The Effects of Corruption and Seigniorage on Growth and Inflation

In the last two decades, cases of corruption have been unveiled in different countries, raising public awareness and reinforcing a trend in which society expects more from their leaders. Our objective in this paper is to examine the effects of corruption and seigniorage on inflation and growth rates. The model used in this article is an extension of the model used by Huang and Wei (2006). We find interesting results and one of them is that, under some conditions, corruption has a positive impact on the growth rate. JEL classification : D73, E52, E58, E62. Keywords : Corruption; Fiscal Policy; Growth; Monetary Policy; Seigniorage.

Fiscal Regime Shifts in Portugal

We estimate changes in fiscal policy regimes in Portugal with a Markov Switching regression of fiscal policy rules for the period 1978-2007, using a new dataset of fiscal quarterly series. We find evidence of a deficit bias, while repeated reversals of taxes making the budget procyclical. Economic booms have typically been used to relax tax pressure, especially during elections. One-off measures have been preferred over structural ones to contain the deficit during economic crises. The EU fiscal rules prompted temporary consolidation, but did not permanently change the budgeting process.

Testing the FTPL across government tiers

Control on regional government budgets is important in a monetary union as lower tiers of government have fewer incentives to consolidate debt. According to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level; unsustainable non-Ricardian fiscal policies eventually force monetary policy to adjust. Hence, uncoordinated and non-regulated regional fiscal policies would therefore threaten price stability for the monetary union as a whole. However, the union central bank is not without defense. A federal government that internalises the spillover effect of non-Ricardian fiscal policies on the price level can offset non-Ricardian regional fiscal policies. A federal government, which taxes and transfers resources between regions, may compensate for unsustainable regional fiscal policies so as to keep fiscal policy Ricardian on aggregate. Following Canzoneri et al. (2001), we test the validity of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level for both federal and regional governments in Germany. We find evidence of a spillover effect of unsustainable policies on the price level for other Länder. However, the German federal government offsets this effect on the price level by running Ricardian policies. These results have implications for the regulation of fiscal policies in the EMU.