144 resultados para silver markets modeling
Resumo:
In 2007, countries in the Euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and lowspreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising theirdeficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and,surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocatedfrom the private to the public sectors, reducing investment and deepening the recessions evenfurther. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debtcan be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discriminationand crowding-out effects. Creditor discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, sovereigndebt offers a higher expected return to domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This providesincentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-out effects arise because private borrowingis limited by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt purchases displace productiveinvestment. The model shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, and may lead toself-fulfilling crises. It also shows how crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other countriesin the Eurozone, and how they may be addressed by policies at the European level.
Resumo:
This paper presents a thermal modeling for power management of a new three-dimensional (3-D) thinned dies stacking process. Besides the high concentration of power dissipating sources, which is the direct consequence of the very interesting integration efficiency increase, this new ultra-compact packaging technology can suffer of the poor thermal conductivity (about 700 times smaller than silicon one) of the benzocyclobutene (BCB) used as both adhesive and planarization layers in each level of the stack. Thermal simulation was conducted using three-dimensional (3-D) FEM tool to analyze the specific behaviors in such stacked structure and to optimize the design rules. This study first describes the heat transfer limitation through the vertical path by examining particularly the case of the high dissipating sources under small area. First results of characterization in transient regime by means of dedicated test device mounted in single level structure are presented. For the design optimization, the thermal draining capabilities of a copper grid or full copper plate embedded in the intermediate layer of stacked structure are evaluated as a function of the technological parameters and the physical properties. It is shown an interest for the transverse heat extraction under the buffer devices dissipating most the power and generally localized in the peripheral zone, and for the temperature uniformization, by heat spreading mechanism, in the localized regions where the attachment of the thin die is altered. Finally, all conclusions of this analysis are used for the quantitative projections of the thermal performance of a first demonstrator based on a three-levels stacking structure for space application.
Resumo:
En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferència del cas bilateral, per als mercats multilaterals d'assignació coneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, el nucleolus i el core-center, i. e. el centre de masses del core, no coincideixen en general. Per demostrar-ho provem que donant un m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues solucions anteriors poden obtenir-se respectivament del nucleolus i el core-center d'un joc convex definit en el conjunt format pels m sectors. Encara més, provem que per calcular el nucleolus d'aquest últim joc només les coalicions formades per un jugador o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simplifiquen el càlcul del nucleolus d'un multi-sided ¿¿ohm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número molt elevat d'agents.
Resumo:
[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.
Resumo:
[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.
Resumo:
[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.
Resumo:
Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus
Resumo:
ic first-order transition line ending in a critical point. This critical point is responsible for the existence of large premartensitic fluctuations which manifest as broad peaks in the specific heat, not always associated with a true phase transition. The main conclusion is that premartensitic effects result from the interplay between the softness of the anomalous phonon driving the modulation and the magnetoelastic coupling. In particular, the premartensitic transition occurs when such coupling is strong enough to freeze the involved mode phonon. The implication of the results in relation to the available experimental data is discussed.
Resumo:
We present a model that allows for the derivation of the experimentally accesible observables: spatial steps, mean velocity, stall force, useful power, efficiency and randomness, etc. as a function of the [adenosine triphosphate] concentration and an external load F. The model presents a minimum of adjustable parameters and the theoretical predictions compare well with the available experimental results.
Resumo:
Stress-strain trajectories associated with pseudoelastic behavior of a Cu¿19.4 Zn¿13.1 Al (at.%) single crystal at room temperature have been determined experimentally. For a constant cross-head speed the trajectories and the associated hysteresis behavior are perfectly reproducible; the trajectories exhibit memory properties, dependent only on the values of return points, where transformation direction is reverted. An adapted version of the Preisach model for hysteresis has been implemented to predict the observed trajectories, using a set of experimental first¿order reversal curves as input data. Explicit formulas have been derived giving all trajectories in terms of this data set, with no adjustable parameters. Comparison between experimental and calculated trajectories shows a much better agreement for descending than for ascending paths, an indication of a dissymmetry between the dissipation mechanisms operative in forward and reverse directions of martensitic transformation.
Resumo:
A stochastic nonlinear partial differential equation is constructed for two different models exhibiting self-organized criticality: the Bak-Tang-Wiesenfeld (BTW) sandpile model [Phys. Rev. Lett. 59, 381 (1987); Phys. Rev. A 38, 364 (1988)] and the Zhang model [Phys. Rev. Lett. 63, 470 (1989)]. The dynamic renormalization group (DRG) enables one to compute the critical exponents. However, the nontrivial stable fixed point of the DRG transformation is unreachable for the original parameters of the models. We introduce an alternative regularization of the step function involved in the threshold condition, which breaks the symmetry of the BTW model. Although the symmetry properties of the two models are different, it is shown that they both belong to the same universality class. In this case the DRG procedure leads to a symmetric behavior for both models, restoring the broken symmetry, and makes accessible the nontrivial fixed point. This technique could also be applied to other problems with threshold dynamics.
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We apply the theory of continuous time random walks (CTRWs) to study some aspects involving extreme events in financial time series. We focus our attention on the mean exit time (MET). We derive a general equation for this average and compare it with empirical results coming from high-frequency data of the U.S. dollar and Deutsche mark futures market. The empirical MET follows a quadratic law in the return length interval which is consistent with the CTRW formalism.
Resumo:
We prove that Brownian market models with random diffusion coefficients provide an exact measure of the leverage effect [J-P. Bouchaud et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 87, 228701 (2001)]. This empirical fact asserts that past returns are anticorrelated with future diffusion coefficient. Several models with random diffusion have been suggested but without a quantitative study of the leverage effect. Our analysis lets us to fully estimate all parameters involved and allows a deeper study of correlated random diffusion models that may have practical implications for many aspects of financial markets.
Resumo:
Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus
Resumo:
En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferència del cas bilateral, per als mercats multilaterals d'assignació coneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, el nucleolus i el core-center, i. e. el centre de masses del core, no coincideixen en general. Per demostrar-ho provem que donant un m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues solucions anteriors poden obtenir-se respectivament del nucleolus i el core-center d'un joc convex definit en el conjunt format pels m sectors. Encara més, provem que per calcular el nucleolus d'aquest últim joc només les coalicions formades per un jugador o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simplifiquen el càlcul del nucleolus d'un multi-sided ¿¿ohm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número molt elevat d'agents.