96 resultados para monetary policy rule
Resumo:
Was the German slump inevitable? This paper argues that -despite thespeed and depth of Germany's deflation in the early 1930s - fear ofinflation is evident in the bond, foreign exchange, and commodity marketsat certain critical junctures of the Great Depression. Therefore, policyoptions were more limited than many subsequent critics of Brüning'spolicies have been prepared to admit. Using a rational expectationsframework, we find strong evidence from the bondmarket to suggest fearof inflation. Futures prices also reveal that market participants werebetting on price increases. These findings are discussed in the contextof reparations and related to the need for a regime shift to overcomethe crisis.
Resumo:
The remarkable decline in macroeconomic volatility experienced by the U.S. economy since the mid-80s (the so-called Great Moderation) has been accompanied by large changes in the patterns of comovements among output, hours and labor productivity. Those changes are reflected in both conditional and unconditional second moments as well as in the impulse responses to identified shocks. That evidencepoints to structural change, as opposed to just good luck, as an explanation for the Great Moderation. We use a simple macro model to suggest some of the immediate sources which are likely to be behindthe observed changes.
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We model firm-owned capital in a stochastic dynamic New-Keynesian generalequilibrium model à la Calvo. We find that this structure impliesequilibrium dynamics which are quantitatively di¤erent from the onesassociated with a benchmark case where households accumulate capital andrent it to firms. Our findings therefore stress the importance ofmodeling an investment decision at the firm level in addition to ameaningful price setting decision. Along the way we argue that the problemof modeling firm-owned capital with Calvo price-setting has not been solvedin a correct way in the previous literature.
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We characterize the macroeconomic performance of a set of industrialized economies in the aftermath of the oil price shocks of the 1970s and of the last decade, focusing on the differences across episodes. We examine four different hypotheses for the mild effects on inflation and economic activity of the recent increase in the price of oil: (a) good luck (i.e. lack of concurrent adverse shocks), (b) smaller share of oil in production, (c) more flexible labor markets, and (d) improvements in monetary policy. Weconclude that all four have played an important role.
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In this paper we study the relationship between labor market institutions and monetary policy. We use a simple macroeconomic framework to show how optimal monetary policy rules depend on labor institutions (labor adjustment costs, and nominal and real wage rigitidy) and social preferences regarding inflation, employment, and real wages. We also calibrate our model tocompute how the change in social welfare brought about by giving up monetary policy as a result of joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) depends on institutions and preferences. We then use the calibrated model to analyze how EMU affects the incentives for labor market reform, both for reformsthat increase the economy's adjustment potential and for those that affect the long-run unemployment rate.
Resumo:
De acuerdo con la teoría de las áreas monetàrias óptimas,los shocks asimétricos tienen un papel fundamental en la determinación de los beneficios y los costes derivados del establecimiento de una área monetaria. En este sentido, diferentes estudios recientes señalan una importante reducción del grado de asimetría de los shocks en términos reales a lo largo de los últimos años entre los países europeos como consecuencia de la mayor coordinación de las políticas económicas y de la aproximación de las estructuras productivas. De todas maneras, una de las cuestiones clave en el nuevo entorno económico, y que no ha sido demasiado considerada a la literatura reciente, es el posible papel desestabilitzador de la política monetaria común como consecuencia de las diferencias en los mecanismos de transmisión de la política monetaria en los distintos países y regiones de la Zona Euro. En este trabajo se considera la mencionada cuestión desde un punto de vista teórico y se analiza empíricamente la existencia de diferencias regionales en los efectos de la política monetaria llevada a término en España a lo largo de los últimos años con la finalidad d identificar los principales determinantes de esta asimetría en el ámbito europeo
Resumo:
De acuerdo con la teoría de las áreas monetàrias óptimas,los shocks asimétricos tienen un papel fundamental en la determinación de los beneficios y los costes derivados del establecimiento de una área monetaria. En este sentido, diferentes estudios recientes señalan una importante reducción del grado de asimetría de los shocks en términos reales a lo largo de los últimos años entre los países europeos como consecuencia de la mayor coordinación de las políticas económicas y de la aproximación de las estructuras productivas. De todas maneras, una de las cuestiones clave en el nuevo entorno económico, y que no ha sido demasiado considerada a la literatura reciente, es el posible papel desestabilitzador de la política monetaria común como consecuencia de las diferencias en los mecanismos de transmisión de la política monetaria en los distintos países y regiones de la Zona Euro. En este trabajo se considera la mencionada cuestión desde un punto de vista teórico y se analiza empíricamente la existencia de diferencias regionales en los efectos de la política monetaria llevada a término en España a lo largo de los últimos años con la finalidad d identificar los principales determinantes de esta asimetría en el ámbito europeo
Resumo:
We propose an extension of Alesina and Tabellini 's model (1987) to include corruption, which is understood as the presence of weak institutions collecting revenue through formal tax channels. This paper analyses how conservative should an independent central bank be when the institutional quality is poor. When there are no political distortions, we show that the central bank has to be more conservative than the government, except with complete corruption. In this particular case, the central bank should be as conservative as the government. Further, we obtain that the relationship between the optimal relative degree of conservativeness of the central bank and the degree of corruption is affected by supply shocks. Concretely, when these shocks are not important, the central bank should be less conservative if the degree of corruption increases. However, this result may not hold when the shocks are relevant. JEL classi fication: D6, D73, E52, E58, E62, E63. Keywords: Central Bank Conservativeness; Corruption; Fiscal Policy; Monetary Policy; Seigniorage.
Resumo:
We study the gains from increased wage flexibility and their dependence on exchange rate policy, using a small open economy model with staggered price andwage setting. Two results stand out: (i) the impact of wage adjustments on employment is smaller the more the central bank seeks to stabilize the exchange rate,and (ii) an increase in wage flexibility often reduces welfare, and more likely so ineconomies under an exchange rate peg or an exchange rate-focused monetary policy.Our findings call into question the common view that wage flexibility is particularlydesirable in a currency union.
Resumo:
This paper investigates the fiscal sustainability of an emerging, dollarized, oil-exporting country: Ecuador. A cointegrated VAR approach is adopted in testing, first, if the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied in Ecuador and, second, in identifying the permanent and transitory shocks that affect a fiscal policy characterized by inertia and a heavy dependence on oil revenues. Following confirmation that the debt-GDP ratio does not place the Ecuadorian budget under any pressure, we reformulate the model and identify two forces that push the fiscal system out of equilibrium, namely, economic activity and oil revenues implemented in the government budget. We argue that Ecuador needs to recover control of its monetary policy and to promote the diversification of its economy in order that non-oil tax revenues can replace oil revenues as a pushing force. Finally, we calculate quarterly elasticities of tax revenues with respect to Ecuador’s GDP and that of eight Eurozone countries. We illustrate graphically how the Eurozone countries with low positive or high negative elasticities’ levels suffer debt problems after the crisis. This finding emphasizes the pressing need for Ecuador to strengthen the connection between its tax revenues and output, and also suggests that the convergence of these elasticities in the Eurozone might contribute to the success of an eventually future fiscal union.
Resumo:
This paper explores the origins of Andorra’s financial cluster. It shows that the free movement of currency, the protection of infant industry, and geographical concentration lie at the foundation of the cluster’s competitive advantage. Drawing on a new set of data, the paper also provides for the first time an estimate of the total deposits held by Andorra’s banks between 1931 and 2007. Based on this new information, the paper reaches the conclusion that the development of the cluster went through four distinct phases in which large companies, acting as leaders, played an important role in enhancing the cluster’s business capabilities.
Resumo:
In the last two decades, cases of corruption have been unveiled in different countries, raising public awareness and reinforcing a trend in which society expects more from their leaders. Our objective in this paper is to examine the effects of corruption and seigniorage on inflation and growth rates. The model used in this article is an extension of the model used by Huang and Wei (2006). We find interesting results and one of them is that, under some conditions, corruption has a positive impact on the growth rate. JEL classification : D73, E52, E58, E62. Keywords : Corruption; Fiscal Policy; Growth; Monetary Policy; Seigniorage.
Resumo:
Control on regional government budgets is important in a monetary union as lower tiers of government have fewer incentives to consolidate debt. According to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level; unsustainable non-Ricardian fiscal policies eventually force monetary policy to adjust. Hence, uncoordinated and non-regulated regional fiscal policies would therefore threaten price stability for the monetary union as a whole. However, the union central bank is not without defense. A federal government that internalises the spillover effect of non-Ricardian fiscal policies on the price level can offset non-Ricardian regional fiscal policies. A federal government, which taxes and transfers resources between regions, may compensate for unsustainable regional fiscal policies so as to keep fiscal policy Ricardian on aggregate. Following Canzoneri et al. (2001), we test the validity of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level for both federal and regional governments in Germany. We find evidence of a spillover effect of unsustainable policies on the price level for other Länder. However, the German federal government offsets this effect on the price level by running Ricardian policies. These results have implications for the regulation of fiscal policies in the EMU.
Resumo:
The fiscal policy rule implicit in the Stability and Growth Pact, has been rationalised as a way to ensure that national fiscal policies remain sustainable within the EU, thereby endorsing the independence of the ECB. We empirically examine the sustainability of European fiscal policies over the period 1970-2001. The intertemporal government budget constraint provides a test based on the cointegration relation between government revenues, expenditures and interest payments. Sustainability is analysed at both the national level and for a European panel. Results show that European fiscal policy has been sustainable overall, yet national experiences differ considerably.
Resumo:
In this paper we analyse the setting of optimal policies in a monetary union with one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities that have a public deficit target. We will show that fiscal cooperation among the fiscal authorities, in the presence of positive supply shocks, ends up producing higher public deficits than in a non-cooperative regime. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0. Keywords: monetary union, fiscal policy coordination.