QDIUS2 (Query Device Information Using Specific Sensors)

QDius2 és una aplicació pensada per a persones amb discapacitat visual. Consisteix en realitzar una descripció verbalitzada de l’estat d’un electrodomèstic utilitzant un dispositiu mòbil amb sistema operatiu Android. L’aplicació guiarà verbalment l’usuari perquè pugui enfocar el panell de control de l’electrodomèstic amb la càmera. Es processarà la imatge obtinguda per extreure la seva informació, ja sigui en el mateix mòbil o al núvol, segons les preferències de l’usuari, i es llegirà la informació resultant. Aquest projecte està dividit en vuit memòries, una per a cada integrant del grup.

Plataforma e-commerce amb recomanació

Creació d'una plataforma de comerç electrònic que ofereix recomanacions als clients potencials tenint en compte les accions de la resta d'usuaris, així com les preferències indicades pel client al seu perfil.

How does ownership structure invfluence bank risk? Analyzing the role of managerial incentives

This paper analyzes how ownership concentration and managerial incentives influences bank risk for a large sample of US banks over the period 1997-2007. Using 2SLS simultaneous equations models, we show that ownership concentration has a positive total effect on bank risk. This is the result of a positive direct effect, which reflects monitoring and opportunistic behavior, and a negative indirect effect, which works through the design of managerial incentive contracts and reflects shareholder preferences toward risk. Large shareholders reduce bank risk by reducing the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (Vega) and by increasing the CEO pay-performance sensitivity (Delta). In addition, we show that the direct and indirect effect of ownership concentration on bank risk depends on the type of the largest shareholder (a family, a bank, a corporation or an institutional investor), as well as, on the total shareholding held by each type as a group. Our results suggest that the positive relation between ownership concentration and risk is not the result of preferences towards more risk. Rather, they point at opportunistic behavior of large shareholders.

Do welfare benefits affect womens' choices of adult care giving?

The efficacy of social care, publicly and universally provided, has been contested from two different points of view. First, advocates of targeting social policy criticized the Matthew’s effect of universal provision and; second, theories arguing in favour of heterogeneous rationalities between men and women and, even different preferences among women, predict that universal provision of services is limiting women’s choices more than home allowances. The author tests both hypotheses and concludes that, at least in the case of adult care, women’s choices are significantly affected by women’s social positions and by the availability of public services. Furthermore, targeting through means-test eligibility criteria has no significant effect on inequality but, confirming the redistributive paradox, reduces women’s options.

Diseño, implementación y evaluación de un juego educativo basado en puzles con scaffolding orientado a la programación

Existe una falta de interés por parte de los estudiantes en el área de las Tecnologías de la Información y la Comunicación (TIC) que se ve reflejada en el descenso de las matriculaciones en este ámbito. El uso de metodologías de aprendizaje basadas en el Constructivismo combinadas con tecnología software, se ha observado que es una buena solución para afrontar dicha falta de interés. Sin embargo, actualmente no existen aplicaciones software que implementen estas metodologías pedagógicas y que proporcionen a los estudiantes los mecanismos de ayuda necesarios (Scaffolding) para darles soporte durante el aprendizaje de conceptos TIC. Una posible solución a este problema es el uso de juegos educativos, los cuáles implementarán técnicas de Scaffolding que den el soporte necesario al estudiante para alcanzarlos objetivos de aprendizaje fijados. Por tanto, en este proyecto se diseñará e implementará un juego educativo basado en puzles orientado a la Programación que estará basado en un método aprendizaje basado en el Constructivismo en el que el estudiante construye su propio conocimiento. Una vez implementado, será evaluado en un centro escolar por parte deestudiantes de últimos cursos de ESO o Bachillerato.

Social capabilities in Alzheimer's patients

Patients with stage-I (very mild and mild) Alzheimer's disease were asked to participate in a Dictator Game, a type of game in which a subject has to decide how to allocate a certain amount of money between himself and another person. The game enables the experimenter to examine the influence of social norms and social preferences on the decision-making process. When the results of treatments involving Alzheimer's disease patients were compared with those of identical treatments involving patients with mild cognitive impairment or healthy control subjects, with similar ages and social backgrounds, no statistically significant difference was found. This finding suggests that stage-I Alzheimer's disease patients may be as capable of making decisions involving social norms and preferences as other individuals of their age. Whatever brain structures are affected by the disease, they do not appear to influence, at this early stage, the neural basis for cooperation-enhancing social interactions.

Asymmetric information and trade policy

Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.

Do the Wealthy Risk More Money? An Experimental Comparison

Are poor people more or less likely to take money risks than wealthy folks? We find that risk attraction is more prevalent among the wealthy when the amounts of money at risk are small (not surprising, since ten dollars is a smaller amount for a wealthy person than for a poor one), but, interestingly, for the larger amounts of money at risk the fraction of the nonwealthy displaying risk attraction exceeds that of the wealthy. We also replicate our previous finding that many people display risk attraction for small money amounts, but risk aversion for large ones. We argue that preferences yielding risk attraction for small money amounts, together with risk aversion for larger amounts, at all levels of wealth, while contradicting the expected utility hypothesis, may be well-defined, independently of reference points, on the choice space.