A century of global equity market correlations

In this paper, we use a unique long-run dataset of regulatory constraints on capital account openness to explain stock market correlations. Since stock returns themselves are highly volatile, any examination of what drives correlations needs to focus on long runs of data. This is particularly true since some of the short-term changes in co-movements appear to reverse themselves (Delroy Hunter 2005). We argue that changes in the co-movement of indices have not been random. Rather, they are mainly driven by greater freedom to move funds from one country to another. In related work, Geert Bekaert and Campbell Harvey (2000) show that equity correlations increase after liberalization of capital markets, using a number of case studies from emerging countries. We examine this pattern systematically for the last century, and find it to be most pronounced in the recent past. We compare the importance of capital account openness with one main alternative explanation, the growing synchronization of economic fundamentals. We conclude that greater openness has been the single most important cause of growing correlations during the last quarter of a century, though increasingly correlated economic fundamentals also matter. In the conclusion, we offer some thoughts on why the effects of greater openness appear to be so much stronger today than they were during the last era of globalization before 1914.

The role of institutions in the contractual process

Human beings increase their productivity by specializingtheir resources and exchanging their products. Theorganization of exchange is costly, however, becausespecialized activities need coordination and incentiveshave to be aligned. This work first describes how theseexchanges are organized in an institutional environment.It then focuses on the dual effect of this environment-as with any other specialized resource, institutions maybe used for expropriation purposes. They enjoyspecialization advantages in safeguarding exchange butthey also make possible new forms of opportunism,causing new costs of exchange. Three perverse tendenciesare identified:In the legal field, there is a surplus ofmandatory rules and, at the same time, a deficit in default rules. Second, courts activity is biased againstthe quasi-judicial role of the parties and the market. Third, Market enforcement is based on reputationalassets that are badly exposed to opportunism.

Quality safeguards and regulation of online pharmacies

Using econometric evidence, this article confirms that distribution ofmedicines online is split into two market segments of very diversequality, and identifies the factors that drive quality and qualityassurance in this activity. Unlike fraudulent, rogue, websites, whichoffer scant guarantees and usually sell just a few medicines withoutprescription, online pharmacies offering insurance coverage and linkedto conventional pharmacies typically sell a wholerange of drugs, require third-party medical prescriptions and provideabundant information to patients. It is shown that, where onlinepharmacies are allowed to act legally, market forces enhance quality,as private insurers require professional standards, and specialized thirdparties make a business of certifying them. Furthermore, older onlinepharmacies and those running conventional operations offer higherquality, probably because of reputational investments. Overall, this evidence supports licensing online pharmacies, especiallyconsidering that prohibiting them is ineffective against fraudulent sites.

Judges' cognition and market order

We argue that during the crystallization of common and civil law in the 19th century, the optimal degree of discretion in judicial rulemaking, albeit influenced by the comparative advantages of both legislative and judicial rulemaking, was mainly determined by the anti-market biases of the judiciary. The different degrees of judicial discretion adopted in both legal traditions were thus optimally adapted to different circumstances, mainly rooted in the unique, market-friendly, evolutionary transition enjoyed by English common law as opposed to the revolutionary environment of the civil law. On the Continent, constraining judicial discretion was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing a market economy. The ongoing debasement of pro-market fundamentals in both branches of the Western legal system is explained from this perspective as a consequence of increased perceptions of exogenous risks and changes in the political system, which favored the adoption of sharing solutions and removed the cognitive advantage of parliaments and political leaders.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Assesing the political viability of labour market reform: The case of employment protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation.Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot ofattention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer jobduration. The support for employment protection will then depend onthe value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. Wehighlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers'bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more preciselyits rate of creative destruction.

Labour market in the Catalan cotton textile sector: Employment and fertility (1850-1913)

This paper deals whit the dynamics of the Catalan textile labour market (theSpanish region that concentrated most of the industrial and factory activity duringthe 19 Century) and offers hypotheses and results on the impact it had on livingstandards and fertility levels. We observe the formation of an uneven labourmarket in which male supply for labour (excluding women and children) grewmuch faster than the demand. We stress the fact that labour supply is verydependant on institutional factors liked to the transmition of household propertybetween generations. Instead the slow path of growth of adult males demand forlabour is witnessing the limits of this industry to expand and to compete ininternational markets. The strategy of working class families to adapt to scarceopportunities of employment we document here is the diminution of legitimatefertility levels. Fertility control is the direct instrument we think workers have tocontrol their number in a situation that was likely to create labour surpluses in theshort and mid run.

Product market deregulation and the U.S. employment miracle

We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulation and equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combining a job matchingmodel with monopolistic competition in the goods market and individual wage bargaining.Product market competition affects unemployment by two channels: the output expansion effect and a countervailing effect due to a hiring externality. Competition is then linked to barriers to entry. We calibrate the model to US data and perform a policy experiment to assess whether the decrease in trend unemployment during the 1980 s and 1990 s could be attributed to product market deregulation. Our quantitative analysis suggests that under individual bargaining, a decrease of less than two tenths of a percentage point of unemployment rates can be attributed to product market deregulation, a surprisingly small amount.

Overconfidence and market efficiency with heterogeneous agents

We study financial markets in which both rational and overconfident agents coexist and make endogenous information acquisition decisions. We demonstrate the following irrelevance result: when a positive fraction of rational agents (endogeneously) decides to become informed in equilibrium, prices are set as if all investors were rational, and as a consequence the overconfidence bias does not aect informational efficiency, price volatility, rational traders expected profits or their welfare. Intuitively, as overconfidence goes up, so does price infornativeness, which makes rational agents cut their information acquisition activities, effectively undoing the standard effect of more aggressive trading by the overconfident.

Composition of electricity generation portfolios, pivotal dynamics and market prices

We use a simulation model to study how the diversification of electricity generation portfoliosinfluences wholesale prices. We find that technological diversification generally leads to lower market prices but that the relationship is mediated by the supply to demand ratio. In each demand case there is a threshold where pivotal dynamics change. Pivotal dynamics pre- and post-threshold are the cause of non-linearities in the influence of diversification on market prices. The findings are robust to our choice of behavioural parameters and match close-form solutions where those are available.

Endogenous labor market participation and the business cycle

Existing models of equilibrium unemployment with endogenous labor market participation are complex, generate procyclical unemployment rates and cannot match unemployment variability relative to GDP. We embed endogenous participation in a simple, tractable job market matching model, show analytically how variations in the participation rate are driven by the cross-sectional density of home productivity near the participation threshold, andhow this density translates into an extensive-margin labor supply elasticity. A calibration of the model to macro data not only matches employment and participation variabilities but also generates strongly countercyclical unemployment rates. With some wage rigidity the model also matches unemployment variations well. Furthermore, the labor supply elasticity implied by our calibration is consistent with microeconometric evidence for the US.

Giffen goods and market making

This paper shows that information effects per se are not responsible forthe Giffen goods anomaly affecting competitive traders demands in multi-asset, noisy rational expectations equilibrium models. The role thatinformation plays in traders strategies also matters. In a market withrisk averse, uninformed traders, informed agents havea dual motive for trading: speculation and market making. Whilespeculation entails using prices to assess the effect of private signalerror terms, market making requires employing them to disentangle noisetraders effects in traders aggregate orders. In a correlated environment,this complicates a trader s signal-extraction problem and maygenerate upward-sloping demand curves. Assuming either (i) that competitive,risk neutral market makers price the assets, or that (ii) the risktolerance coefficient of uninformed traders grows without bound, removesthe market making component from informed traders demands, rendering themwell behaved in prices.

Auctions of licences and market structure

This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to operate in amarket where those firms that obtain at least one licence then engage ina symmetric market game. I employ a new refinement of Nash equilibrium,the concept of {\sl Markovian recursively undominated equilibrium}.The unique solution satisfies the following properties: (i) when severalfirms own licences before the auction (incumbents), new entrants buylicences in each stage, and (ii) when there is no more than one incumbent,either the single firm preempts entry altogether or entry occurs inevery stage, depending on the parameter configuration.

Wage inequality in a frictional labor market

Wage inequality in the United States has grown substantially in thepast two decades. Standard supply-demand analysis in the empiricsof inequality (e.g.Katz and Murphy (1992)) indicates that we mayattribute some of this trend to an outward shift in the demand forhigh skilled labor. In this paper we examine a simple static channelin which the wage premium for skill may grow -increased firm entry.We consider a model of wage dispersion where there are two types ofworkers and homogeneous firms must set wages and preferences forwhat type of worker they would like to hire. We find that both thewage differential and the demand for high skill workers can increasewith the proportion of high skill workers -these high skill workerstherefore 'create' their own demand without exogenous factors. Inaddition, within group wage inequality can increase in step with thebetween group wage inequality. Simulations of the model are providedin order to compare the findings with empirical results.

The impact of generic reference pricing interventions in the statin market

The objective of this study was to evaluate the intended and unintended impact on pharmaceutical use and sales of three public financing reforms applied to the prescription of statins: a Spanish generic reference pricing (RP) system for lovastatin and simvastatin, and two competing policies introduced by the Andalusian Public Health Service (APHS) for all statins, first a maximum consumer price (MCP) and then a so called quality prescribing incentive for general practitioners (MCP plus PI).This study is designed as an observational, retrospective, interrupted time series analysis with comparison series (APHS and the rest of Spain) of 46 monthly drug use and sales ratios from January 2001 to October 2004 for each active ingredient in the group of statins.RP has been effective at reducing the volume of sales growth of the off-patent statins, yet its overall impact on sales of all statins has been relatively modest. The quantity and volume of sales impact heavily depends on regulatory RP details such as when the system is introduced, how often it is updated, and how the reference price is calculated.