Determinants sociodemogràfics, incentius i rendiments econòmics de l'aprenentage de l'idioma Català per part de la població immigrant a Catalunya

En aquest projecte s’han estudiat diferents aspectes relacionats amb l’aprenentatge del català per part de la població immigrant. Aquest es un tema rellevant donat que les habilitats idiomàtiques dels immigrants es una altra forma de capital humà, que no només facilita la seva integració social, sinó que també incrementa les seves oportunitats laborals. En aquest estudi s’ha enfocat l’aprenentatge de l’idioma català per part de la població immigrant com una inversió de la qual es deriven costos i beneficis. Una qüestió rellevant és quins son els incentius que els immigrants que ja parlen el castellà, bé per que és la seva llengua materna o per que l’han après amb posterioritat, tenen per aprendre la llengua catalana. Aquest estudi es encara més interessant si considerem aquells immigrants que no tenen un nivell fluït del castellà, i encara més els que arriben a Catalunya sense conèixer cap de les dues llegües oficials. Aquest estudi es centra en els determinants econòmics i demogràfics del nivell de coneixement del català entre els immigrants a Catalunya. En aquest sentit, és clau determinar el rol que juguen variables com el grau d’exposició, eficiència i els incentius econòmics, com per exemple les conseqüències laborals (salaris i oportunitat de treball). Tanmateix, també es important determinar si viure en entorns on hi ha una gran concentració d’immigrants d’un mateix país exerceix un efecte depressor en l’aprenentatge del català per part dels immigrants. La segona part del projecte ha consistit en estimar un model per contrastar la hipòtesi de si el coneixement del català per part dels immigrants implica un millor salari. Per altra banda, també analitzarem si aquest coneixement del català implícita tenir accés a millors oportunitats de treball. La confirmació d’aquestes hipòtesis implicaria que els immigrants realment tenen un incentiu econòmic per invertir en l’aprenentatge del català.     

Occupational sex-composition and earnings : individual and social effects

This paper investigates the micro and macro-level factors affecting the empirical association between occupational sex-composition and individual earnings. This is done in two analytical steps using data from the second round of the European Social Survey. In a first step, country-fixed-effects regressions are used to test the extent to which job-specialization, gender attitudes and the relative supply of domestic work can account for the impact of occupational sex-composition on earnings. In accordance with previous research, it is found that all these micro-level variables have a significant effect on the analyzed association, yet only job-specialization can explain it away by itself. In a second analytical step, macro-level interactions are tested under the hypothesis that defamilialization policies reduce the pay-offs of sphere specialization by sex, generating incentives for all types of women to invest in the labor market. Empirical results suggest that gender attitudes and the relative supply of housework are much more loosely associated to earning in social-democratic and former communist societies than in conservative or liberal regimes. This finding is interpreted as consistent with the defamilialization hypothesis.

Theorizing institutional changes: understanding decentralization and federalization in Brazil, Spain and South Africa

In light of the existing theories about institutional change, this paper seeks to advance a common framework to understand the unfolding of decentralization and federalization in three countries: Brazil, Spain, and South Africa. Although in different continents, these three countries witnessed processes after their respective transitions to democracy that transferred administrative and fiscal authority to their regions (decentralization) and vertically distributed political and institutional capacity (federalization). This paper attempts to explain how institutional changes prompted a shift of power and authority towards regional governments by looking at internal sources of change within the intergovernmental arena in the three countries. This analysis is organized around two propositions: that once countries transit to democracy under all-encompassing constitutions there are high incentives for institutional change, and that under a bargained intergovernmental interaction among political actors subnational political elites are able to advance their interests incrementally. In short, through a common framework this paper will explain the evolving dynamics of intergovernmental dynamics in three countries.

Book vs. Fair Value Accounting in Banking, and Intertemporal Smoothing

The aim of this paper is to examine the pros and cons of book and fair value accounting from the perspective of the theory of banking. We consider the implications of the two accounting methods in an overlapping generations environment. As observed by Allen and Gale(1997), in an overlapping generation model, banks have a role as intergenerational connectors as they allow for intertemporal smoothing. Our main result is that when dividends depend on profits, book value ex ante dominates fair value, as it provides better intertemporal smoothing. This is in contrast with the standard view that states that, fair value yields a better allocation as it reflects the real opportunity cost of assets. Banking regulation play an important role by providing the right incentives for banks to smooth intertemporal consumption whereas market discipline improves intratemporal efficiency.

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Motivation, Test Scores, and Economic Success

This paper argues that low-stakes test scores, available in surveys, may be partially determined by test-taking motivation, which is associated with personality traits but not with cognitive ability. Therefore, such test score distributions may not be informative regarding cognitive ability distributions. Moreover, correlations, found in survey data, between high test scores and economic success may be partially caused by favorable personality traits. To demonstrate these points, I use the coding speed test that was administered without incentives to National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) participants. I suggest that due to its simplicity its scores may especially depend on individuals' test-taking motivation. I show that controlling for conventional measures of cognitive skills, the coding speed scores are correlated with future earnings of male NLSY participants. Moreover, the coding speed scores of highly motivated, though less educated, population (potential enlists to the armed forces) are higher than NLSY participants' scores. I then use controlled experiments to show that when no performance-based incentives are provided, participants' characteristics, but not their cognitive skills, affect effort invested in the coding speed test. Thus, participants with the same ability (measured by their scores on an incentivized test) have significantly different scores on tests without performance- based incentives.

The Economic Effects of Christian Moralities

This article examines the different influences that Catholicism and Protestantism exert on economically relevant values. It argues that Catholic theology and practice facilitate personal transactions while Protestantism favors values and types of moral and legal enforcement better adapted for impersonal trade. Protestantism may thus be more conducive to economic growth through anonymous exchange while Catholicism may provide better support for personal contracting. Several components of this hypothesis are confirmed using statistical models with data from the 1998 ISSP international survey on religion. These show that Protestants are more trusting of anonymous counter parties, develop more reliable institutions for legal enforcement and are more willing to spend resources on monitoring and punishing other members of the community. Catholicism is more protective of the family and small-group relationships, and provides more tolerant and less motivating beliefs. Relatively smaller and less consistent differences appear in terms of worldly personal success and incentives.

Money, Fame and the Allocation of Talent: Brain Drain, the Matthew Effect and the Institution of Science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of the institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector and the private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model the institution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). We show that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the science sector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate the brain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through the market might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and thereby worsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetary and non-monetary incentives in science.

Asymmetric information and trade policy

Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.

Employment Protection, International Specialization, and Innovation

We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentives for R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firing cost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle. Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where, roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country will specialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existing goods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primary innovation', that is, invention of new goods.

A theory of optimal random crackdowns

An incentives based theory of policing is developed which can explain the phenomenon of random “crackdowns,” i.e., intermittent periods of high interdiction/surveillance. For a variety of police objective functions, random crackdowns can be part of the optimal monitoring strategy. We demonstrate support for implications of the crackdown theory using traffic data gathered by the Belgian Police Department and use the model to estimate the deterrence effectof additional resources spent on speeding interdiction.

The effects of poor financial information systems on the long term sustainability of local public services. Empirical evidence from the Catalan Municipalities

In this paper we describe the existence of financial illusion in public accountingand we comment on its effects for the future sustainability of local publicservices. We relate these features to the lack of incentives amongst publicmanagers for improving the financial reporting and thus management of publicassets. Financial illusion pays off for politicians and managers since it allowsfor larger public expenditure increases and managerial slack, these beingarguments in their utility functions. This preference is strengthen by the shorttime perspective of politically appointed public managers. Both factors runagainst public accountability. This hypothesis is tested for Spain by using anunique sample. We take data from around forty Catalan local authorities withpopulation above 20,000 for the financial years 1993-98. We build this databasis from the Catalan Auditing Office Reports in a way that it can be linkedto some other local social and economic variables in order to test ourassumptions. The results confirm that there is a statistical relationship between the financialillusion index (FI as constructed in the paper) and higher current expenditure.This reflects on important overruns and increases of the delay in payingsuppliers, as well as on a higher difficulties to face capital finance. Mechanismsfor FI creation have to do among other factors, with delays in paying suppliers(and thereafter higher future financial costs per unit of service), no adequateprovision for bad debts and lack of appropriate capital funding either forreposition or for new equipments. For this, it is crucial to monitor the way inwhich capital transfers are accounted in local public sheet balances. As a result,for most of the Municipalities we analyse, the funds for guaranteeing continuityand sustainability of public services provision are today at risk.Given managerial incentives at present in public institutions, we conclude thatpublic regulation recently enforced for assuring better information systems inlocal public management may not be enough to change the current state of affairs.

Quality assurance mechanisms in agrifood: The case of the Spanish fresh meat sector

The largest fresh meat brand names in Spain are analyzed here to studyhow quality is signaled in agribusiness and how the underlying quality-assurance organizations work. Results show, first, that organizationalform varies according to the specialization of the brand name.Publicly-controlled brand names are grounded on market contracting withindividual producers, providing stronger incentives. In contrast,private brands rely more on hierarchy, taking advantage of itssuperiority in solving specific coordination problems. Second, theseemingly redundant coexistence of several quality indicators for agiven product is explained in efficiency terms. Multiple brands areshown to be complementary, given their specialization in guaranteeingdifferent attributes of the product.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.

Stare decisis: Rhetoric and substance

Stare decisis allows common law to develop gradually and incrementally. We show howjudge-made law can steadily evolve and tend to increase efficiency even in the absence ofnew information. Judges' opinions must argue that their decisions are consistent withprecedent: this is the more costly, the greater the innovation they are introducing. As aresult, each judge effects a cautious marginal change in the law. Alternative models inwhich precedents are either strictly obeyed or totally discarded would instead predictabrupt large swings in legal rules. Thus we find that the evolution of case law isgrounded not in binary logic fixing judges' constraints, but in costly rhetoric shapingtheir incentives. We apply this finding to an assessment of the role of analogicalreasoning in shaping the joint development of different areas of law.