Adjustment to Target Capital, Finance, and Growth

Does financial development result in capital being reallocated more rapidly to industries where it is most productive? We argue that if this was the case, financially developed countries should see faster growth in industries with investment opportunities due to global demand and productivity shifts. Testing this cross-industry cross-country growth implication requires proxies for (latent) global industry investment opportunities. We show that tests relying only on data from specific (benchmark) countries may yield spurious evidence for or against the hypothesis. We therefore develop an alternative approach that combines benchmark-country proxies with a proxy that does not reflect opportunities specific to a country or level of financial development. Our empirical results yield clear support for the capital reallocation hypothesis.

The Three Horsemen of Growth: Plague, War and Urbanization in Early Modern Europe

How did Europe overtake China? We construct a simple Malthusian model with two sectors, and use it to explain how European per capita incomes and urbanization rates could surge ahead of Chinese ones. That living standards could exceed subsistence levels at all in a Malthusian setting should be surprising. Rising fertility and falling mortality ought to have reversed any gains. We show that productivity growth in Europe can only explain a small fraction of rising living standards. Population dynamics - changes of the birth and death schedules - were far more important drivers of the longrun Malthusian equilibrium. The Black Death raised wages substantially, creating important knock-on effects. Because of Engel's Law, demand for urban products increased, raising urban wages and attracting migrants from rural areas. European cities were unhealthy, especially compared to Far Eastern ones. Urbanization pushed up aggregate death rates. This effect was reinforced by more frequent wars (fed by city wealth) and disease spread by trade. Thus, higher wages themselves reduced population pressure. Without technological change, our model can account for the sharp rise in European urbanization as well as permanently higher per capita incomes. We complement our calibration exercise with a detailed analysis of intra-European growth in the early modern period. Using a panel of European states in the period 1300-1700, we show that war frequency can explain a good share of the divergent fortunes within Europe.

Growing at the production frontier. European aggregate growth, 1870-1914

The view of a 1870-1913 expanding European economy providing increasing welfare to everybody has been challenged by many, then and now. We focus on the amazing growth that was experienced, its diffusion and its sources, in the context of the permanent competition among European nation states. During 1870-193 the globalized European economy reached a silver age . GDP growth was quite rapid (2.15% per annum) and diffused all over Europe. Even discounting the high rates of population growth (1.06%), per capita growth was left at a respectable 1.08%. Income per capita was rising in every country, and the rates of improvement were quite similar. This was a major achievement after two generations of highly localized growth, both geographically and socially. Growth was based on the increased use of labour and capital, but a good part of growth (73 per cent for the weighted average of the best documented European countries) came out of total factor productivity efficiency gains resulting from not well specified ultimate sources of growth. This proportion suggests that the European economy was growing at full capacity at its production frontier. It would have been very difficult to improve its performance. Within Europe, convergence was limited, and it only was in motion after 1900. What happened was more the end of the era of big divergence rather than an era of convergence.

Economic growth with bubbles

We develop a stylized model of economic growth with bubbles. In this model, changes in investorsentiment lead to the appearance and collapse of macroeconomic bubbles or pyramid schemes.We show how these bubbles mitigate the effects of financial frictions. During bubbly episodes,unproductive investors demand bubbles while productive investors supply them. These transfersof resources improve the efficiency at which the economy operates, expanding consumption, thecapital stock and output. When bubbly episodes end, these transfers stop and consumption, thecapital stock and output contract. We characterize the stochastic equilibria of the model and arguethat they provide a natural way of introducing bubble shocks into business cycle models.

Capital, wages and growth: Theory and evidence

Returns to scale to capital and the strength of capital externalities play a key role for the empirical predictions and policy implications of different growth theories. We show that both can be identified with individual wage data and implement our approach at the city-level using US Census data on individuals in 173 cities for 1970, 1980, and 1990. Estimation takes into account fixed effects, endogeneity of capital accumulation, and measurement error. We find no evidence for human or physical capital externalities and decreasing aggregate returns to capital. Returns to scale to physical and human capital are around 80 percent. We also find strong complementarities between human capital and labor and substantial total employment externalities.

A global view of economic growth

This paper integrates in a unified and tractable framework some of the key insights of the field of international trade and economic growth. It examines a sequence of theoretical models that share a common description of technology and preferences but differ on their assumptions about trade frictions. By comparing the predictions of these models against each other, it is possible to identify a variety of channels through which trade affects the evolution of world income and its geographical distribution. By comparing the predictions of these models against the data, it is also possible to construct coherent explanations of income differences and long-run trends in economic growth.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.

The contribution of schooling in development accounting: Results from a nonparametric upper bound

How much would output increase if underdeveloped economies were toincrease their levels of schooling? We contribute to the development accounting literature by describing a non-parametric upper bound on theincrease in output that can be generated by more schooling. The advantage of our approach is that the upper bound is valid for any number ofschooling levels with arbitrary patterns of substitution/complementarity.Another advantage is that the upper bound is robust to certain forms ofendogenous technology response to changes in schooling. We also quantify the upper bound for all economies with the necessary data, compareour results with the standard development accounting approach, andprovide an update on the results using the standard approach for a largesample of countries.

The effects of structural reforms on productivity and profitability enhancing reallocation: Evidence from Colombia

Estimates for the U.S. suggest that at least in some sectors productivity enhancing reallocationis the dominant factor in accounting for producitivity growth. An open question, particularlyrelevant for developing countries, is whether reallocation is always productivity enhancing. Itmay be that imperfect competition or other barriers to competitive environments imply that thereallocation process is not fully e?cient in these countries. Using a unique plant-levellongitudinal dataset for Colombia for the period 1982-1998, we explore these issues byexamining the interaction between market allocation, and productivity and profitability.Moreover, given the important trade, labor and financial market reforms in Colombia during theearly 1990's, we explore whether and how the contribution of reallocation changed over theperiod of study. Our data permit measurement of plant-level quantities and prices. Takingadvantage of the rich structure of our price data, we propose a sequential mehodology to estimateproductivity and demand shocks at the plant level. First, we estimate total factor productivity(TFP) with plant-level physical output data, where we use downstream demand to instrumentinputs. We then turn to estimating demand shocks and mark-ups with plant-level price data, usingTFP to instrument for output in the inversedemand equation. We examine the evolution of thedistributions of TFP and demand shocks in response to the market reforms in the 1990's. We findthat market reforms are associated with rising overall productivity that is largely driven byreallocation away from low- and towards highproductivity businesses. In addition, we find thatthe allocation of activity across businesses is less driven by demand factors after reforms. Wefind that the increase in aggregate productivity post-reform is entirely accounted for by theimproved allocation of activity.

Dimensions of national culture and the accounting environment -The Spanish case-

Gray (1988) has put forward a hypothesis on how a national accountingenvironment might reflect the cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980, 1983). A number of studies have tested Gray's hypothesis, including one by Pourjalali and Meek (1995) which identified a match between changes in cultural dimensions and the accounting environment in Iran following the revolution. In this paper we replicate this work in the context of Spain following the death of Franco in 1975 and the emergence of a democratic constitution in 1978. Specifically, we: 1) Consider Gray's hypothesis built on Hofstede's cultural dimensions and review some empirical tests of the hypotheses.2) Building on the work of Hofstede and Gray, we: put forward some hypotheses on how we would expect cultural dimensions to change in Spain with the transition to democracy.3) Review developments in accounting in Spain following the transition to democracy, in order to identify how well these fit with our hypotheses.