Pay-as-you-go social security and the distribution of bequests

This paper studies the impact of an unfunded social security system on the distribution of bequests in a framework where savings are due both by life cycle and by random altruistic motivations. We show that the impact of social security on the distribution of bequests depends crucially on the importance of the bequest motive in explaining savings behavior. If the bequest motive is strong, then an increase in the social security tax raises the bequests left by altruistic parents. On the other hand, when the importance of bequests in motivating savings is sufficiently low, theincrease in the social security tax could result in a reduction of the bequests left by altruistic parents under some conditions on the attitude of individuals toward risk and on the relative returns associated with private saving and social security. Some implications concerning the transitional effects of introducing an unfunded social security scheme are also discussed.

Price regulation of plastic money: A critical assessment of Spanish rules

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate paymentsystems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees(MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificiallowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but itwill however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of saleterminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.

Altruism, equity and reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment: An encompassing approach

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motivesmust be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recentmodels of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as either altruism-based, equity-based, or reciprocity-based. We estimate and compareleading approaches in these categories, using experimental data. Wethen offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches,thereby allowing for nested hypothesis testing and for determiningthe relative strength of each of the competing theories. In addition,the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. Using this flexible form for nested tests, we findthat intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and altruisticconsiderations all play a significant role in players' decisions.

Openness, government size and the terms of trade

This paper investigates the relationship between trade openness and the size of government, both theoretically and empirically. We show that openness can increase the size of governments through two channels: (1) a terms of trade externality, whereby trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation and (2) the demand for insurance, whereby trade raises risk and public transfers. We provide a unified framework for studying and testing these two mechanisms. First, we show how their relative strength depends on a key parameter, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Second, while the terms of trade externality leads to inefficiently large governments, the increase in public spending due to the demand for insurance is optimal. We show that large volumes of trade may result in welfare losses if the terms of trade externality is strong enough while small volumes of trade are always beneficial. Third, we provide new evidence on the positive association between openness and the size of government and test whether it is consistent with the terms of trade externality or the demand for insurance. Our findings suggest that the positive relationship is remarkably robust and that the terms of trade externality may be the driving force behind it, thus raising warnings that globalization may have led to inefficiently large governments.

Pitfalls in the modeling of forward-looking price setting and investment decisions

The present paper makes progress in explaining the role of capital for inflation and output dynamics. We followWoodford (2003, Ch. 5) in assuming Calvo pricing combined with a convex capital adjustment cost at the firm level. Our main result is that capital accumulation affects inflation dynamics primarily through its impact on the marginal cost. This mechanism is much simpler than the one implied by the analysis in Woodford's text. The reason is that his analysis suffers from a conceptual mistake, as we show. The latter obscures the economic mechanism through which capital affects inflation and output dynamics in the Calvo model, as discussed in Woodford (2004).

Relative payoffs and happiness: An experimental study

Some current utility models presume that people are concerned with their relative standing in a reference group. If this is true, do certain types care more about this than others? Using simple binary decisions and self-reported happiness, we investigate both the prevalence of ``difference aversion'' and whether happiness levels influence the taste for social comparisons. Our decision tasks distinguish between a person s desire to achieving the social optimum, equality or advantageous relative standing. Most people appear to disregard relative payoffs, instead typically making choices resulting in higher social payoffs. While we do not find a strong general correlation between happiness and concern for relative payoffs, we do observe that a willingness to lower another person s payoff below one s own (competitive preferences) seems correlated with unhappiness.

Bargaining on networks: An experiment

While markets are often decentralized, in many other cases agents in one role can only negotiate with a proper subset of the agents in the complementary role. There may be proximity issues or restricted communication flows. For example, information may be transmitted only through word-of-mouth, as is often the case for job openings, business opportunities, and confidential transactions. Bargaining can be considered to occur over a network that summarizes the structure of linkages among people. We conduct an alternating-offer bargaining experiment using separate simple networks, which are then joined during the session by an additional link. The results diverge sharply depending on how this connection is made. Payoffs can be systematically affected even for agents who are not connected by the new link. We use a graph-theoretic analysis to show that any two-sided network can be decomposed into simple networks of three types, so that our result can be generalized to more complex bargaining environments. Participants appear to grasp the essential characteristics of the networks and we observe a rather consistently high level of bargaining efficiency.

How competition controls team production: The case of fishing firms

Under team production, those who monitor individual productivity areusually the only ones compensated with a residual that varies withthe performance of the team. This pattern is efficient, as is shownby the prevalence of conventional firms, except for small teams andwhen specialized monitoring is ineffective. Profit sharing in repeatedteam production induces all team members to take disciplinary actionagainst underperformers through switching and separation decisions,however. Such action provides effective self-enforcemnt when themarkets for team members are competitive, even for large teams usingspecialized monitoring. The traditional share system of fishing firmsshows that for this competition to provide powerful enough incentivesthe costs of switching teams and measuring team productivity must bebellow. Risk allocation may constrain the organizational designdefined by the use of a share system. It does not account for itsexistence, however.

Killing by lung cancer or by diabetes? The trade-off between smoking and obesity

As the prevalence of smoking has decreased to below 20%, health practitioners interest has shifted towards theprevalence of obesity, and reducing it is one of the major health challenges in decades to come. In this paper westudy the impact that the final product of the anti-smoking campaign, that is, smokers quitting the habit, had onaverage weight in the population. To these ends, we use data from the Behavioral Risk Factors Surveillance System,a large series of independent representative cross-sectional surveys. We construct a synthetic panel that allows us tocontrol for unobserved heterogeneity and we exploit the exogenous changes in taxes and regulations to instrumentthe endogenous decision to give up the habit of smoking. Our estimates, are very close to estimates issued in the 90sby the US Department of Health, and indicate that a 10% decrease in the incidence of smoking leads to an averageweight increase of 2.2 to 3 pounds, depending on choice of specification. In addition, we find evidence that the effectovershoots in the short run, although a significant part remains even after two years. However, when we split thesample between men and women, we only find a significant effect for men. Finally, the implicit elasticity of quittingsmoking to the probability of becoming obese is calculated at 0.58. This implies that the net benefit from reducingthe incidence of smoking by 1% is positive even though the cost to society is $0.6 billions.

When in peril, retrench: Testing the portfolio channel of contagion

One plausible mechanism through which financial market shocks may propagate across countriesis through the impact that past gains and losses may have on investors risk aversion and behavior. This paper presents a stylized model illustrating how heterogeneous changes in investors risk aversion affect portfolio allocation decisions and stock prices. Our empirical findings suggest that when funds returns are below average, they adjust their holdings toward the average (or benchmark) portfolio. In so doing, funds tend to sell the assets of countries in which they were overweight , increasing their exposure to countries in which they were underweight. Based on this insight, the paper constructs an index of financial interdependence which reflects the extent to which countries share overexposed funds. The index helps in explain the pattern of stock market comovement across countries. Moreover, a comparison of this interdependence measure to indices of trade or commercial bank linkages indicates that our index can improve predictions about which countries are more likely to be affected by contagion from crisis centers.

What risks do people perceive in everyday life? A perspective gained from the experience sampling method (ESM)

The experiential sampling method (ESM) was used to collect data from 74 parttimestudents who described and assessed the risks involved in their current activitieswhen interrupted at random moments by text messages. The major categories ofperceived risk were short-term in nature and involved loss of time or materials relatedto work and physical damage (e.g., from transportation). Using techniques of multilevelanalysis, we demonstrate effects of gender, emotional state, and types of risk onassessments of risk. Specifically, females do not differ from males in assessing thepotential severity of risks but they see these as more likely to occur. Also, participantsassessed risks to be lower when in more positive self-reported emotional states. Wefurther demonstrate the potential of ESM by showing that risk assessments associatedwith current actions exceed those made retrospectively. We conclude by notingadvantages and disadvantages of ESM for collecting data about risk perceptions.

The risk of divorce and household saving behavior

We analyze the impact of an increase in the risk of divorce on the savingbehaviour of married couples. From a theoretical perspective, the expected sign of theeffect is ambiguous. We take advantage of the legalization of divorce in Ireland in 1996as an exogenous increase in the likelihood of marital dissolution. We analyze the savingbehaviour over time of couples who were married before the law was passed. We proposea difference-in-differences approach where we use as comparison groups either marriedcouples in other European countries (not affected by the law change), or Irish familieswho did not experience a significant increase in the expected risk of divorce (such as veryreligious families, or single individuals). Our results suggest that the increase in the riskof divorce brought about by the law was followed by an increase in the propensity to saveof married couples, consistent with a rise in precautionary savings interpretation. Anincrease in the risk of marital dissolution of about 40 percent led to a 7 to 13 percent risein the proportion of married couples reporting positive savings.

On ignoring scientific evidence: The bumpy road to enlightenment

It is well accepted that people resist evidence that contradicts their beliefs.Moreover, despite their training, many scientists reject results that are inconsistent withtheir theories. This phenomenon is discussed in relation to the field of judgment anddecision making by describing four case studies. These concern findings that clinical judgment is less predictive than actuarial models; simple methods have proven superiorto more theoretically correct methods in times series forecasting; equal weighting ofvariables is often more accurate than using differential weights; and decisions cansometimes be improved by discarding relevant information. All findings relate to theapparently difficult-to-accept idea that simple models can predict complex phenomenabetter than complex ones. It is true that there is a scientific market place for ideas.However, like its economic counterpart, it is subject to inefficiencies (e.g., thinness,asymmetric information, and speculative bubbles). Unfortunately, the market is only correct in the long-run. The road to enlightenment is bumpy.

Revealed preference and indifferent selection

It is shown that preferences can be constructed from observed choice behavior in a way that is robust to indifferent selection (i.e., the agent is indifferent between two alternatives but, nevertheless, is only observed selecting one of them). More precisely, a suggestion by Savage (1954) to reveal indifferent selection by considering small monetary perturbations of alternatives is formalized and generalized to a purely topological framework: references over an arbitrary topological space can be uniquely derived from observed behavior under the assumptions that they are continuous and nonsatiated and that a strictly preferred alternative is always chosen, and indifferent selection is then characterized by discontinuity in choice behavior. Two particular cases are then analyzed: monotonic preferences over a partially ordered set, and preferences representable by a continuous pseudo-utility function.

A simple model of multiple equilibria based on risk

This paper shows how risk may aggravate fluctuations in economies with imperfect insurance and multiple assets. A two period job matching model is studied, in which risk averse agents act both as workers and as entrepreneurs. They choose between two types of investment: one type is riskless, while the other is a risky activity that creates jobs.Equilibrium is unique under full insurance. If investment is fully insured but unemployment risk is uninsured, then precautionary saving behavior dampens output fluctuations. However, if both investment and employment are uninsured, then an increase in unemployment gives agents an incentive to shift investment away from the risky asset, further increasing unemployment. This positive feedback may lead to multiple Pareto ranked equilibria. An overlapping generations version of the model may exhibit poverty traps or persistent multiplicity. Greater insurance is doubly beneficial in this context since it can both prevent multiplicity and promote risky investment.