Collective dynamic properties in simple crystals: Influence of the structural disorder

Collective dynamic properties in Lennard-Jones crystals are investigated by molecular dynamics simulation. The study is focused on properties such as the dynamic structure factors, the longitudinal and transverse currents and the density of states. The influence on these properties of the structural disorder is analyzed by comparing the results for one-component crystals with those for liquids and supercooled liquids at analogous conditions. The effects of species-disorder on the collective properties of binary crystals are also discussed.

Static and dynamic structure of liquid metals: Role of the different parts of the interaction potential

The influence of different parts of the interaction potential on the microscopic behavior of simple liquid metals is investigated by molecular dynamics simulation. The role of the soft-core repulsive, short-range attractive, and long-range oscillatory forces on the properties of liquid lithium close to the triple point is analyzed by comparing the results from simulations of identical systems but truncating the potential at different distances. Special attention is paid to dynamic collective properties such as the dynamic structure factors, transverse current correlation functions, and transport coefficients. It is observed that, in general, the effects of the short-range attractive forces are important. On the contrary, the influence of the oscillatory long-range interactions is considerably less, being the most pronounced for the dynamic structure factor at long wavelengths. The results of this work suggest that the influence of the attractive forces becomes less significant when temperature and density increase.

Self-dynamic structure factor of dense liquids: Theory and simulation

The self-intermediate dynamic structure factor Fs(k,t) of liquid lithium near the melting temperature is calculated by molecular dynamics. The results are compared with the predictions of several theoretical approaches, paying special attention to the Lovesey model and the Wahnstrm and Sjgren mode-coupling theory. To this end the results for the Fs(k,t) second memory function predicted by both models are compared with the ones calculated from the simulations.

Dynamic properties of Lennard Jones fluids and liquid metals

The dependence of the dynamic properties of liquid metals and Lennard-Jones fluids on the characteristics of the interaction potentials is analyzed. Molecular-dynamics simulations of liquids in analogous conditions but assuming that their particles interact either through a Lennard-Jones or a liquid-metal potential were carried out. The Lennard-Jones potentials were chosen so that both the effective size of the particles and the depth of the potential well were very close to those of the liquid-metal potentials. In order to investigate the extent to which the dynamic properties of liquids depend on the short-range attractive interactions as well as on the softness of the potential cores, molecular-dynamics simulations of the same systems but assuming purely repulsive interactions with the same potential cores were also performed. The study includes both singleparticle dynamic properties, such as the velocity autocorrelation functions, and collective dynamic properties, such as the intermediate scattering funcfunctions, and collective dynamic properties, such as the intermediate scattering functions, the dynamic structure factors, the longitudinal and transverse current correlations, and the transport coefficients.

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center

En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferència del cas bilateral, per als mercats multilaterals d'assignació coneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, el nucleolus i el core-center, i. e. el centre de masses del core, no coincideixen en general. Per demostrar-ho provem que donant un m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues solucions anteriors poden obtenir-se respectivament del nucleolus i el core-center d'un joc convex definit en el conjunt format pels m sectors. Encara més, provem que per calcular el nucleolus d'aquest últim joc només les coalicions formades per un jugador o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simplifiquen el càlcul del nucleolus d'un multi-sided ¿¿ohm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número molt elevat d'agents.

The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games

En aquest treball demostrem que en la classe de jocs d'assignació amb diagonal dominant (Solymosi i Raghavan, 2001), el repartiment de Thompson (que coincideix amb el valor tau) és l'únic punt del core que és maximal respecte de la relació de dominància de Lorenz, i a més coincideix amb la solucié de Dutta i Ray (1989), també coneguda com solució igualitària. En segon lloc, mitjançant una condició més forta que la de diagonal dominant, introduïm una nova classe de jocs d'assignació on cada agent obté amb la seva parella òptima almenys el doble que amb qualsevol altra parella. Per aquests jocs d'assignació amb diagonal 2-dominant, el repartiment de Thompson és l'únic punt del kernel, i per tant el nucleolo.

Monge assignment games

Un juego de asignación se define por una matriz A; donde cada fila representa un comprador y cada columna un vendedor. Si el comprador i se empareja a un vendedor j; el mercado produce aij unidades de utilidad. Estudiamos los juegos de asignación de Monge, es decir, aquellos juegos bilaterales de asignación en los cuales la matriz satisface la propiedad de Monge. Estas matrices pueden caracterizarse por el hecho de que en cualquier submatriz 2x2 un emparejamiento óptimo está situado en la diagonal principal. Para mercados cuadrados, describimos sus núcleos utilizando sólo la parte central tridiagonal de elementos de la matriz. Obtenemos una fórmula cerrada para el reparto óptimo de los compradores dentro del núcleo y para el reparto óptimo de los vendedores dentro del núcleo. Analizamos también los mercados no cuadrados reduciéndolos a matrices cuadradas apropiadas.

On the nucleolus of 2 x 2 assignment games

[spa] En este artículo hallamos fórmulas para el nucleolo de juegos de asignación arbitrarios con dos compradores y dos vendedores. Se analizan cinco casos distintos, dependiendo de las entradas en la matriz de asignación. Los resultados se extienden a los casos de juegos de asignación de tipo 2 x m o m x 2.

An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

[cat] En el domini dels jocs bilaterals d’assignació, es presenta una axiomàtica del nucleolus com l´unica solució que compleix les propietats de consistència respecte del joc derivat definit per Owen (1992) i monotonia de les queixes dels sectors respecte de la seva cardinalitat. Com a conseqüència obtenim una caracterització geomètrica del nucleolus mitjançant una propietat de bisecció més forta que la que satisfan els punts del kernel (Maschler et al, 1979).