Wage rigidity and job creation

Recent research in macroeconomics emphasizes the role of wage rigidity in accounting for the volatility of unemployment fluctuations. We use worker-level datafrom the CPS to measure the sensitivity of wages of newly hired workers to changesin aggregate labor market conditions. The wage of new hires, unlike the aggregatewage, is volatile and responds almost one-to-one to changes in labor productivity.We conclude that there is little evidence for wage stickiness in the data. We alsoshow, however, that a little wage rigidity goes a long way in amplifying the responseof job creation to productivity shocks.

Structural unemployment

Structural unemployment is due to mismatch between available jobs and workers.We formalize this concept in a simple model of a segmented labor market with searchfrictions within segments. Worker mobility, job mobility and wage bargaining costsacross segments generate structural unemployment. We estimate the contribution ofthese costs to fluctuations in US unemployment, operationalizing segments as statesor industries. Most structural unemployment is due to wage bargaining costs, whichare large but nevertheless contribute little to unemployment fluctuations. Structuralunemployment is as cyclical as overall unemployment and no more persistent, bothin the current and in previous recessions.

Compensating wage differentials and voluntary job changes: Evidence from West Germany

Does the labor market place wage premia on jobs that involve physical strain,job, insecurity or bad regulation of hours? This paper derives bounds on themonetary returns to these job disamenities in the West German labor market.We show that in a market with dispersion in both job characteristics andwages, the average wage change of workers who switch jobs voluntarily and optfor consuming more (less) disamenities,provides an upper (lower) bound on themarket return to the disamenity. Using longitudinal information from workersin the German Socio Economic Panel, we estimate an upper bound of 5% and alower bound of 3.5% for the market return to work strain in a job.

Employee referrals and efficiency wages

Many workers believe that personal contacts are crucial for obtainingjobs in high-wage sectors. On the other hand, firms in high-wage sectorsreport using employee referrals because they help provide screening andmonitoring of new employees. This paper develops a matching model thatcan explain the link between inter-industry wage differentials and useof employee referrals. Referrals lower monitoring costs because high-effortreferees can exert peer pressure on co-workers, allowing firms to pay lowerefficiency wages. On the other hand, informal search provides fewer job andapplicant contacts than formal methods (e.g., newspaper ads). In equilibrium,the matching process generates segmentation in the labor market becauseof heterogeneity in the size of referral networks. Referrals match good high-paying jobs to well-connected workers, while formal methods matchless attractive jobs to less-connected workers. Industry-level data show apositive correlation between industry wage premia and use of employeereferrals. Moreover, evidence using the NLSY shows similar positive andsignificant OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the returns to employeereferrals, but insignificant effects once sector of employment is controlledfor. This evidence suggests referred workers earn higher wages not becauseof higher unobserved ability or better matches but rather because theyare hired in high-wage sectors.

Award errors and permanent disability benefits in Spain

There is a controversial debate about the effects of permanent disability benefits on labormarket behavior. In this paper we estimate equations for deserving and receiving disabilitybenefits to evaluate the award error as the difference in the probability of receiving anddeserving using survey data from Spain. Our results indicate that individuals aged between55 and 59, self-employers or working in an agricultural sector have a probability of receiving a benefit without deserving it significantly higher than the rest of individuals. We also find evidence of gender discrimination since male have a significantly higher probability of receiving a benefit without deserving it. This seems to confirm that disability benefits are being used as an instrument for exiting the labor market for some individuals approaching the early retirement or those who do not have right to retire early. Taking into account that awarding process depends on Social Security Provincial Department, this means that some departments are applying loosely the disability requirements for granting disability benefits.

Estimating the probability of leaving unemployment using uncompleted spells from repeated cross-section data

We propose a new econometric estimation method for analyzing the probabilityof leaving unemployment using uncompleted spells from repeated cross-sectiondata, which can be especially useful when panel data are not available. Theproposed method-of-moments-based estimator has two important features:(1) it estimates the exit probability at the individual level and(2) it does not rely on the stationarity assumption of the inflowcomposition. We illustrate and gauge the performance of the proposedestimator using the Spanish Labor Force Survey data, and analyze the changesin distribution of unemployment between the 1980s and 1990s during a periodof labor market reform. We find that the relative probability of leavingunemployment of the short-term unemployed versus the long-term unemployedbecomes significantly higher in the 1990s.

Unemployment vs. mismatch of talents: Reconsidering unemployment benefits

We develop an equilibrium search-matching model with risk-neutral agentsand two-sided ex-ante heterogeneity. Unemployment insurance has thestandard effect of reducing employment, but also helps workers to get a suitable job. The predictions of our simple modelare consistent with the contrasting performance of the labor market in Europeand US in terms of unemployment, productivity growth and wage inequality.To show this, we construct two fictitious economies with calibratedparameters which only differ by the degree of unemployment insurance andassume that they are hit by a common technological shock which enhancesthe importance of mismatch. This shock reduces the proportion of jobs whichworkers regards as acceptable in the economy with unemployment insurance(Europe). As a result, unemployment doubles in this economy.In the laissez-faire economy (US), unemployment remains constant,but wage inequality increases more and productivity grows less due to largermismatch. The model can be used to address a number of normative issues.

Nonparametric bounds on the returns to language skills

This paper applies the theoretical literature on nonparametric bounds ontreatment effects to the estimation of how limited English proficiency (LEP)affects wages and employment opportunities for Hispanic workers in theUnited States. I analyze the identifying power of several weak assumptionson treatment response and selection, and stress the interactions between LEPand education, occupation and immigration status. I show that thecombination of two weak but credible assumptions provides informative upperbounds on the returns to language skills for certain subgroups of thepopulation. Adding age at arrival as a monotone instrumental variable alsoprovides informative lower bounds.

Schumpeterian technology shocks

We analyze the labor market effects of neutral and investment-specific technologyshocks along the intensive margin (hours worked) and the extensive margin(unemployment). We characterize the dynamic response of unemploymentin terms of the job separation and the job finding rate. Labor market adjustmentsoccur along the extensive margin in response to neutral shocks, along theintensive margin in response to investment specific shocks. The job separationrate accounts for a major portion of the impact response of unemployment. Neutralshocks prompt a contemporaneous increase in unemployment because of asharp rise in the separation rate. This is prolonged by a persistent fall in thejob finding rate. Investment specific shocks rise employment and hours worked.Neutral shocks explain a substantial portion of the volatility of unemploymentand output; investment specific shocks mainly explain hours worked volatility.This suggests that neutral progress is consistent with Schumpeterian creative destruction,while investment-specific progress operates as in a neoclassical growthmodel.

Are changes in education important for the wage premium and unemployment?

A generalized rise in unemployment rates for both college and high-schoolgraduates, a widening education wage premium, and a sharp increase incollege education participation are characteristic features of thetransformations of the U.S. labor market between 1970 and 1990. This paperinvestigates the interactions between these changes in the labor marketand in educational attainment. First, it develops an equilibrium searchand matching model of the labor market where education is endogenouslydetermined. Second, calibrated versions of the model are used to studyquantitatively whether either a skill-biased change in technology or amismatch shock can explain the above facts. The skill-biased shock accountsfor a considerable part of the changes but fails to produce the increasein unemployment for the educated labor force. The mismatch shock explainsinstead much of the change in the four variables, including the wage premium.

The impact of tax credits on labour supply

One of the principle aims of the Working Families' Tax Credit in the UK was to increase the participation of single mothers. The literature to date concludes there was approximately a five-percentage-point increase in employment of single mothers. The differences-in-differences methodology that is typically used compares single mother with single women without children. However, the characteristics of these groups are very different, and change over time in relative covariates are likely to violate the identifying assumption. We find that when we control for differential trends between women with and without children, the employment effect of the policy falls significantly. Moreover, the effect is borne solely by those working full-time (30 hours or more), while having no effect on inducing people into the labor market from inactivity. Looking closely at important covariates over time, we can see sizeable changes in the relative returns to employment between the treatment and control groups.

Shocks and institutions in a job matching model

This paper explains the divergent behavior of European an US unemploymentrates using a job market matching model of the labor market with aninteraction between shocks an institutions. It shows that a reduction inTF growth rates, an increase in real interest rates, and an increase intax rates leads to a permanent increase in unemployment rates when thereplacement rates or initial tax rates are high, while no increase inunemployment occurs when institutions are "employment friendly". The paperalso shows that an increase in turbulence, modelle as an increase probabilityof skill loss, is not a robust explanation for the European unemploymentpuzzle in the context of a matching model with both endogenous job creationand job estruction.

Business cycles, unemployment insurance and the calibration of matching models

This paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, either sticky wages or match-specific productivity shocks can improve the model's performance by making the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical, which makes hiring more procyclical too.

Body size, activity, employment and wages in Europe: A first approach

This paper examines the associations between obesity, employment status and wages for several European countries. Our results provide weak evidence that obese workers are more likely to be unemployed or tend to be more segregated in self-employment jobs than their non-obese counterparts. We also find difficult to detect statistically significant relationships between obesity and wages. As previously reported in the literature, the association between obesity, unemployment and wages seems to be different for men and women. Moreover, heterogeneity is also found across countries. Such heterogeneity can be somewhat explained by some labor market institutions, such as the collective bargaining coverage and the employer-provided health insurance.

What form of relative performance evaluation?

We study relative performance evaluation in executive compensation whenexecutives have private information about their ability. We assume that thejoint distribution of an individual firm s profit and market movements dependson the ability of the executive that runs the firm. In the equilibrium of theexecutive labor market, compensation schemes exploit this fact to sortexecutives of di ?erent abilities. This implies that executive compensation isincreasing in own performance, but may also be increasing in industryperformance-a sharp departure from standard relative performance evaluation.This result provides an explanation for the scarcity of relative performanceconsiderations in executive compensation documented by the empirical literature.