The Three Horsemen of Growth: Plague, War and Urbanization in Early Modern Europe

How did Europe overtake China? We construct a simple Malthusian model with two sectors, and use it to explain how European per capita incomes and urbanization rates could surge ahead of Chinese ones. That living standards could exceed subsistence levels at all in a Malthusian setting should be surprising. Rising fertility and falling mortality ought to have reversed any gains. We show that productivity growth in Europe can only explain a small fraction of rising living standards. Population dynamics - changes of the birth and death schedules - were far more important drivers of the longrun Malthusian equilibrium. The Black Death raised wages substantially, creating important knock-on effects. Because of Engel's Law, demand for urban products increased, raising urban wages and attracting migrants from rural areas. European cities were unhealthy, especially compared to Far Eastern ones. Urbanization pushed up aggregate death rates. This effect was reinforced by more frequent wars (fed by city wealth) and disease spread by trade. Thus, higher wages themselves reduced population pressure. Without technological change, our model can account for the sharp rise in European urbanization as well as permanently higher per capita incomes. We complement our calibration exercise with a detailed analysis of intra-European growth in the early modern period. Using a panel of European states in the period 1300-1700, we show that war frequency can explain a good share of the divergent fortunes within Europe.

Growing at the production frontier. European aggregate growth, 1870-1914

The view of a 1870-1913 expanding European economy providing increasing welfare to everybody has been challenged by many, then and now. We focus on the amazing growth that was experienced, its diffusion and its sources, in the context of the permanent competition among European nation states. During 1870-193 the globalized European economy reached a silver age . GDP growth was quite rapid (2.15% per annum) and diffused all over Europe. Even discounting the high rates of population growth (1.06%), per capita growth was left at a respectable 1.08%. Income per capita was rising in every country, and the rates of improvement were quite similar. This was a major achievement after two generations of highly localized growth, both geographically and socially. Growth was based on the increased use of labour and capital, but a good part of growth (73 per cent for the weighted average of the best documented European countries) came out of total factor productivity efficiency gains resulting from not well specified ultimate sources of growth. This proportion suggests that the European economy was growing at full capacity at its production frontier. It would have been very difficult to improve its performance. Within Europe, convergence was limited, and it only was in motion after 1900. What happened was more the end of the era of big divergence rather than an era of convergence.

Economic growth with bubbles

We develop a stylized model of economic growth with bubbles. In this model, changes in investorsentiment lead to the appearance and collapse of macroeconomic bubbles or pyramid schemes.We show how these bubbles mitigate the effects of financial frictions. During bubbly episodes,unproductive investors demand bubbles while productive investors supply them. These transfersof resources improve the efficiency at which the economy operates, expanding consumption, thecapital stock and output. When bubbly episodes end, these transfers stop and consumption, thecapital stock and output contract. We characterize the stochastic equilibria of the model and arguethat they provide a natural way of introducing bubble shocks into business cycle models.

Capital, wages and growth: Theory and evidence

Returns to scale to capital and the strength of capital externalities play a key role for the empirical predictions and policy implications of different growth theories. We show that both can be identified with individual wage data and implement our approach at the city-level using US Census data on individuals in 173 cities for 1970, 1980, and 1990. Estimation takes into account fixed effects, endogeneity of capital accumulation, and measurement error. We find no evidence for human or physical capital externalities and decreasing aggregate returns to capital. Returns to scale to physical and human capital are around 80 percent. We also find strong complementarities between human capital and labor and substantial total employment externalities.

A global view of economic growth

This paper integrates in a unified and tractable framework some of the key insights of the field of international trade and economic growth. It examines a sequence of theoretical models that share a common description of technology and preferences but differ on their assumptions about trade frictions. By comparing the predictions of these models against each other, it is possible to identify a variety of channels through which trade affects the evolution of world income and its geographical distribution. By comparing the predictions of these models against the data, it is also possible to construct coherent explanations of income differences and long-run trends in economic growth.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.

High-growth cooperatives: Financial profile and key factors for competitiveness

Given the current economic environment, high-growth companies are particularly relevant for their contribution to employment generation and wealth.This paper discusses the results of a survey that was conducted in order to gain a deeper understanding of high-growth cooperatives through analyzing their financial profiles and then identifying key contributing factors to their growth. To do this, we compared this particular sample with other cooperatives and other high-growth mercantile companies.The results show the main drivers related to high-growth companies success. They are the competitive advantages based on the surveyed group, modern management techniques, quality and productivity, innovation and internationalization. Additionally, we have observed some financial strengths and weaknesses. In this sense, they are under capitalized companies with an unbalanced growth.

One person in the battlefield is not a warrior: Self-construal, perceived ability to make a difference, and socially responsible behavior

We suggest that cultivating an individual's connectedness to others promotes sociallyresponsible behavior both directly and indirectly through increased perceived abilityto make a difference. Individuals whose interdependent self is more prominent feel theyhave more of an impact on larger scale societal outcomes and, therefore, engage more insocially responsible behaviors than do individuals whose independent self is moreprominent. We test these hypotheses in two experiments in which participants makefinancial contributions or exert an effort for a social cause. In a survey, we find thatperceived effectiveness mediates the effect of self-construal on socially responsibleconsumption.

Productivity and the welfare of nations

We show that the welfare of a representative consumer can be related to observable aggregatedata. To a first order, the change in welfare is summarized by (the present value of) the Solowproductivity residual and by the growth rate of the capital stock per capita. We also show thatproductivity and the capital stock suffice to calculate differences in welfare across countries, withboth variables computed as log level deviations from a reference country. These results hold forarbitrary production technology, regardless of the degree of product market competition, and applyto open economies as well if TFP is constructed using absorption rather than GDP as the measureof output. They require that TFP be constructed using prices and quantities as perceived byconsumers. Thus, factor shares need to be calculated using after-tax wages and rental rates, andwill typically sum to less than one. We apply these results to calculate welfare gaps and growthrates in a sample of developed countries for which high-quality TFP and capital data are available.We find that under realistic scenarios the United Kingdom and Spain had the highest growth ratesof welfare over our sample period of 1985-2005, but the United States had the highest level ofwelfare.