 1200 overweight/obese patients. Random assignment of the intervention by Basic Health Areas (BHA): two geographically separate groups have been created, one of which receives group motivational intervention (group intervention), delivered by a nurse trained by an expert phsychologist, in 32 group sessions, 1 to 12 fortnightly, and 13 to 32, monthly, on top of their standard program of diet, exercise, and the other (control group), receiving the usual follow up, with regular visits every 3 months. Discussion By addressing currently unanswered questions regarding the maintenance in weight loss in obesity/overweight, upon the expected completion of participant follow-up in 2012, the IMOAP trial should document, for the first time, the benefits of a motivational intervention as a treatment tool of weight loss in a primary care setting.