Trade credit: Suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers

There are two fundamental puzzles about trade credit: why does it appearto be so expensive,and why do input suppliers engage in the business oflending money? This paper addresses and answers both questions analysingthe interaction between the financial and the industrial aspects of thesupplier-customer relationship. It examines how, in a context of limitedenforceability of contracts, suppliers may have a comparative advantageover banks in lending to their customers because they hold the extrathreat of stopping the supply of intermediate goods. Suppliers may alsoact as lenders of last resort, providing insurance against liquidityshocks that may endanger the survival of their customers. The relativelyhigh implicit interest rates of trade credit result from the existenceof default and insurance premia. The implications of the model areexamined empirically using parametric and nonparametric techniques on apanel of UK firms.

Wealth, financial intermediation and growth

This paper presents empirical support for the existence of wealth effects in the contribution of financial intermediation to economic growth, and offers a theoretical explanation for these effects. Using GMM dynamic panel data techniques applied to study the growth-promoting effects of financial intermediation, we show that the exogenous contribution of financial development on economic growth has different effects for different levels of income per capita. We find that this contribution is generally increasing with thelevel of income per capita of the economy, up to a relatively high level of income. This contribution is consistently lower for poor countries; and for some low levels of income per capita it can be negative. We provide a model to account for these wealth effects. The model is a overlapping generations growth model where financial intermediaries implement liquidity risk sharing among depositors. We show that at early stages of economic development, a bank can increase welfare of its depositors only at the cost of lowering investment and growth. However, once the economy has crossed certain wealth threshold, the liquidity role of banks becomes unambiguously growth enhancing. As wealth increases, banks offer improving liquidity insurance, and higher growth; however, for high levels of wealth, growth generated byfinancial intermediation declines as the economy attains the optimal level of consumption risk sharing.

An attempt to go beyond conventional financial accounting information

Conventional financial accounting informationis slanted in favour of certain economic interests. This paper argues in favour ofaccounting information capturing and showingrelevant aspects of the economic-social situation,and of decision-making based on it allowingfor decisions to be taken with economic-social,and not purely economic-weighted, awareness.

The transmission of US shocks to Latin America

I study whether and how US shocks are transmitted to eight Latin American countries. US shocks are identified using sign restrictions and treated as exogenous with respect to Latin American economies. Posterior estimates for individual and average effects are constructed. US monetary shocks produce significant fluctuations in Latin America, but real demand and supply shocks do not. Floaters and currency boarders display similar output but different inflation and interest rate responses. The financial channel plays a crucial role in the transmission. US disturbances explain important portions of the variability of LatinAmerican macrovariables, producing continental cyclical fluctuations and, in two episodes, destabilizing nominal exchange rate effects. Policy implications are discussed.

Credit constraints, firms' precautionary investment and the business cycle

This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of firms' investment composition choices in the presence of credit constraints. Following a negative andpersistent aggregate productivity shock, firms shift into short-term investments because they produce more pledgeable output and because they help alleviate futureborrowing constraints. This produces a short-run dampening of the effects of theshock, at the expense of lower long-term investment and future output, relativeto an economy with no credit market imperfections. The effects are exacerbatedby a steepening of the term structure of interest rates that further encourages ashift towards short-term investments in the short-run. Small temporary shocks tothe severity of financing frictions generate large and long-lasting effects on outputthrough their impact on the composition of investment. A positive financial shockproduces much stronger effects than an identical negative shock, while the responsesto positive and negative shocks to aggregate productivity are roughly symmetric.Finally, the paper introduces a novel explanation for the countercyclicality of financing constraints of firms.

Constant interest rate projections without the curse of indeterminacy

Constant interest rate (CIR) projections are often criticized on the grounds that they are inconsistent with the existence of a unique equilibrium in a variety of forward-looking models. This note shows howto construct CIR projections that are not subject to that criticism, using a standard New Keynesian model as a reference framework.

Risk management under a two-factor model of the term structure of interest rates

This paper presents several applications to interest rate risk managementbased on a two-factor continuous-time model of the term structure of interestrates previously presented in Moreno (1996). This model assumes that defaultfree discount bond prices are determined by the time to maturity and twofactors, the long-term interest rate and the spread (difference between thelong-term rate and the short-term (instantaneous) riskless rate). Several newmeasures of ``generalized duration" are presented and applied in differentsituations in order to manage market risk and yield curve risk. By means ofthese measures, we are able to compute the hedging ratios that allows us toimmunize a bond portfolio by means of options on bonds. Focusing on thehedging problem, it is shown that these new measures allow us to immunize abond portfolio against changes (parallel and/or in the slope) in the yieldcurve. Finally, a proposal of solution of the limitations of conventionalduration by means of these new measures is presented and illustratednumerically.

How well do individuals predict the selling prices of their homes?

Self-reported home values are widely used as a measure of housing wealth by researchers employing a variety of data sets and studying a number of different individual and household level decisions. The accuracy of this measure is an open empirical question, and requires some type of market assessment of the values reported. In this research, we study the predictive power of self-reported housing wealth when estimating sales prices utilizing the Health and Retirement Study. We find that homeowners, on average, overestimate the value of their properties by between 5% and 10%. More importantly, we are the first to document a strong correlation between accuracy and the economic conditions at the time of the purchase of the property (measured by the prevalent interest rate, the growth of household income, and the growth of median housing prices). While most individuals overestimate the value of their properties, those who bought during more difficult economic times tend to be more accurate, and in some cases even underestimate the value of their house. These results establish a surprisingly strong, likely permanent, and in many cases long-lived, effect of the initial conditions surrounding the purchases of properties, on how individuals value them. This cyclicality of the overestimation of house prices can provide some explanations for the difficulties currently faced by many homeowners, who were expecting large appreciations in home value to rescue them in case of increases in interest rates which could jeopardize their ability to live up to their financial commitments.

On the timing of balance of payments crises: Disaggregated information and interest rate policy

This paper proposes a dynamic framework to study the timing of balance of paymentscrises. The model incorporates two main ingredients: (i) investors have private information; (ii)investors interact in a dynamic setting, weighing the high returns on domestic assets against the incentives to pull out before the devaluation. The model shows that the presence of disaggregated information delays the onset of BOP crises, giving rise to discrete devaluations. It also shows that high interest rates can be eective in delaying and possibly avoiding the abandonment of the peg. The optimal policy is to raise interest rates sharply as fundamentals become very weak. However, this policy is time inconsistent, suggesting a role for commitment devices such as currency boards or IMF pressure.

A two-mean reverting-factor model of the term structure of interest rates

This paper presents a two--factor model of the term structure ofinterest rates. We assume that default free discount bond prices aredetermined by the time to maturity and two factors, the long--term interestrate and the spread (difference between the long--term rate and theshort--term (instantaneous) riskless rate). Assuming that both factorsfollow a joint Ornstein--Uhlenbeck process, a general bond pricing equationis derived. We obtain a closed--form expression for bond prices andexamine its implications for the term structure of interest rates. We alsoderive a closed--form solution for interest rate derivatives prices. Thisexpression is applied to price European options on discount bonds andmore complex types of options. Finally, empirical evidence of the model'sperformance is presented.

Neglected risks, financial innovation and financial fragility

We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.

One hundred issues of Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad (REFC)-insights into trends in the Spanish academic community

From the year of its foundation, until the foundation of Revista deContabilidad in 1997, REFC has been the only referred accounting journalin Spain. Published by the Spanish Association for Accounting and BusinessAdministration (AECA), this journal is at the heart of the emergence ofa distinctly Spanish academic accounting community.Our study is based on:1. An analysis of 100 issues of REFC covering the period from 1985 to 1999.2. A questionnaire to Spanish accounting academics on their perceptionsand experience of the journal.Key points emerging from this study include:a) A move away from interest in accounting concepts and rules, as wellas accounting history, and towards positive accounting theory, the impactof accounting information on capital markets, and financial analysis.b) The emergence of a small number of universities as the driving forcein Spanish accounting research.c) Spanish academics rate REFC highly compared to other Spanish journalsfor publication status, as a support for research, and as a support forteaching. A number of English language journals are rated more highly forboth publication status and as a support for teaching.

Private borrowing during the financial revolution: Hoare’s Bank and its customers, 1702-1724

The financial revolution improved the British government s ability to borrow, andthus its ability to wage war. North andWeingast argued that it also permitted privateparties to borrow more cheaply and widely.We test these inferences with evidencefrom a London bank.We confirm that private bank credit was cheap in the earlyeighteenth century, but we argue that it was not available widely. Importantly, thegovernment reduced the usury rate in 1714, sharply reducing the circle of privateclients that could be served profitably.

Productivity growth and the exchange rate regime: The role of financial development

This paper offers empirical evidence that a country's choice of exchange rate regime can have a signifficant impact on its medium-term rate of productivity growth. Moreover, the impact depends critically on the country's level of financial development, its degree of market regulation, and its distance from the global technology frontier. We illustrate how each of these channels may operate in a simple stylized growth model in which real exchange rate uncertainty exacerbates the negative investment e¤ects of domestic credit market constraints. The empirical analysis is based on an 83 country data set spanning the years 1960-2000. Our approach delivers results that are in striking contrast to the vast existing empirical exchange rate literature, which largely finds the effects of exchange rate volatility on real activity to be relatively small and insignificant.

International capital flows and credit market imperfections: A tale of two frictions

The financial crisis of 2007-08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in financialmarkets. This friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of financialimperfections, however, which have focused almost exclusively on the effects of limited pledgeability.In this paper, we fill this gap by developing a standard growth model with adverseselection. Our main results are that, by fostering unproductive investment, adverse selection:(i) leads to an increase in the economy s equilibrium interest rate, and; (ii) it generates a negativewedge between the marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate. Underfinancial integration, we show how this translates into excessive capital inflows and endogenouscycles. We also extend our model to the more general case in which adverse selection and limitedpledgeability coexist. We conclude that both frictions complement one another and show thatlimited pledgeability exacerbates the effects of adverse selection.