Aggregate Costs of Gender Gaps in the Labor Market: A Quantitative Estimate

[eng] This paper examines the quantitative effects of gender gaps in entrepreneurship and labor force participation on aggregate productivity and income per capita. We simulate an occupational choice model with heterogeneous agents in entrepreneurial ability, where agents choose to be workers, self-employed or employers. The model assumes that men and women have the same talent distribution, but we impose several frictions on women's opportunities and pay in the labor market. In particular, we restrict the fraction of women participating in the labor market.

Aggregate Costs of Gender Gaps in the Labor Market: A Quantitative Estimate

This paper examines the quantitative effects of gender gaps in entrepreneurship and labor force participation on aggregate productivity and income per capita. We simulate an occupational choice model with heterogeneous agents in entrepreneurial ability, where agents choose to be workers, self-employed or employers. The model assumes that men and women have the same talent distribution, but we impose several frictions on women's opportunities and pay in the labor market. In particular, we restrict the fraction of women participating in the labor market.

Aggregate Costs of Gender Gaps in the Labor Market: A Quantitative Estimate

This paper examines the quantitative effects of gender gaps in entrepreneurship and labor force participation on aggregate productivity and income per capita. We simulate an occupational choice model with heterogeneous agents in entrepreneurial ability, where agents choose to be workers, self-employed or employers. The model assumes that men and women have the same talent distribution, but we impose several frictions on women's opportunities and pay in the labor market. In particular, we restrict the fraction of women participating in the labor market.

Characterization of Reward Functions in Networks with Costs

In this paper we study network structures in which the possibilities for cooperation are restricted and can not be described by a cooperative game. The benefits of a group of players depend on how these players are internally connected. One way to represent this type of situations is the so-called reward function, which represents the profits obtainable by the total coalition if links can be used to coordinate agents' actions. The starting point of this paper is the work of Vilaseca et al. where they characterized the reward function. We concentrate on those situations where there exist costs for establishing communication links. Given a reward function and a costs function, our aim is to analyze under what conditions it is possible to associate a cooperative game to it. We characterize the reward function in networks structures with costs for establishing links by means of two conditions, component permanence and component additivity. Finally, an economic application is developed to illustrate the main theoretical result.

Computational and Energy Costs of Cryptographic Algorithms on Handheld Devices

Networks are evolving toward a ubiquitous model in which heterogeneousdevices are interconnected. Cryptographic algorithms are required for developing securitysolutions that protect network activity. However, the computational and energy limitationsof network devices jeopardize the actual implementation of such mechanisms. In thispaper, we perform a wide analysis on the expenses of launching symmetric and asymmetriccryptographic algorithms, hash chain functions, elliptic curves cryptography and pairingbased cryptography on personal agendas, and compare them with the costs of basic operatingsystem functions. Results show that although cryptographic power costs are high and suchoperations shall be restricted in time, they are not the main limiting factor of the autonomyof a device.

Impact of quality and environmental investment on business competitiveness and profitability: The case of travel agencies

Few studies have examined the combined effect of implementing quality and environmental management within the service sector. This void is more evident if we focus on segments in which small businesses predominate and even more so if we look for highly competitive sectors that are very variable and that have high business mortality. After analysing 198 surveys of Spanish travel agency managers using structural equations, it can be concluded that practices of quality management have a significant direct impact on business competitiveness but not on this business's financial results, at least directly. However, there is a significant relationship between environmental management practices and economic benefits. This article suggests that commitment to quality and the environment can allow small businesses in the service sector to have a competitive advantage that will separate surviving and ceased operations, particularly in sectors that are rapidly evolving and highly competitive.