The maximun and the addition of assigment games

[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden escollir on dur a terme les seves transaccions. Mostrem que el joc corresponent a aquesta situació, que es representa pel màxim d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, pot ser un joc no equilibrat. Aleshores proporcionem condicions per a l’equilibri del joc i, per aquest cas, analitzem algunes propietats del core del joc. En segon lloc, considerem que els jugadors poden fer transaccions en diversos mercats simultàniament i, llavors, sumar els guanys obtinguts. El joc corresponent, representat per la suma d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, és equilibrat. A més a més, sota certes condicions, la suma dels cores dels dos jocs d’assignació coincideix amb el core del joc suma.

English grammar games in primary education

The purpose of this study was to analyse pupils’ English grammar acquisition from competitive and cooperative approaches. After searching a wide range of authors’ contribution to English language learning, grammar acquisition, classroom environment and language games. A hundred and twenty pupils from three schools; two from Ripoll and one from Campdevànol were enrolled in a specific grammar games intervention. This was imparted in three different phases: first of all, I interviewed the three teachers from the three schools, then I put into practice my competitive and cooperative games which I designed especially for this study (all the sessions were carried, assessed and registered by myself); finally, all pupils answered a questionnaire related to their experiences in my grammar games intervention. Analysis of teaching interventions showed that, in terms of English language acquisition, pupils used different strategies to show up understanding and achieve the objective of the game such as: recalling their background knowledge, expressing sentences influenced by their internal language and their mother tongue. Data collected revealed that most difficulties were founded in team work, even more in competitive games. The results also showed that team work is something which has to be developed step by step in order to achieve language learning and all pupils’ active participation successfully.

Flash Card 7: Sistema d'estudi per targetes

Flash Card 7 és un sistema d'estudi basat en targetes per facilitar l'aprenentatge.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Axiomatization of the nucl eolus of assignment games

On the domain of general assignment games (with possible reservation prices) the core is axiomatized as the unique solution satisfying two consistency principles: projection consistency and derived consistency. Also, an axiomatic characterization of the nucleolus is given as the unique solution that satisfies derived consistency and equal maximum complaint between groups. As a consequence, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus. Maschler et al. (1979) provide a geometrical characterization for the intersection of the kernel and the core of a coalitional game, showing that those allocations that lie in both sets are always the midpoint of certain bargaining range between each pair of players. In the case of the assignment game, this means that the kernel can be determined as those core allocations where the maximum amount, that can be transferred without getting outside the core, from one agent to his / her optimally matched partner equals the maximum amount that he / she can receive from this partner, also remaining inside the core. We now prove that the nucleolus of the assignment game can be characterized by requiring this bisection property be satisfied not only for optimally matched pairs but also for optimally matched coalitions. Key words: cooperative games, assignment game, core, nucleolus

Pla de Prevenció d’Incendis Forestals a la Serra de Cardó (província de Tarragona)

Els incendis forestals són actualment les majors pertorbacions del sistema mediterrani, ocasionant pèrdues econòmiques, ambientals i alarma social. La nostra àrea d’estudi és la Serra de Cardó, serra prelitoral i meridional catalana representativa de l’ecosistema mediterrani, on llur règim d’incendis de baixa intensitat ha canviat en els últims anys. L’èxode rural i l' abandonament agrícola han augmentat considerablement la colonització d’aquests espais per brolles mediterrànies i masses arbrades de pi blanc, amb la conseqüent acumulació de combustible i continuïtat entre estrats. A més, l’abandonament dels aprofitaments forestals tradicionals i les polítiques medi ambientals dels últims temps, han contribuït a canviar el règim d’incendis d’aquesta zona generant sovint episodis de Grans Incendis Forestals (GIF), provocant incendis intensos, de grans proporcions i d’altes velocitats de propagació que sobrepassen la capacitat de treball dels nostres mitjans d’extinció. Partint d’una anàlisi profunda de tot el territori i per tal d’optimar la planificació territorial i la gestió forestal, analitzarem el context espacio-temporal en el que es donaren els episodis de grans incendis forestals per tal de caracteritzar el nou règim d’incendis. També analitzarem la dinàmica vegetal que afronta el territori per albirar la tendència vegetal futura. Com a resultat d’aquesta anàlisi determinarem punts estratègics de gestió i planificarem infraestructures de prevenció d’acord amb els resultats obtinguts. Analitzarem les zones d’interfície urbano-forestal i classificarem els tipus d’interfase existents, analitzarem el comportament del foc i finalment, d’acord amb els resultats obtinguts i amb la normativa vigent justificarem i pressupostarem les obres de prevenció d’incendis planificades, contribuint a la defensa de la Serra davant possibles focs forestals.

On reduced games and the lexmax solution

For a family of reduced games satisfying a monotonicity property, we introduced the reduced equal split-off set, an extension of the equal split-off set (Branzei et. al, 2006), and study its relation with the core. Regardless of the reduction operation we consider, the intersection between both sets is either empty or a singleton containing the lexmax solution (Arin et al., 2008). We also provide a procedure for computing the lexmax solution for a class of games that includes games with large core (Sharkey, 1982). [JEL Classification: C71]

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Os games digitais como um recurso cognitivo para o ensino da historia da Catalunha: um estudo de caso

Os games digitais possuem um valor educativo importante e têm sido reconhecidos pelos educadores como um rico e produtivo espaço que proporciona conteúdos de aprendizagem para os estudantes, melhorando, através dele, o desenvolvimento cognitivo do aluno. Este artigo explora as oportunidades cognitivas dos games digitais como uma ferramenta de aprendizagem e mostra um estudo de caso: o jogo de Joan de Peratallada. O objetivo desse estudo é promover o diálogo e a possível colaboração entre um jogo digital cognitivo aplicado as escolas primárias de forma a colaborar com a ensino de historia de Catalunha, Espanha.

The pedagogical value of games and songs : The perceptions of teachers

Aquest estudi intenta explorar i descobrir les actituds i creences d’alguns mestres de llengua anglesa de Catalunya sobre la naturalesa dels jocs i les cançons, així com el paper que juguen en les seves aules per ensenyar l’anglès als infants. Les opinions dels mestres de llengua anglesa van ser recollides mitjançant un qüestionari que contenia preguntes sobre els jocs i les cançons i els resultats s’analitzen i s’exposen en aquest estudi.

Enjoying cooperative games: The R package GameTheory

This paper focuses on cooperative games with transferable utility. We propose the computation of two solutions, the Shapley value for n agents and the nucleolus with a maximum of four agents. The current approach is also focused on conflicting claims problems, a particular case of coalitional games. We provide the computation of the most well-known and used claims solutions: the proportional, the constrained equal awards, the constrained equal losses, the Talmud and the random arrival rules. Keywords: Cooperative game, Shapley value, nucleolus, claims problem, claims rule, bankruptcy.