Completing contracts ex post: How car manufacturers manage car dealers

This article illustrates how contracts are completed ex post in practice and, in so doing, indirectly suggests what the real function of contracts may be. Our evidence comes from the contracts between automobile manufacturers and their dealers in 23 dealership networks in Spain. Franchising dominates automobile distribution because of the need to decentralize pricing and control of service decisions. It motivates local managers to undertake these activities at minimum cost for the manufacturer. However, it creates incentive conflicts, both between manufacturers and dealers and among dealers themselves, concerning the level of sales and service provided. It also holds potential for expropriation of specific investments. Contracts deal with these conflicts by restricting dealers decision rights and granting manufacturers extensive completion, monitoring and enforcement powers. The main mechanism that may prevent abuse of these powers is the manufacturers reputational capital.

Mobile termination and mobile penetration

In this paper, we study how access pricing affects network competition when subscription demand is elastic and each network uses non-linear prices and can applytermination-based price discrimination. In the case of a fixed per minute terminationcharge, we find that a reduction of the termination charge below cost has two opposing effects: it softens competition but helps to internalize network externalities. Theformer reduces mobile penetration while the latter boosts it. We find that firms always prefer termination charge below cost for either motive while the regulator preferstermination below cost only when this boosts penetration.Next, we consider the retail benchmarking approach (Jeon and Hurkens, 2008)that determines termination charges as a function of retail prices and show that thisapproach allows the regulator to increase penetration without distorting call volumes.

Speculation, risk premia and expectations in the yield curve

An affine asset pricing model in which traders have rational but heterogeneous expectations aboutfuture asset prices is developed. We use the framework to analyze the term structure of interestrates and to perform a novel three-way decomposition of bond yields into (i) average expectationsabout short rates (ii) common risk premia and (iii) a speculative component due to heterogeneousexpectations about the resale value of a bond. The speculative term is orthogonal to public informationin real time and therefore statistically distinct from common risk premia. Empirically wefind that the speculative component is quantitatively important accounting for up to a percentagepoint of yields, even in the low yield environment of the last decade. Furthermore, allowing for aspeculative component in bond yields results in estimates of historical risk premia that are morevolatile than suggested by standard Affine Gaussian term structure models which our frameworknests.

Regulatory ambivalence and the limitations of pharmaceutical policy in Spain

Broadly speaking, pharmaceutical policy in Spain has been unable to control either the price or thevolume of drugs prescribed. Limited attempts have been made to bring together the regulation of thepharmaceutical market and policies, in pursuit of the desired goals of efficiency and quality. Thispaper assesses the regulation of the Spanish pharmaceutical market over the last two decades byexamining regulation and policy and the available empirical evidence on their appreciable effects,and presents recommendations for policy design. Our findings suggest that policies aiming to improveefficiency and quality have not managed to contain costs, while cost-effectiveness is still overlooked.We argue that future policies should encourage broader participation in the decision-making processesand promote a higher degree of competition, especially from generic drugs.

Spanning tests in return and stochastic discount factor mean-variance frontiers: A unifying approach

We propose new spanning tests that assess if the initial and additional assets share theeconomically meaningful cost and mean representing portfolios. We prove their asymptoticequivalence to existing tests under local alternatives. We also show that unlike two-step oriterated procedures, single-step methods such as continuously updated GMM yield numericallyidentical overidentifyng restrictions tests, so there is arguably a single spanning test.To prove these results, we extend optimal GMM inference to deal with singularities in thelong run second moment matrix of the influence functions. Finally, we test for spanningusing size and book-to-market sorted US stock portfolios.

Implicit collusion on wide spreads

Recent empirical findings suggest that spreads quoted in dealershipmarkets might be uncompetitive. This paper analyzes theoretically if pricecompetition between risk--averse market--makers leaves room for implicitcollusive behavior. We compare the spread and risk--sharing efficiencyarising in several market structures differing in terms of i) the priorityrule followed in case of ties, and ii) the type of schedules market makersmay use, namely: general schedules, linear schedules, or limit orders. Ingeneral, competitive pricing does not arise in equilibrium, and there isa conflict between risk sharing efficiency and the tightness of the spread.This conflict can be mitigated by an appropriate market structure design.The limit order market is the only market structure in which the competitiveequilibrium is the unique equilibrium.

Variable Kernel estimates: On the impossibility of tuning the parameters

For the standard kernel density estimate, it is known that one can tune the bandwidth such that the expected L1 error is within a constant factor of the optimal L1 error (obtained when one is allowed to choose the bandwidth with knowledge of the density). In this paper, we pose the same problem for variable bandwidth kernel estimates where the bandwidths are allowed to depend upon the location. We show in particular that for positive kernels on the real line, for any data-based bandwidth, there exists a densityfor which the ratio of expected L1 error over optimal L1 error tends to infinity. Thus, the problem of tuning the variable bandwidth in an optimal manner is ``too hard''. Moreover, from the class of counterexamples exhibited in the paper, it appears thatplacing conditions on the densities (monotonicity, convexity, smoothness) does not help.

The impact of the reference price system on the pharmaceutical market: A theoretical approach

This article analyses the impact of the reference pricesystem on the price-setting strategies of thepharmaceutical firms and on the level of generic usage.This model is the first to take explicitly into accountthe impact of the reference price mechanism on the levelof competition between brand-name and generic drugs andnational pharmaceutical spending. We consider aduopolistic model with one firm producing the brand-namedrug, whose patent has already expired, and the otherproducing the corresponding generic version. We work ina partial equilibrium framework where firms set pricessequentially and consumers face heterogeneous switchingcosts.We show that brand producers compensate thedecline of profits by selling greater quantities insteadof charging higher prices, thus fostering pricecompetition in the pharmaceutical market. This result isa consequence of both the assumption of a verticallydifferentiated model and the introduction of thereference price system.

Measuring time-varying economic fears with consumption-based stochastic discount factors

This paper analyzes empirically the volatility of consumption-based stochastic discount factors as a measure of implicit economic fears by studying its relationship with future economic and stock market cycles. Time-varying economic fears seem to be well captured by the volatility of stochastic discount factors. In particular, the volatility of recursive utility-based stochastic discount factor with contemporaneous growth explains between 9 and 34 percent of future changes in industrial production at short and long horizons respectively. They also explain ex-ante uncertainty and risk aversion. However, future stock market cycles are better explained by a similar stochastic discount factor with long-run consumption growth. This specification of the stochastic discount factor presents higher volatility and lower pricing errors than the specification with contemporaneous consumption growth.

Putting health in all policies: The National Institute for Welfare Enhancement

Welfare is a rather vague term whose meaning depends on ideology, values andjudgments. Material resources are just means to enhance people s well-being, butgrowth of the Gross Domestic Production is still the standard measure of thesuccess of a society. Fortunately, recent advances in measuring social performanceinclude health, education and other social outcomes. Because what we measureaffects what we do it is hoped that social policies will change. The movementHealth in all policies and its associated Health Impact Assessment methodologywill contribute to it. The task consists of designing transversal policies thatconsider health and other welfare goals, the short term and long-term implicationsand intergenerational redistributions of resources. As long as marginalproductivity on health outside the healthcare system is higher than inside it,efficiency needs cross-sectoral policies. And fairness needs them even more,because in order to reduce social inequalities in health, a wide social and politicalresponse is needed.Unless we reduce the well-documented inefficiencies in our current health caresystems the welfare states will fail to consolidate and the overall economic wellbeingcould be in serious trouble. In this article we sketched some policy solutionssuch as pricing according to net benefits of innovation and public encouragementof radical innovation besides the small type incremental and market-ledinnovation. We proposed an independent agency, the National Institute forWelfare Enhancement to guarantee long term fair and efficient social policies inwhich health plays a central role.

Seeking theta's desperately: Estimating the distribution of consumers under increasing block rates

This paper shows that the distribution of observed consumption is not a good proxy for the distribution of heterogeneous consumers when the current tariff is an increasing block tariff. We use a two step method to recover the "true" distribution of consumers. First, we estimate the demand function induced by the current tariff. Second, using the demand system, we specify the distribution of consumers as a function of observed consumption to recover the true distribution. Finally, we design a new two-part tariff which allows us to evaluate the equity of the existence of an increasing block tariff.

Selling to consumers with endogenous types

For many goods (such as experience goods or addictive goods), consumers preferences may change over time. In this paper, we examine a monopolist s optimal pricing schedule when current consumption can affect a consumer s valuation in the future and valuations are unobservable. We assume that consumers are anonymous, i.e. the monopolist can t observe a consumer s past consumption history. For myopic consumers, the optimal consumption schedule is distorted upwards, involving substantial discounts for low valuation types. This pushes low types into higher valuations, from which rents can be extracted.For forward looking consumers, there may be a further upward distortion of consumption due to a reversal of the adverse selection effect; low valuation consumers now have a strong interest in consumption in order to increase their valuations. Firms will find it profitable to educate consumers and encourage forward looking behavior.

Earnings management and audit adjustments: An empirical study of IBEX 35 constituents

Doubts about the reliability of a company's qualitative financial disclosure increase market participant expectations from the auditor's report. The auditing process is supposed to serve as a monitoring device that reduces management incentives to manipulate reported earnings. Empirical research confirms that it could be an efficient device under some circumstancesand recognizes that our estimates of the informativeness of audit reports are unavoidably biased (e.g., because of a client's anticipation of the auditing process). This empirical study supports the significant role of auditors in the financial market, in particular in the prevention of earnings management practice. We focus on earnings misstatements, which auditors correct with anadjustment, using a sample of past and current constituents of the benchmark market index in Spain, IBEX 35, and manually collected audit adjustments reported over the 1997-2004 period (42 companies, 336 annual reports, 75 earnings misstatements). Our findings confirm that companies more often overstate than understate their earnings. An investor may foresee earningsmisreporting, as manipulators have a similar profile (e.g., more leveraged and with lower sales). However, he may receive valuable information from the audit adjustment on the size of earnings misstatement, which can be significantly large (i.e., material in almost all cases). We suggest that the magnitude of an audit adjustment depends, other things constant, on annual revenues and free cash levels. We also examine how the audit adjustment relates to the observed market price, trading volume and stock returns. Our findings are that earnings manipulators have a lower price and larger trading volume compared to their rivals. Their returns are positively associated with the magnitude of earnings misreporting, which is not consistent with the possible pricing of audit information.

A comparison of stock market mechanisms

This paper studies the relationship between the amount of publicinformation that stock market prices incorporate and the equilibriumbehavior of market participants. The analysis is framed in a static, NREEsetup where traders exchange vectors of assets accessing multidimensionalinformation under two alternative market structures. In the first(the unrestricted system), both informed and uninformed speculators cancondition their demands for each traded asset on all equilibrium prices;in the second (the restricted system), they are restricted to conditiontheir demand on the price of the asset they want to trade. I show thatinformed traders incentives to exploit multidimensional privateinformation depend on the number of prices they can condition upon whensubmitting their demand schedules, and on the specific price formationprocess one considers. Building on this insight, I then give conditionsunder which the restricted system is more efficient than the unrestrictedsystem.

Optimal regulation of a fully insured deposit banking system

We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurancein the presence of private information when the market value of depositinsurance can be determined using Merton's (1997) formula. We show that,under the assumption that transferring funds from taxpayers to financialinstitutions has a social cost, the optimal regulation combines differentlevels of capital requirements combined with decreasing premia on depositinsurance. On the other hand, it is never efficient to require the banksto hold riskless assets, so that narrow banking is not efficient. Finally,chartering banks is necessary in order to decrease the cost of asymmetricinformation.