Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and constructive ambiguity

This paper addresses the issue of the optimal behaviour of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) in its microeconomic role regarding individual financial institutions in distress. It has been argued that the LOLR should not intervene at the microeconomic level and let any defaulting institution face the market discipline, as it will be confronted with the consequences of the risks it has taken. By considering a simple costbenefit analysis we show that this position may lack a sufficient foundation. We establish that, instead, uder reasonable assumptions, the optimal policy has to be conditional on the amount of uninsured debt issued by the defaulting bank. Yet in equilibrium, because the rescue policy is costly, the LOLR will not rescue all the banks that fulfill the uninsured debt requirement condition, but will follow a mixed strategy. This we interpret as the confirmation of the "creative ambiguity" principle, perfectly in line with the central bankers claim that it is efficient for them to have discretion in lending to individual institutions. Alternatively, in other cases, when the social cost of a bank's bankruptcy is too high, it is optimal for the LOLR to bail out the insititution, and this gives support to the "too big to fail" policy.

A measure of rationality and welfare

There is evidence showing that individual behavior often deviates fromthe classical principle of maximization. This evidence raises at least two importantquestions: (i) how severe the deviations are and (ii) which method is the best forextracting relevant information from choice behavior for the purposes of welfare analysis.In this paper we address these two questions by identifying from a foundationalanalysis a new measure of the rationality of individuals that enables the analysis ofindividual welfare in potentially inconsistent subjects, all based on standard revealedpreference data. We call such measure minimal index.

A characterization of sequential rationalizability

A choice function is sequentially rationalizable if there is an ordered collection of asymmetric binary relations that identifies the selected alternative in every choice problem. We propose a property, F-consistency, and show that it characterizes the notion of sequential rationalizability. F-consistency is a testable property that highlights the behavioral aspects implicit in sequentially rationalizable choice. Further, our characterization result provides a novel tool with which to study how other behavioral concepts are related to sequential rationalizability, and establish a priori unexpected implications. In particular, we show that the concept of rationalizability by game trees, which, in principle, had little to do with sequential rationalizability, is a refinement of the latter. Every choice function that is rationalizable by a game tree is also sequentially rationalizable. Finally, we show that some prominent voting mechanisms are also sequentially rationalizable.

Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition

We construct a dynamic voting model of multiparty competition in order to capture the following facts: voters base their decision on past economicperformance of the parties, and parties and candidates have different objectives. This model may explain the emergence of parties' ideologies,and shows the compatibility of the different objectives of parties and candidates. Together, these results give rise to the formation ofpolitical parties, as infinetely-lived agents with a certain ideology, out of the competition of myopic candidates freely choosing policy positions. We also show that in multicandidate elections held under the plurality system, Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation is no longer satisfied.

The risk of divorce and household saving behavior

We analyze the impact of an increase in the risk of divorce on the savingbehaviour of married couples. From a theoretical perspective, the expected sign of theeffect is ambiguous. We take advantage of the legalization of divorce in Ireland in 1996as an exogenous increase in the likelihood of marital dissolution. We analyze the savingbehaviour over time of couples who were married before the law was passed. We proposea difference-in-differences approach where we use as comparison groups either marriedcouples in other European countries (not affected by the law change), or Irish familieswho did not experience a significant increase in the expected risk of divorce (such as veryreligious families, or single individuals). Our results suggest that the increase in the riskof divorce brought about by the law was followed by an increase in the propensity to saveof married couples, consistent with a rise in precautionary savings interpretation. Anincrease in the risk of marital dissolution of about 40 percent led to a 7 to 13 percent risein the proportion of married couples reporting positive savings.

A simple model of multiple equilibria based on risk

This paper shows how risk may aggravate fluctuations in economies with imperfect insurance and multiple assets. A two period job matching model is studied, in which risk averse agents act both as workers and as entrepreneurs. They choose between two types of investment: one type is riskless, while the other is a risky activity that creates jobs.Equilibrium is unique under full insurance. If investment is fully insured but unemployment risk is uninsured, then precautionary saving behavior dampens output fluctuations. However, if both investment and employment are uninsured, then an increase in unemployment gives agents an incentive to shift investment away from the risky asset, further increasing unemployment. This positive feedback may lead to multiple Pareto ranked equilibria. An overlapping generations version of the model may exhibit poverty traps or persistent multiplicity. Greater insurance is doubly beneficial in this context since it can both prevent multiplicity and promote risky investment.

Irreversible investment in stochastically cyclical markets

This paper presents a new framework for studying irreversible (dis)investment whena market follows a random number of random-length cycles (such as a high-tech productmarket). It is assumed that a firm facing such market evolution is always unsure aboutwhether the current cycle is the last one, although it can update its beliefs about theprobability of facing a permanent decline by observing that no further growth phasearrives. We show that the existence of regime shifts in fluctuating markets suffices for anoption value of waiting to (dis)invest to arise, and we provide a marginal interpretationof the optimal (dis)investment policies, absent in the real options literature. Thepaper also shows that, despite the stochastic process of the underlying variable has acontinuous sample path, the discreteness in the regime changes implies that the samplepath of the firm s value experiences jumps whenever the regime switches all of a sudden,irrespective of whether the firm is active or not.

States of maximum entropy production in a onedimensional vertical model with convective adjustment

We investigate the hypothesis that the atmosphere is constrained to maximize its entropy production by using a one-dimensional (1-D) vertical model. We prescribe the lapse rate in the convective layer as that of the standard troposphere. The assumption that convection sustains a critical lapse rate was absent in previous studies, which focused on the vertical distribution of climatic variables, since such a convective adjustment reduces the degrees of freedom of the system and may prevent the application of the maximum entropy production (MEP) principle. This is not the case in the radiative–convective model (RCM) developed here, since we accept a discontinuity of temperatures at the surface similar to that adopted in many RCMs. For current conditions, the MEP state gives a difference between the ground temperature and the air temperature at the surface ≈10 K. In comparison, conventional RCMs obtain a discontinuity ≈2 K only. However, the surface boundary layer velocity in the MEP state appears reasonable (≈3 m s-¹). Moreover, although the convective flux at the surface in MEP states is almost uniform in optically thick atmospheres, it reaches a maximum value for an optical thickness similar to current conditions. This additional result may support the maximum convection hypothesis suggested by Paltridge (1978)

A new maximum likelihood method for luminosity calibrations

A new statistical parallax method using the Maximum Likelihood principle is presented, allowing the simultaneous determination of a luminosity calibration, kinematic characteristics and spatial distribution of a given sample. This method has been developed for the exploitation of the Hipparcos data and presents several improvements with respect to the previous ones: the effects of the selection of the sample, the observational errors, the galactic rotation and the interstellar absorption are taken into account as an intrinsic part of the formulation (as opposed to external corrections). Furthermore, the method is able to identify and characterize physically distinct groups in inhomogeneous samples, thus avoiding biases due to unidentified components. Moreover, the implementation used by the authors is based on the extensive use of numerical methods, so avoiding the need for simplification of the equations and thus the bias they could introduce. Several examples of application using simulated samples are presented, to be followed by applications to real samples in forthcoming articles.

CP2 stars as viewed by the uvby Hbeta system

A new statistical parallax method using the Maximum Likelihood principle is presented, allowing the simultaneous determination of a luminosity calibration, kinematic characteristics and spatial distribution of a given sample. This method has been developed for the exploitation of the Hipparcos data and presents several improvements with respect to the previous ones: the effects of the selection of the sample, the observational errors, the galactic rotation and the interstellar absorption are taken into account as an intrinsic part of the formulation (as opposed to external corrections). Furthermore, the method is able to identify and characterize physically distinct groups in inhomogeneous samples, thus avoiding biases due to unidentified components. Moreover, the implementation used by the authors is based on the extensive use of numerical methods, so avoiding the need for simplification of the equations and thus the bias they could introduce. Several examples of application using simulated samples are presented, to be followed by applications to real samples in forthcoming articles.

Towards a theory of the credit-risk balance sheet

This article designs what it calls a Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (the risk being that of default by customers), a tool which, in principle, can contribute to revealing, controlling and managing the bad debt risk arising from a company¿s commercial credit, whose amount can represent a significant proportion of both its current and total assets.To construct it, we start from the duality observed in any credit transaction of this nature, whose basic identity can be summed up as Credit = Risk. ¿Credit¿ is granted by a company to its customer, and can be ranked by quality (we suggest the credit scoring system) and ¿risk¿ can either be assumed (interiorised) by the company itself or transferred to third parties (exteriorised).What provides the approach that leads to us being able to talk with confidence of a real Credit-Risk Balance Sheet with its methodological robustness is that the dual vision of the credit transaction is not, as we demonstrate, merely a classificatory duality (a double risk-credit classification of reality) but rather a true causal relationship, that is, a risk-credit causal duality.Once said Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (which bears a certain structural similarity with the classic net asset balance sheet) has been built, and its methodological coherence demonstrated, its properties ¿static and dynamic¿ are studied.Analysis of the temporal evolution of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet and of its applications will be the object of subsequent works.

La obligatoriedad de la mediación derivada de la voluntad de las partes: las cláusulas de mediación

[spa] La voluntariedad constituye el presupuesto de cualquier análisis sobre la mediación. De entre sus diversas manifestaciones, destacan la libertad de acogerse al procedimiento y la posibilidad de desistir del mismo en cualquier momento. Sin embargo, en relación con su primera manifestación ―libertad de acogerse a la mediación―, el principio de voluntariedad parece admitir ciertas modulaciones, debidas, por una parte, a la exigencia legal, en algunos casos, del uso de la mediación como condición de procedibilidad ante los tribunales (mandatory mediation) y, por otra, a la discutida admisibilidad de las llamadas"cláusulas de mediación". El estudio se centra en estas últimas. En particular, se analiza el debate que éstas han generado, su eficacia ―tanto ordinaria (derivada de su cumplimiento) como extraordinaria (consecuencia de su incumplimiento)― y la cuestión de sus posibles contenidos.

Semiclassical theory of shot noise in ballistic n+in+ semiconductor structures: relevance of Pauli and long range Coulomb interactions

We work out a semiclassical theory of shot noise in ballistic n+-i-n+ semiconductor structures aiming at studying two fundamental physical correlations coming from Pauli exclusion principle and long-range Coulomb interaction. The theory provides a unifying scheme which, in addition to the current-voltage characteristics, describes the suppression of shot noise due to Pauli and Coulomb correlations in the whole range of system parameters and applied bias. The whole scenario is summarized by a phase diagram in the plane of two dimensionless variables related to the sample length and contact chemical potential. Here different regions of physical interest can be identified where only Coulomb or only Pauli correlations are active, or where both are present with different relevance. The predictions of the theory are proven to be fully corroborated by Monte Carlo simulations.

Towards a theory of the credit-risk balance sheet

This article designs what it calls a Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (the risk being that of default by customers), a tool which, in principle, can contribute to revealing, controlling and managing the bad debt risk arising from a company¿s commercial credit, whose amount can represent a significant proportion of both its current and total assets.To construct it, we start from the duality observed in any credit transaction of this nature, whose basic identity can be summed up as Credit = Risk. ¿Credit¿ is granted by a company to its customer, and can be ranked by quality (we suggest the credit scoring system) and ¿risk¿ can either be assumed (interiorised) by the company itself or transferred to third parties (exteriorised).What provides the approach that leads to us being able to talk with confidence of a real Credit-Risk Balance Sheet with its methodological robustness is that the dual vision of the credit transaction is not, as we demonstrate, merely a classificatory duality (a double risk-credit classification of reality) but rather a true causal relationship, that is, a risk-credit causal duality.Once said Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (which bears a certain structural similarity with the classic net asset balance sheet) has been built, and its methodological coherence demonstrated, its properties ¿static and dynamic¿ are studied.Analysis of the temporal evolution of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet and of its applications will be the object of subsequent works.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.