A Comparison of polarization measures

This paper provides a systematic classification of the different measures of polarization based on their properties. Together with the axioms proposed in Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) and in Wang and Tsui (2000) we consider three additional properties. We examine which properties are common to all indices and which set them apart.

A Model of ethnic conflict

We present a model of conflict, in which discriminatory government policy or social intolerance is responsive to various forms of ethnic activism, including violence. It is this perceived responsiveness -captured by the probability that the government gives in and accepts a proponed change in ethnic policy- that induces individuals to mobilize in support for their cause. Yet, mobilization is costly and demonstrators have to be compensated accordingly. Individuals have to weigh their ethnic radicalism with their material well-being to determine the size of their money contribution to the cause. Our main results are: (i) a one-sided increase in radicalism or in population size increases conflict; (ii) a one-sided increase in income has ambiguous effects depending on the elasticity of contributions to income; (iii) an increase in within-group inequality increases conflict; and (iv) an increase in the correlation between ethnic radicalism and inequality also increases conflict.

The Social contract with endogenous sentiments

Moral values infuence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially signif- cant instance is the case of moral values concerning work e¤ort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals di¤er in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria. In "cohesive" equilibria, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behav- iour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type. Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality. In a "clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and toward the poor for a set of OECD countries.

Polarization, fractionalization and conflict

A recent upsurge of empirical studies on the causes of conflict attempts to connect various features of the distribution of the relevant characteristic (typically ethnicity or religion) to conflict. The distributional indices differ (polarization, fractionalization or Lorenz-domination) and so do the various specifications of "conflict" (onset, incidence or intensity). Overall, the results are far from clear, and combined with the mixture of alternative indices and notions of "conflict" it is not surprising that the reader may come away thoroughly perplexed. The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework that permits us to distinguish between the occurrence of conflict and its severity and that clarifies the role of polarization and fractionalization in each of these cases.

Dynamics of the third order Lyness' difference equation

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On the number of K3,3-minor-free and maximal K3,3-minor-free graphs

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Diophantine approximation on projective varieties I: algebraic distance and metric Bézout theorem

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Numerical schemes of diffusion asymptotics and moment closures for kinetic equations

We investigate different models that are intended to describe the small mean free path regime of a kinetic equation, a particular attention being paid to the moment closure by entropy minimization. We introduce a specific asymptotic-induced numerical strategy which is able to treat the stiff terms of the asymptotic diffusive regime. We evaluate on numerics the performances of the method and the abilities of the reduced models to capture the main features of the full kinetic equation.

Síntesi i caracterització de nanopartícules de níquel

La finalitat d’aquest projecte és la síntesi de nanopartícules (partícules d’entre 1 i 100 nm) de níquel metàl·lic. Entenent els processos de formació, així com els factors decisius de les condicions de reacció. Caracteritzar tant a nivell estructural com magnètic les nanopartícules obtingudes amb estructura típica fcc, i prenent atenció en aquelles mostres que presentin la fase NiHCP.

Descobriment de serveis en xarxes ad-hoc : directory facilitator

Aquest projecte presenta una solució intregrada amb les especificacions de la FIPA d’un servei de pàgines grogues per a la plataforma d’agents de JADE en entorns ad hoc. El servei de pàgines grogues interaccionarà a través d’un middleware amb diferents tecnologies P2P per proporcionar als agents un servei totalment fiable i transparent que els ajudarà a superar la limitació del sistema de federacions de FIPA.

L'Educació assistencial i social a Vic

A partir de les fonts documentals de la “Casa Misericòrdia” i de “Casa Caritat” de Vic i també del testimoni de persones que hi havien viscut o hi havien treballat o les coneixien de prop, s’ha volgut explicar el naixement, evolució i decadència de les dues institucions centenàries que van realitzar, gairebé sempre amb pocs mitjans però amb notable dedicació, una tasca ingent en favor dels més desfavorits i que van deixar d’existir a principis dels anys setanta. Casa Caritat atenia persones necessitades d’ambdós sexes, encara que en dues instal•lacions diferents, com l’antic convent dels Trinitaris per al sexe femení i l’antic convent de Sant Domènec, per al masculí. La Misericòrdia va acollir durant poc més de dos-cents cinquanta anys nenes, noies, dones i velles pobres i desemparades. La raresa d’aquesta institució estava en el règim d’autogestió, sense la intervenció de cap ordre religiosa, com era costum en aquells temps. El tancament de les dues institucions va donar lloc a un nou model assistencial i educatiu per als menors, promogut pel bisbe de Vic Ramon Masnou i per Joan Riera, els impulsors de la Llar Juvenil. Es tractava d’un recurs modern i d’inspiració cristiana, ubicat en una casa de nova construcció i sota un reglament molt més humanitzat i amb menys pes de les pràctiques religioses. La conflictivitat dels nens i nenes, a mesura que creixien, i amb les necessitats d’uns altres temps, a més d’assumpció de les competències de menors per part de la Generalitat el 1981, van propiciar la creació per part de la Generalitat i de l’Ajuntament de Vic de Casa Moreta, amb un projecte totalment laic i portat per professionals que després es convertiria en el Centre Residencial Osona i també va suposar el naixement d’una altra entitat, la Llar Terricabras. La recerca, doncs, pretén posar les bases per a futures anàlisis aprofundides sobre l’atenció als menors a la ciutat de Vic, al llarg del temps.

Contractive probability metrics and asymptotic behavior of dissipative kinetic equations

The present notes are intended to present a detailed review of the existing results in dissipative kinetic theory which make use of the contraction properties of two main families of probability metrics: optimal mass transport and Fourier-based metrics. The first part of the notes is devoted to a self-consistent summary and presentation of the properties of both probability metrics, including new aspects on the relationships between them and other metrics of wide use in probability theory. These results are of independent interest with potential use in other contexts in Partial Differential Equations and Probability Theory. The second part of the notes makes a different presentation of the asymptotic behavior of Inelastic Maxwell Models than the one presented in the literature and it shows a new example of application: particle's bath heating. We show how starting from the contraction properties in probability metrics, one can deduce the existence, uniqueness and asymptotic stability in classical spaces. A global strategy with this aim is set up and applied in two dissipative models.

Shelah's singular compactness theorem

We present Shelah’s famous theorem in a version for modules, together with a self-contained proof and some examples. This exposition is based on lectures given at CRM in October 2006.

┴N as an Abstract Elementary Class

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Political institutions and the development of telecommunications

It has traditionally been argued that the development of telecommunications infrastructure is dependent on the quality of countries' political institutions. We estimate the effect of political institutions on the diffusion of three telecommunications services and find it to be much smaller in cellular telephony than in the others. By evaluating the importance of institutions for technologies rather than for industries, we reveal important growth opportunities for developing countries and offer policy implications for alleviating differences between countries in international telecommunications development. Keywords: Political constraints, telecommunications, GMM, economic development. JEL codes: O1, O3.