Biana: a software framework for compiling biological interactions and analyzing networks

Background: The analysis and usage of biological data is hindered by the spread of information across multiple repositories and the difficulties posed by different nomenclature systems and storage formats. In particular, there is an important need for data unification in the study and use of protein-protein interactions. Without good integration strategies, it is difficult to analyze the whole set of available data and its properties.Results: We introduce BIANA (Biologic Interactions and Network Analysis), a tool for biological information integration and network management. BIANA is a Python framework designed to achieve two major goals: i) the integration of multiple sources of biological information, including biological entities and their relationships, and ii) the management of biological information as a network where entities are nodes and relationships are edges. Moreover, BIANA uses properties of proteins and genes to infer latent biomolecular relationships by transferring edges to entities sharing similar properties. BIANA is also provided as a plugin for Cytoscape, which allows users to visualize and interactively manage the data. A web interface to BIANA providing basic functionalities is also available. The software can be downloaded under GNU GPL license from http://sbi.imim.es/web/BIANA.php.Conclusions: BIANA's approach to data unification solves many of the nomenclature issues common to systems dealing with biological data. BIANA can easily be extended to handle new specific data repositories and new specific data types. The unification protocol allows BIANA to be a flexible tool suitable for different user requirements: non-expert users can use a suggested unification protocol while expert users can define their own specific unification rules.

Heterogeneity as a coordination device

A model of directed search with a finite number of buyers and sellers is considered, where sellers compete in direct mechanisms. Buyer heterogeneity and Nash equilibrium results in perfect sorting. The restriction to complementary inputs, that the match value function Q is supermodular, in addition coordinates the sellers strategies. In that case, equilibrium implements positive assortative matching, which is efficient and consistent with the stable (cooperative equilibrium) outcome. This provides a non-cooperative and decentralizedsolution for the Assignment Game. Conversely, if buyers are identical, no such coordination is possible, and there is a continuum of equilibria, one of which exhibits price posting, another yields competition in auctions.

Property as an economic concept: Reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rightsdisregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide torightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers interms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstatethe role of "private ordering" and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, theessential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and,second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable ofmaking truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactionson the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting bothelements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of bothproperty and corporate contracting.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

A house price index defined in the potential outcomes framework

Current methods for constructing house price indices are based on comparisons of sale prices of residential properties sold two or more times and on regression of the sale prices on the attributes of the properties and of their locations. The two methods have well recognised deficiencies, selection bias and model assumptions, respectively. We introduce a new method based on propensity score matching. The average house prices for two periods are compared by selecting pairs of properties, one sold in each period, that are as similar on a set of available attributes (covariates) as is feasible to arrange. The uncertainty associated with such matching is addressed by multiple imputation, framing the problem as involving missing values. The method is applied to aregister of transactions ofresidential properties in New Zealand and compared with the established alternatives.

Ex post bargaining, labor coordination and wage formation at the firm level

We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.

Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices

Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalentequilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibriumand is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players'choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act asan equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closelyrelated small subset of Nash equilibria. We present theoretical as well asexperimental support for these two new roles of focal points as coordinationdevices.

Towards a database on societal impact of Mediterranean floods in the framework of the HYMEX project

The NW Mediterranean region experiences every year heavy rainfall and flash floods that occasionally produce catastrophic damages. Less frequent are floods that affect large regions. Although a large number of databases devoted exclusively to floods or considering all kind of natural hazards do exist, usually they only record catastrophic flood events. This paper deals with the new flood database that is being developed within the framework of HYMEX project. Results are focused on four regions representative of the NW sector of Mediterranean Europe: Catalonia, Spain; the Balearic Islands, Spain; Calabria, Italy; and Languedoc-Roussillon, Midi-Pyrenées and PACA, France. The common available 30-yr period starts in 1981 and ends in 2010. The paper shows the database structure and criteria, the comparison with other flood databases, some statistics on spatial and temporal distribution, and an identification of the most important events. The paper also provides a table that includes the date and affected region of all the catastrophic events identified in the regions of study, in order to make this information available for all audiences.

Patients' right to information: a review of the regulatory and ethical framework

[eng] Aim: The paper examines the current situation of recognition of patients' right to information in international standards and in the national laws of Belgium, France, Italy, Spain (and Catalonia), Switzerland and the United Kingdom.Methodology: International standards, laws and codes of ethics of physicians and librarians that are currently in force were identified and analyzed with regard to patients' right to information and the ownership of this right. The related subjects of access to clinical history, advance directives and informed consent were not taken into account.Results: All the standards, laws and codes analyzed deal with guaranteeing access to information. The codes of ethics of both physicians and librarians establish the duty to inform.Conclusions: Librarians must collaborate with physicians in the process of informing patients.

Building a Social Accounting Matrix within the ESA95 Framework: Obtaining a Dataset for Applied General Equilibrium Modelling

This research provides a description of the process followed in order to assemble a "Social Accounting Matrix" for Spain corresponding to the year 2000 (SAMSP00). As argued in the paper, this process attempts to reconcile ESA95 conventions with requirements of applied general equilibrium modelling. Particularly, problems related to the level of aggregation of net taxation data, and to the valuation system used for expressing the monetary value of input-output transactions have deserved special attention. Since the adoption of ESA95 conventions, input-output transactions have been preferably valued at basic prices, which impose additional difficulties on modellers interested in computing applied general equilibrium models. This paper addresses these difficulties by developing a procedure that allows SAM-builders to change the valuation system of input-output transactions conveniently. In addition, this procedure produces new data related to net taxation information.

Interaccion among systems of finite size in predictive relativistic mechanics I. General framework

We derive a Hamiltonian formulation for the three-dimensional formalism of predictive relativistic mechanics. This Hamiltonian structure is used to derive a set of dynamical equations describing the interaction among systems in perturbation theory.