The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Estimating the effect of transitory economic shocks on civil conflict

This note tries to clarify some remaining issues in the debate on the effect of income shocks oncivil conflict. Section 1 discusses the discrepant findings on the effect of rainfall shocks oncivil conflict in Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011) and Ciccone (2011). Section 2 develops aninstrumental variables approach to estimate the effect of transitory (rainfall-driven) incomeshocks on civil conflict and contrasts the conclusions with those of Miguel, Satyanath, andSergenti (2004) and Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011). Throughout, the note uses the data ofMiguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti to focus on the methodological issues at the core of the debate(for results using the latest data see Ciccone, 2011).

Banks and development: Jewish communities in the Italian Renaissance and current economic performance

Are differences in local banking development long-lasting? Do they affect long-term economic performance?I answer these questions by relying on an historical development that occurred in Italian cities during the 15thcentury. A sudden change in the Catholic doctrine had driven the Jews toward money lending. Cities thatwere hosting Jewish communities developed complex banking institutions for two reasons: first, the Jews werethe only people in Italy who were allowed to lend for a profit and, second, the Franciscan reaction to Jewishusury led to the creation of charity lending institutions, the Monti di Pietà, that have survived until today andhave become the basis of the Italian banking system. Using Jewish demography in 1500 as an instrument, Iprovide evidence of (1) an extraordinary persistence in the level of banking development across Italian cities (2)large effects of current local banking development on per-capita income. Additional firm-level analyses suggestthat well-functioning local banks exert large effects on aggregate productivity by reallocating resources towardmore efficient firms. I exploit the expulsion of the Jews from the Spanish territories in Italy in 1541 to arguethat my results are not driven by omitted institutional, cultural and geographical characteristics. In particular,I show that, in Central Italy, the difference in current income between cities that hosted Jewish communitiesand cities that did not exists only in those regions that were not Spanish territories in the 16th century.

The effects of structural reforms on productivity and profitability enhancing reallocation: Evidence from Colombia

Estimates for the U.S. suggest that at least in some sectors productivity enhancing reallocationis the dominant factor in accounting for producitivity growth. An open question, particularlyrelevant for developing countries, is whether reallocation is always productivity enhancing. Itmay be that imperfect competition or other barriers to competitive environments imply that thereallocation process is not fully e?cient in these countries. Using a unique plant-levellongitudinal dataset for Colombia for the period 1982-1998, we explore these issues byexamining the interaction between market allocation, and productivity and profitability.Moreover, given the important trade, labor and financial market reforms in Colombia during theearly 1990's, we explore whether and how the contribution of reallocation changed over theperiod of study. Our data permit measurement of plant-level quantities and prices. Takingadvantage of the rich structure of our price data, we propose a sequential mehodology to estimateproductivity and demand shocks at the plant level. First, we estimate total factor productivity(TFP) with plant-level physical output data, where we use downstream demand to instrumentinputs. We then turn to estimating demand shocks and mark-ups with plant-level price data, usingTFP to instrument for output in the inversedemand equation. We examine the evolution of thedistributions of TFP and demand shocks in response to the market reforms in the 1990's. We findthat market reforms are associated with rising overall productivity that is largely driven byreallocation away from low- and towards highproductivity businesses. In addition, we find thatthe allocation of activity across businesses is less driven by demand factors after reforms. Wefind that the increase in aggregate productivity post-reform is entirely accounted for by theimproved allocation of activity.

The impact of investment in education on economic development: Spain in comparative perspective (1860-2000)

Throughout the 19th century and until the mid-20th century, in terms of long-terminvestment in human capital and, above all, in education, Spain lagged far behind theinternational standards and, more specifically, the levels attained by its neighbours inEurope. In 1900, only 55% of the population could read; in 1950, the figure was 93%.This no doubt contributed to a pattern of slower economic growth in which thephysical strength required for agricultural work, measured here through height, had alarger impact than education on economic growth. It was not until the 1970s, with thearrival of democracy, that the Spanish education system was modernized and theinfluence of education on economic growth increased.

Transfers, social safety nets and economic growth

The role of social safety nets in the form of redistributional transfersand wage subsidies is analyzed using a simple model of criminal behavior. Itis argued that public welfare programs act as a crime--preventing ordisruption--preventing devices because they tend to increase the opportunitycost of engaging in crime or disruptive activities. It is shown that, in thepresence of a leisure choice, wage subsidies may be better than pure transfers. Using a simple growth model, it is shown that it is not optimal for the governmentto try to fully eliminate crime. The optimal size of the public welfare programis found and it is argued that public welfare should be financed with income(not lump--sum) taxes, despite the fact that income taxes are distortionary.The intuition for this result is that income taxes act as a user fee oncongested public goods and transfers can be thought of as {\it productive}public goods {\it subject to congestion}. Finally, using a cross-section of 75 countries, the partial correlation betweentransfers and growth is shown to be significantly positive.

Start-up costs and pecuniary externalities as barriers to economic development

We use a dynamic monopolistic competition model to show that an economythat inherits a small range of specialized inputs can be trapped into alower stage of development. The limited availability of specialized inputsforces the final goods producers to use a labor intensive technology, whichin turn implies a small inducement to introduce new intermediate inputs. Thestart--up costs, which make the intermediate inputs producers subject todynamic increasing returns, and pecuniary externalities that result from thefactor substitution in the final goods sector, play essential roles in themodel.