Ex post bargaining, labor coordination and wage formation at the firm level

We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.

The rise and decline of children's labour participation levels during the early stages of industrialisation. Catalonia (1850-1925)

This article aims to analyse the reasons for the intensive use of childlabour in the 19th century and its subsequent decline in the first thirdof the 20th century in the context of an economy with a highly flexiblelabour supply like that of Catalonia. During the second half of the 19thcentury,factors relating to family economies, such as numerous familiesand low wages for adults, along with the technologies of the time thatrequired manual labour resources, would appear to explain the intensiveuse of child labour to the detriment of schooling. The technologicalchanges that occurred during the first third of the 20th century, thedemographic transition and adult wage increase (for both men and women)explain the schooling of children up to the age of 15 and theconsequent practical abolition of child labour in that new era ofeconomic modernisation.

Children's work in Spanish textiles during the 19th and 20th Centuries

This essay deals with the reasons explaining children s work in 19th century textile factories and their removal during the first part of the 20th century. The inadequacy of the structure of incomes and expenditures of the household and the very low economic incentives to educate children can explain why children were in the factories and not in the school. Moreover, the marginal economic contribution to the economy of the household of a child was the same as that of his mother. This normally implied that women and children were perfect substitutes. When the family had a child at working age this allowed to replace the paid work input of the mother. With the beginnings of the 20th century a set of changes leading to the increase of women s productivity and hourly real wages, switched the situation and involved the new incorporation of women into paid work and the investment in children s human capital.

Educational opportunity and the college premium

Since World War II, the United States government has made improved accessto higher education a priority. This e¤ort has substantially increasedthe number of people who complete college. We show that by reducing theeffective interest rate on borrowing for education, such policies canactually increase the gap in wages between those with a college educationand those without. The mechanism that drives our results is the signaling role of education first explored by Spence (1973). We argue that financialconstraints on education reduce the value of education as a signal. Wesolve for the reduced form relationship between the interest rate and thewage premium in the steady state of a dynamic asymmetric information model.In addition, we discuss evidence of decreases in borrowing costs for educationfinancing in the U.S.

Downsizing, job insecurity and firm reputation

This paper studies how firms make layoff decisions in the presence of adverse shocks. In this uncertain environment, workers' expectations about their job security affect their on-the-job performance. This productivity effect on job insecurity forces firms to strike a balance between laying off redundant workers and maintaining survivors' commitment when deciding on the amount and timing of downsizing. This framework offers an explanation of conservative employment practices (such as zero or reduced layoffs) based on firms having private information about their future profits. High retention rates and wages can signal that the firm has a bright future, boosting workers' confidence. Moreover, the model provides clear predictions about when waves of downsizing will occur as opposed to one-time massive cuts.

Behavioral assumptions and management ability

The paper explores the consequences that relying on different behavioral assumptions intraining managers may have on their future performance. We argue that training with anemphasis on the standard assumptions used in economics (rationality and self-interest) is goodfor technical posts but may also lead future managers to rely excessively on rational and explicitsafeguarding, crowding out instinctive relational heuristics and signaling a bad human type topotential partners. In contrast, human assumptions used in management theories, because oftheir diverse, implicit and even contradictory nature, do not conflict with the innate set ofcooperative tools and may provide a good training ground for such tools. We present tentativeconfirmatory evidence by examining how the weight given to behavioral assumptions in the corecourses of the top 100 business schools influences the average salaries of their MBA graduates.Controlling for the self-selected average quality of their students and some other schools characteristics, average salaries are seen to be significantly greater for schools whose core MBAcourses contain a higher proportion of management courses as opposed to courses based oneconomics or technical disciplines.

Falling real wages during an industrial revolution

The Industrial Revolution was characterized by technologicalprogress and an increasing capital intensity. Why did real wages stagnateor fall in the beginning? I answer this question by modeling the IndustrialRevolution as the introduction of a relatively more capital intensiveproduction method in a standard neoclassical framework. I show that{\sl real wages fall in the beginning of an industrial revolution if andonly if technological progress in the relatively more capital intensivesector is relatively fast.}

Malthusian dynamism and the rise of Europe: Make war, not love

This paper argues that Malthusian regimes are capable of sustained changes in per capita incomes. Shifting mortality and fertility schedules can lead to different steady-state income levels, with long periods of growth during the transition. Europe checked the downward pressure on wages through late marriage, which reduced fertility, and a mortality regime that combined high death rates with high incomes. We argue that both emerged as a result of the Black Death.

Job dynamics, correlated shocks and wage profiles

We generalize the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model of the labor marketwith a more realistic structure for the stochastic process of theshocks to the worker-firm match. In this way we can acommodate theempirical observation that hazard rates of job termination decrease andaverage wages increase with job tenure. Besides being able to fit bettersome observables of the model, the changes we introduce are nontrivialfor the analysis of policies as well.

Unemployment duration and workers' wage aspirations in Spain

This paper examines unemployed workers' declared willingness to work for a wage lower than the one warranted by their qualification. We analyze which personal and economic characteristics determine thiswillingness and how it changes as unemployment spells lengthen. Moreover, we also study the influence of this willingness on unemployment duration. The main results are: (i) Young workers, those less educated and those living in regions with high unemployment show a more positive attitude towards accepting lower wages while married women with a working husband show more negative attitudes; (ii) The exhaustion of unemployment benefits has positive effects in the transition probability of the attitude from negative to positive; (iii) The effect of this attitude on the unemployment hazard rate is positive but only marginally significant which may be showing that this willingness is not only reflecting the worker's reservation wage but also some unobserved heterogeneity; (iv) The negative duration dependence of the unemployment hazard rate is substantially reduced when unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for.

Which inflation to target? A small open economy with sticky wages indexed to past inflation

In a closed economy context there is common agreement on price inflation stabilization being one of the objects of monetary policy. Moving to an open economy context gives rise to the coexistence of two measures of inflation: domestic inflation (DI) and consumer price inflation (CPI). Which one of the two measures should be the target variable? This is the question addressed in this paper. In particular, I use a small open economy model to show that once sticky wages indexed to past CPI inflation are introduced, a complete inward looking monetary policy is no more optimal. I first, derive a loss function from a secondorder approximation of the utility function and then, I compute the fully optimalmonetary policy under commitment. Then, I use the optimal monetary policy as a benchmark to compare the performance of different monetary policy rules. The main result is that once a positive degree of indexation is introduced in the model the rule performing better (among the Taylor type rules considered) is the one targeting wage inflation and CPI inflation. Moreover this rule delivers results very close to the one obtained under the fully optimal monetary policy with commitment.

The three horsemen of riches: Plague, war and urbanization in early modern Europe

How did Europe escape the "Iron Law of Wages?" We construct a simple Malthusian model withtwo sectors and multiple steady states, and use it to explain why European per capita incomes andurbanization rates increased during the period 1350-1700. Productivity growth can only explain a smallfraction of the rise in output per capita. Population dynamics changes of the birth and death schedules were far more important determinants of steady states. We show how a major shock to population cantrigger a transition to a new steady state with higher per-capita income. The Black Death was such ashock, raising wages substantially. Because of Engel's Law, demand for urban products increased, andurban centers grew in size. European cities were unhealthy, and rising urbanization pushed up aggregatedeath rates. This effect was reinforced by diseases spread through war, financed by higher tax revenues.In addition, rising trade also spread diseases. In this way higher wages themselves reduced populationpressure. We show in a calibration exercise that our model can account for the sustained rise in Europeanurbanization as well as permanently higher per capita incomes in 1700, without technological change.Wars contributed importantly to the "Rise of Europe", even if they had negative short-run effects. We thustrace Europe s precocious rise to economic riches to interactions of the plague shock with the belligerentpolitical environment and the nature of cities.

Job search and asset accumulation under borrowing constraints

In this paper I show how borrowing constraints and job search interact.I fit a dynamic model to data from the National Longitudinal Survey(1979-cohort) and show that borrowing constraints are significant. Agentswith more initial assets and more access to credit attain higher wagesfor several periods after high school graduation. The unemployed maintaintheir consumption by running down their assets, while the employed saveto buffer against future unemployment spells. I also show that, unlikein models with exogenous income streams, unemployment transfers, byallowing agents to attain higher wages do not 'crowd out' but increasesaving.

Parents’ Investments and Education Returns

[cat] Aquest article analitza la relació entre els ingressos dels pares i l’educació dels seus fills. En un context d’altruïsme perfecte, el model descriu les decisions dels pares sobre quant consumir i quant invertir en l’educació dels seus fills. El model prediu que els rendiments de l’educació en termes de sous haurien de ser lineals. Usant aquest model en una economia competitiva, es mostra com el resultat depèn dels subsidis o impostos del govern sobre l’educació. El compromís habitual igualtat-eficiència apareix en aquest context. Finalment, el model dóna intuïcions sobre la relació entre educació i productivitat.

Union power, minimum wage legislation endogenous labor supplies and production

The objective of this work is to study the impact of the unions' bargaining power on production and wages. We present a model where a competitive final good is produced through two substitutable intermediate goods, one produced by unskilled labor and the other by skilled labor. Potential workers decide at their cost to become skilled or unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined endogenously. We find that the reallocation of the labor supplies due to changes in the unskilled (or skilled) unions¿ bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final goods production. At the same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions¿ bargaining power if the final goods production increases too. We also show that the minimum wage legislation has efects similar to an increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions.