Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Adaptive model selection using empirical complexities

Given $n$ independent replicates of a jointly distributed pair $(X,Y)\in {\cal R}^d \times {\cal R}$, we wish to select from a fixed sequence of model classes ${\cal F}_1, {\cal F}_2, \ldots$ a deterministic prediction rule $f: {\cal R}^d \to {\cal R}$ whose risk is small. We investigate the possibility of empirically assessingthe {\em complexity} of each model class, that is, the actual difficulty of the estimation problem within each class. The estimated complexities are in turn used to define an adaptive model selection procedure, which is based on complexity penalized empirical risk.The available data are divided into two parts. The first is used to form an empirical cover of each model class, and the second is used to select a candidate rule from each cover based on empirical risk. The covering radii are determined empirically to optimize a tight upper bound on the estimation error. An estimate is chosen from the list of candidates in order to minimize the sum of class complexity and empirical risk. A distinguishing feature of the approach is that the complexity of each model class is assessed empirically, based on the size of its empirical cover.Finite sample performance bounds are established for the estimates, and these bounds are applied to several non-parametric estimation problems. The estimates are shown to achieve a favorable tradeoff between approximation and estimation error, and to perform as well as if the distribution-dependent complexities of the model classes were known beforehand. In addition, it is shown that the estimate can be consistent,and even possess near optimal rates of convergence, when each model class has an infinite VC or pseudo dimension.For regression estimation with squared loss we modify our estimate to achieve a faster rate of convergence.

Entrepreneurial structure of the mercantile company in pre-industrial Catalonia

The mercantile company was the basic form of enterprise in pre-industrial Catalonia. The aim of this paper is to study the formation and development of the mercantile companies in Barcelona whose end was the wholesale and retail sale of textiles in the botigues de teles (textile retail shops) throughout the eighteenth century. These firms were officially registered before a notary and their deeds reveal how these establishments were administered and managed.The study covers a sample of 121 mercantile companies, and the articles and documentation that were put into effect by 32 notaries who were active in Barcelona in the 18th century have been consulted in their entirety. From an initial selection of documentation, a total of 228 deeds registering companies have been found, 107 of which (47%) relate to the creation of companies whose various activities were centred in taverns, textile manufacturing, braiding.... While the 121 companies, which make up our sample and which account for 53% of the deeds registered with the notaries mentioned above, focused exclusively on the management of textile retail shops located in the commercial heart of the city. Thus one point of interest that the documentation reveals is that the majority of the mercantile companies registered by Barcelona notaries throughout the 18th century were establishments which traded in textiles. The first part of the article focuses on the structural characteristics of these enterprises, the number and socio-professional status of the partners and the extent of each partner s involvement in the administration and management. The second part of the article examines the capital investment made by each partner, their rights and obligations agreed on, the sharing out of profits and possible losses and the duration of the companies. The final aim of the paper is to highlight the evolution of these companies through one specific case.

Revealed preference and indifferent selection

It is shown that preferences can be constructed from observed choice behavior in a way that is robust to indifferent selection (i.e., the agent is indifferent between two alternatives but, nevertheless, is only observed selecting one of them). More precisely, a suggestion by Savage (1954) to reveal indifferent selection by considering small monetary perturbations of alternatives is formalized and generalized to a purely topological framework: references over an arbitrary topological space can be uniquely derived from observed behavior under the assumptions that they are continuous and nonsatiated and that a strictly preferred alternative is always chosen, and indifferent selection is then characterized by discontinuity in choice behavior. Two particular cases are then analyzed: monotonic preferences over a partially ordered set, and preferences representable by a continuous pseudo-utility function.

The impact of firing costs on turnover and unemployment: Evidence from the Colombian labour market reform

Reductions in firing costs are often advocated as a way of increasingthe dynamism of labour markets in both developed and less developed countries. Evidence from Europe and the U.S. on the impact of firing costs has, however, been mixed. Moreover, legislative changes both in Europe and the U.S. have been limited. This paper, instead, examines the impact of the Colombian Labour Market Reform of 1990, which substantially reduced dismissal costs. I estimate the incidence of a reduction in firing costs on worker turnover by exploiting the temporal change in the Colombian labour legislation as well as the variability in coverage between formal and informal sector workers. Using a grouping estimator to control for common aggregate shocks and selection, I find that the exit hazard rates into and out of unemployment increased after the reform by over 1% for formal workers (covered by the legislation) relative to informal workers (uncovered). The increase of the hazards implies a net decrease in unemployment of a third of a percentage point, which accounts for about one quarter of the fall in unemployment during the period of study.

A finite-population revenue management model and a risk-ratio procedure for the joint estimation of population size and parameters

Many dynamic revenue management models divide the sale period into a finite number of periods T and assume, invoking a fine-enough grid of time, that each period sees at most one booking request. These Poisson-type assumptions restrict the variability of the demand in the model, but researchers and practitioners were willing to overlook this for the benefit of tractability of the models. In this paper, we criticize this model from another angle. Estimating the discrete finite-period model poses problems of indeterminacy and non-robustness: Arbitrarily fixing T leads to arbitrary control values and on the other hand estimating T from data adds an additional layer of indeterminacy. To counter this, we first propose an alternate finite-population model that avoids this problem of fixing T and allows a wider range of demand distributions, while retaining the useful marginal-value properties of the finite-period model. The finite-population model still requires jointly estimating market size and the parameters of the customer purchase model without observing no-purchases. Estimation of market-size when no-purchases are unobservable has rarely been attempted in the marketing or revenue management literature. Indeed, we point out that it is akin to the classical statistical problem of estimating the parameters of a binomial distribution with unknown population size and success probability, and hence likely to be challenging. However, when the purchase probabilities are given by a functional form such as a multinomial-logit model, we propose an estimation heuristic that exploits the specification of the functional form, the variety of the offer sets in a typical RM setting, and qualitative knowledge of arrival rates. Finally we perform simulations to show that the estimator is very promising in obtaining unbiased estimates of population size and the model parameters.

A model of collateral, investment and adverse selection

This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investmentunder adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not bemonotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in whichinvestment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurialwealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing inentrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively highand; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuousfall in investment.

Revised NEO personality inventory normative data for catalan police officer selection: preliminary study

El Servei d'Avaluació, Seguiment i Selecció de l'ISPC han elaborat un estudi sobre el perfil de personalitat dels aspirants al Curs de Formació bàsica per policies, que es va presentar a l'International Society for the Study of Individual Differences Meeting celebrat al CosmoCaixa de Barcelona i que organitzen conjuntament l’Associació Iberoamericana per a la recerca de les diferències individuals i la Universitat de Barcelona. L’estudi, titulat Revised NEO Personality Inventory Normative Data for Catalan police officer selection: A preliminary study, té com a objectiu comparar els perfils de personalitat d’una mostra d’aspirants de l’ISPC amb els resultats d’una mostra d’aspirants a policia dels EUA, publicada en una revista científica de prestigi el mes de febrer passat. Els resultats mostren que els aspirants catalans destaquen per obtenir millors puntuacions en les dimensions de responsabilitat i amabilitat, cosa que indicaria que aquest tret es valora especialment durant el procés de selecció de la policia de Catalunya; en altres característiques de la personalitat les dues mostres obtenen resultats similars. Els trets característics del perfil del policia català seria el de persones estables emocionalment, poc impulsives, amb capacitat per gestionar l’estrés, orientades a les persones, agradables, sociables, responsables, disciplinades i cauteloses. Enllaç a: International Society for the Study of Individual Differences Meeting :http://www.issid.org/conferences/ISSID2013/ISSIDconference2013.html

Restoration of a lost geological reference point: the loggingstone of Pedralta (Girona, Spain)

The Pedralta is a loggingstone formed of monzonitic leucogranites, which has a volume of about 38 m3 and weighs 101 tons. After its fall in December 1996, a public subscription was opened to meet the expenses of the restoration work, which was completed in May 1999