The Speed of the Financial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare’s Bank

Finance is important for development, yet the onset of modern economic growth in Britain lagged the British financial revolution by over a century. We present evidence from a new West-End London private bank to explain this delay. Hoare’s Bank loaned primarily to a highly select and well-born clientele, although it did not discriminate against “unknown” borrowers in the early 18th century. It could not extend credit more generally because of government restrictions (usury limits) and policies (frequent wars). Britain’s financial development could have aided growth substantially, had it not been for the rigidities and turmoil introduced by government interference.

Equilibrium asset prices and savings of heterogeneous agents in the presence of incomplete markets and portfolio constraints

We study the quantitative properties of a dynamic general equilibrium model in which agents face both idiosyncratic and aggregate income risk, state-dependent borrowing constraints that bind in some but not all periods and markets are incomplete. Optimal individual consumption-savings plans and equilibrium asset prices are computed under various assumptions about income uncertainty. Then we investigate whether our general equilibrium model with incomplete markets replicates two empirical observations: the high correlation between individual consumption and individual income, and the equity premium puzzle. We find that, when the driving processes are calibrated according to the data from wage income in different sectors of the US economy, the results move in the direction of explaining these observations, but the model falls short of explaining the observed correlations quantitatively. If the incomes of agents are assumed independent of each other, the observations can be explained quantitatively.

Interbank market integration under asymmetric information

We argue that the main barrier to an integrated international interbankmarket is the existence of asymmetric information between differentcountries, which may prevail in spite of monetary integration or successfulcurrency pegging. In order to address this issue, we study the scope forinternational interbank market integration with unsecured lending whencross-country information is noisy. We find not only that an equilibriumwith integrated markets need not always exist, but also that when it does,the integrated equilibrium may coexist with one of interbank marketsegmentation. Therefore, market deregulation, per se, does not guaranteethe emergence of an integrated interbank market. The effect of a repo marketwhich, a priori, was supposed to improve efficiency happens to be morecomplex: it reduces interest rate spreads and improves upon the segmentationequilibrium, but\ it may destroy the unsecured integrated equilibrium, sincethe repo market will attract the best borrowers. The introduction of othertransnational institutional arrangements, such as multinational banking,correspondent banking and the existence of "too-big-to-fail" banks mayreduce cross country interest spreads and provide more insurance againstcountry wide liquidity shocks. Still, multinational banking, as theintroduction of repos, may threaten the integrated interbank marketequilibrium.

Equities and inequality

Most US credit card holders revolve high-interest debt, often combined with substantial (i) asset accumulation by retirement, and (ii) low-rate liquid assets. Hyperbolic discounting can resolve only the former puzzle (Laibson et al., 2003). Bertaut and Haliassos (2002) proposed an 'accountant-shopper'framework for the latter. The current paper builds, solves, and simulates a fully-specified accountant-shopper model, to show that this framework canactually generate both types of co-existence, as well as target credit card utilization rates consistent with Gross and Souleles (2002). The benchmark model is compared to setups without self-control problems, with alternative mechanisms, and with impatient but fully rational shoppers.

Theoretical notes on bubbles and the current crisis

We explore a view of the crisis as a shock to investor sentiment that led to the collapse of abubble or pyramid scheme in financial markets. We embed this view in a standard model of thefinancial accelerator and explore its empirical and policy implications. In particular, we show howthe model can account for: (i) a gradual and protracted expansionary phase followed by a suddenand sharp recession; (ii) the connection (or lack of connection!) between financial and real economicactivity and; (iii) a fast and strong transmission of shocks across countries. We also use the modelto explore the role of fiscal policy.

Determining underlying macroeconomic fundamentals during emerging market crises: Are conditions as bad as they seem?

Emerging market crises are characterized by large swings in both macroeconomic fundamentalsand asset prices. The economic significance of observed movements in macroeconomicvariables is obscured by the brief and extreme nature of crises. In this paper we propose to study the macroeconomic consequences of crises by studying the behavior of effective fundamentals, constructed by studying the relative movements of stock prices during crises. We find that these effective fundamentals provide a different picture than that implied by observed fundamentals. First, asset prices often reflect expectations of improvement in fundamentals after the initial devaluations; specifically, effective depreciations are positive but not as large as the observed ones. Second, crises vary in their effect on credit market conditions, with investors expecting tightening of credit in some cases (Mexico 1994, Philippines 1997), but loosening of credit in others (Sweden 1992, Korea 1997, Brazil 1999).