Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition

We construct a dynamic voting model of multiparty competition in order to capture the following facts: voters base their decision on past economicperformance of the parties, and parties and candidates have different objectives. This model may explain the emergence of parties' ideologies,and shows the compatibility of the different objectives of parties and candidates. Together, these results give rise to the formation ofpolitical parties, as infinetely-lived agents with a certain ideology, out of the competition of myopic candidates freely choosing policy positions. We also show that in multicandidate elections held under the plurality system, Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation is no longer satisfied.

On information and competition in private value auctions

How much information does an auctioneer want bidders to have in a private value environment?We address this question using a novel approach to ordering information structures based on the property that in private value settings more information leads to a more disperse distribution of buyers updated expected valuations. We define the class of precision criteria following this approach and different notions of dispersion, and relate them to existing criteria of informativeness. Using supermodular precision, we obtain three results: (1) a more precise information structure yields a more efficient allocation; (2) the auctioneer provides less than the efficient level of information since more information increases bidder informational rents; (3) there is a strategic complementarity between information and competition, so that both the socially efficient and the auctioneer s optimal choice of precision increase with the number of bidders, and both converge as the number of bidders goes to infinity.

How competition controls team production: The case of fishing firms

Under team production, those who monitor individual productivity areusually the only ones compensated with a residual that varies withthe performance of the team. This pattern is efficient, as is shownby the prevalence of conventional firms, except for small teams andwhen specialized monitoring is ineffective. Profit sharing in repeatedteam production induces all team members to take disciplinary actionagainst underperformers through switching and separation decisions,however. Such action provides effective self-enforcemnt when themarkets for team members are competitive, even for large teams usingspecialized monitoring. The traditional share system of fishing firmsshows that for this competition to provide powerful enough incentivesthe costs of switching teams and measuring team productivity must bebellow. Risk allocation may constrain the organizational designdefined by the use of a share system. It does not account for itsexistence, however.

Bundling and competition for slots: On the portfolio effects of bundling

We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio ofdistinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affectscompetition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not existand hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each sellerhas an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists.Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze theconsequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.

Effects of employment protection and product market regulations on the Italian labor market

Labor market regulations have often being blamed for high and persistentunemployment in Europe, but evidence on their impact remains mixed. Morerecently, attention has turned to the impact of product market regulationson employment growth. This paper analyzes how labor and product marketregulations interact to affect turnover and employment. We present a matchingmodel which illustrates how barriers to entry in the product market mitigatethe impact of labor market deregulation. We, then, use the Italian SocialSecurity employer-employee panel to study the interaction between barriersto entry and dismissal costs. We exploit the fact that costs for unjustdismissals in Italy increased for firms below 15 employees relative to biggerfirms after 1990. We find that the increase in dismissal costs after 1990decreased accessions and separations in small relative to big firms,especially for women. Moreover, consistent with our model, we find evidencethat the increase in dismissal costs had smaller effects on turnover for womenin sectors faced with strict product market regulations.

Increasing returns, imperfect competition and factor prices

We show how, in general equilibrium models featuring increasing returns, imperfectcompetition and endogenous markups, changes in the scale of economic activity affectincome distribution across factors. Whenever final goods are gross-substitutes (gross-complements), a scale expansion raises (lowers) the relative reward of the scarce factoror the factor used intensively in the sector characterized by a higher degree of product differentiation and higher fixed costs. Under very reasonable hypothesis, our theory suggests that scale is skill-biased. This result provides a microfoundation for the secular increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. Moreover, it constitutes an important link among major explanations for the rise in wage inequality: skill-biased technical change, capital-skill complementarities and international trade. We provide new evidence on the mechanism underlying the skill bias of scale.

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

Corruption and competition in procurement

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, ii) competitive (rather than collusive) behavior of procurement agents, and iii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.

Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest

We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when theweak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a ``centrist'' policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, ``posturing'' by the strong party leads to platform divergence.

Motivation and content Language Integrated Learning : an impulse for Second Language Teaching

“Estudiantes motivados producen profesores motivados y viceversa” (Lesley Denham)La cita refleja el efecto recíproco que tiene el comportamiento del profesor en el compromiso de los estudiantes a lo largo del año y viceversa. Es sorprendente como, destacando las fortalezas de cada estudiante en lugar de sus debilidades, nunca comparándolos entre ellos sino con su propio rendimiento, puede despertar una motivación intrínseca en el estudiante, y una merecida satisfacción personal para el profesor.Sin embargo, no existen botones motivacionales mágicos que podamos pulsar y hacer que el alumno quiera aprender. Como profesores, tomar la iniciativa será crucial: dar a nuestros estudiantes el espacio suficiente para experimentar, realzar su autonomía, e intuir las respuestas a través de un proceso inductivo. En definitiva, hacerles protagonistas de su proceso de aprendizaje.Incluir AICLE en la clase de inglés es una metodología que nos ayudará a conseguirlo. Los estudiantes asocian AICLE con algo interesante y divertido, diferente a las sesiones teóricas. Como resultado, al utilizar la lengua, lo hacen movidos por sus sentimientos, aprendiendo de forma implícita.“Estudiants motivats produeixen professors motivats i viceversa” (Lesley Denham)La cita reflecteix l'efecte recíproc que té el comportament del professor en el compromís dels estudiants al llarg de l'any i viceversa. És sorprenent com, destacant les fortaleses de cada estudiant en lloc de les seves debilitats, mai comparant-los entre ells sinó amb el seu propi rendiment, pot despertar una motivació intrínseca a l'estudiant, i una merescuda satisfacció personal per al professor.No obstant això, no existeixen botons motivacionals màgics que puguem prémer i fer que l'alumne vulgui aprendre. Com a professors, prendre la iniciativa serà crucial: donar als nostres estudiants l'espai suficient per experimentar, realçar la seva autonomia, i intuir les respostes a través d'un procés inductiu. En definitiva, fer-los protagonistes del seu procés d'aprenentatge.Incloure AICLE en la classe d'anglès és una metodologia que ens ajudarà a aconseguir-ho. Els estudiants consideren AICLE interessant i divertit, diferent a les sessions teòriques. Com a resultat, en utilitzar la llengua, ho fan moguts pels seus sentiments, aprenent de forma implícita.

Breaking down the barriers between literature and language in the EFL classroom

Aquest treball gira entorn la qüestió de l’ús que es fa de la literatura com a medi per a l’ensenyament de l’anglès com a segona llengua. En primer lloc, dibuixa el marc de la situació actual on hi ha una clara separació entre llengua i literatura com a assignatures diferenciades i fa un repàs de les diferents metodologies que al llarg de la historia han utilitzat la literatura com a eina d’aprenentatge de la llengua. Segonament, el treball explica el desenvolupament i posada en pràctica d’una unitat didàctica completa per a alumnes de segon de batxillerat, que te la literatura con a punt de sortida. El treball mira de concloure com la utilització de la literatura exerceix un poder de motivació clau en els alumnes i aporta un context que dona sentit i riquesa a l’ensenyament de la llengua. Per últim, el treball fa un recull de les opinions de professors d’anglès de Catalunya al respecte d’aquest tema, a través d’un qüestionari que 66 professors associats a l’APAC (Associació de Professors d’Anglès de Catalunya) van respondre de manera desinteressada.

Transferencia en la adquisición de segundas lenguas. Un estudio con alumnado rumano en un contexto bilingüe = Transfer in second language acquisition. A study with Romanian schoolchildren in a bilingual context

Situados en el contexto catalán, el artículo estudia la influencia de la L1 (rumano) en algunos aspectos morfosintácticos de la adquisición de las L2s. Para ello se analizan las competencias lingüísticas en catalán y castellano de un grupo de escolares cuya L1 es el rumano y que cursan 2.º y 4.º de ESO. Los datos muestran que los alumnos cuya L1 es el rumano, a pesar de dominar una lengua románica cercana a las lenguas de aprendizaje (L2/L3), presentan dificultades comparables a otros colectivos con otras lenguasde origen. Por otra parte, nuestra investigación confirma que la L1 de este alumnado juega un importante papel en la adquisición de ambas lenguas, concluyendo que parte de los errores hallados son aquellos que se basan en estructuras de la lengua propia

Editorial: Language, frequency and bibliometric indexes

This editorial examines the actions undertaken in number 5 and announces two important changes for the numbers 6 and 7, namely frequency and languages. Furthermore, the use of some bibliometric indicators, such as impact factor and refusal rate, is critically analyzed.