Good practice for dialogue and communication as strategic principle for policing political manifestations in Europe (GODIAC):the anthology

The volume is divided into two parts; the fi rst deals with issues related to the police, and the second addresses issues related to demonstrators and protesters. We hope that this volume will provide further insight into issues associated with policing at major events and shed light on the complexity of the organisations, motives, and strategies in play whenever protester groups are involved.

Good practice for dialogue and communication as strategic principle for policing political manifestations in Europe (GODIAC):recommendations for policing political manifestations in Europe

This report summarises the fi eld study results of the project ’Good practice for dialogue and communication as strategic principles for policing political manifestations in Europe’ (GODIAC).1 The overall idea was to integrate operative police work, research and training within the fi eld and to build international and institutional networks, ensuring and recognising the responsibilities of the organisers. The purpose of the GODIAC project was to contribute to the development of a European approach to policing political manifestations.

La Política 2.0 amb la generació Nintendo

The eruption of Web 2.0 has transformed the uses and strategies of political communication. The campaign developed by Obama's team is a good example of the electoral efficiency of these new tools whose results we are now analysing and evaluating. While our present leaders could be classified as the "fax generation", the North American experience opens the doors to a new way of relating with the electoral masses. With these new instruments of interactive communication, voters have the space to be able to make their voices heard and to be able to affect the electoral programme, something which undoubtedly benefits an election campaign's degree of democratic quality

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.

Political centralization and government accountability

This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.

“Of Spitzenkandidaten and European Leaders”: Is the new 2014 "politicized” Presidency of the Commission going to be a real step forward in the EU legitimization process?

Thanks to ART.17.7 of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council now has to “take into account” the results of EP Elections when selecting a candidate for the role of Commission President. The European Parliament has grabbed the opportunity to launch the first electoral race for spitzenkandidaten to the Presidency. Is this the start of a new democratizing (and thus, politicizing) process for the European Union? This dissertation will try to give a possible answer to the dilemma by constructing a comprehensive framework around EP Elections 2014 that will involve both the Commission and the Parliament and an analysis of the debate beyond legal provisions and the possibility of a politicized presidency of the Commission.

An Explanatory Approach to the Political Uses of ICT Initiatives for Participation : Institutions, Context, and Characteristics of the Actors

Political actors use ICTs in a different manner and in different degrees when it comes to achieving a closer relationship between the public and politicians. Usually, political parties develop ICT strategies only for electoral campaigning and therefore restrain ICT usages to providing information and establishing a few channels of communication. By contrast, local governments make much more use of ICT tools for participatory and deliberative purposes. These differences in usages have not been well explained in the literature because of a lack of a comprehensive explanatory model. This chapter seeks to build the basis for this model, that is, to establish which factors affect and condition different political uses of ICTs and which principles underlie that behaviour. We consider that political actors are intentional and their behaviour is mediated by the political institutions and the socioeconomic context of the country. Also, though, the actor¿s own characteristics, such as the type and size of the organization or the model of e-democracy that the actor upholds, can have an influence in launching ICT initiatives for approaching the public.

Reconsidering the analysis of the uses of ICTs by political parties : an application to the Catalan case

For years a literature on the uses that political parties make of information andcommunication technologies (ICTs) has been developed. It is a rapidly increasing, rich,and interesting field in the forefront of the investigation in political science. Generally,these works start from the expectation that the ICTs have a regenerative potential forliberal democracies and for the political parties as well. In developed societies, politicalparties have experienced some transformations that have leaded them to an increasingdivorce with the public. This divorce is shown by the decay of party adscription andmembership, and also by the decay of the conventional political participation. In thetheoretical discussion this situation has been described as ¿the crisis of the democracy¿(Norris, 1999). According to the more radically oriented scholars this crisis reflects theincapacities of liberal democracies. In this sense, ICTs suppose a great opportunity tosurpass the representative institutions and to institutionalize new forms of directdemocracy. More moderate scholars have considered that ICTs offer the opportunity for¿renaissance¿ for representative institutions, as they can reinforce the bonds between thepublic and its representatives.

From urban political economy to the cultural political economy : rethinking culture and economy in and beyond the urban

Discussions about the culture-economy articulation have occurred largely within theconfines of economic geography. In addition, much attention has been diverted intocaricaturized discussions over the demise of political economy or the invalidity ofculturalist arguments. Moving the argument from the inquiry on the ¿nature¿ of theeconomy itself to the transformation of the role of culture and economy inunderstanding the production of the urban form from an urban political economy (UPE)this paper focuses on how the challenges posed by the cultural turn have enabled urbanpolitical economy to participate constructively in interdisciplinary efforts to reorientpolitical economy in the direction of a critical cultural political economy.

Local privatization, intermunicipal cooperation, transaction costs and political interests: Evidence from Spain

Several empirical studies have analyzed the factors that influence local privatization. Variables related to fiscal stress, cost reduction, political processes and ideological attitudes are the most common explanatory variables used in these studies. In this paper, we add to this literature by examining the influence of transaction costs and political factors on local governments’ choices through new variables. In addition to this, we consider the role of additional aspects, such as intermunicipal cooperation as a potential alternative to privatization in order to exploit scale economies or scope economies. We consider two relevant services: solid waste collection and water distribution. Results from our estimates show that privatization (that is, contracting out to a private firm) is less common for water distribution than for solid waste collection. Higher transaction costs in water distribution are consistent with this finding. Furthermore, we find that municipalities with a conservative ruling party privatize more often regardless of the ideological orientation of the constituency. This shows that those political interests able to influence local elections are more important in determining the form of delivery than is the basic ideological stance of the constituency. Finally, we find that intermunicipal cooperation is an alternative to local privatization.